

Spotlight on Sustainable Development

Report by the Reflection Group
on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

2016



Spotlight on Sustainable Development 2016

Report by the Reflection Group on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

with contributions from



Table of contents

Overview

- | | | |
|-----|--|----|
| 1.1 | The 2030 Agenda – a new start towards global sustainability? | 11 |
| | By Jens Martens on behalf of the Reflection Group on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development | |
| 1.2 | Reports from the bottom up: “The road is hazy and full of obstacles” | 16 |
| | By Roberto Bissio, Social Watch | |

Spotlights on the SDGs

- | | | |
|-----|--|----|
| 2.1 | The new goal on poverty: A welcome paradigm shift | 27 |
| | By Roberto Bissio, Social Watch | |
| 2.2 | Towards the transformation of our agricultural and food systems | 33 |
| | By Lim Li Ching, Third World Network | |
| 2.3 | The “Health SDG”: Some progress, but critical concerns remain | 39 |
| | By Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) | |
| 2.4 | Access to quality education, the new paradigm | 44 |
| | By Jorge Osorio-Vargas, Professor at the Escuela de Psicología, Universidad de Valparaíso (Chile) | |
| 2.5 | Overcoming Global Structural Obstacles and Preventing Negative Spill-over Effects for Realizing Women’s Human Rights | 49 |
| | By Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) | |
| 2.6 | Whose rights to water will the 2030 Agenda promote? | 54 |
| | By Meera Karunanathan, Council of Canadians, in collaboration with Devin Tellatin and the NGO Mining Working Group | |
| 2.7 | Energy at a crossroad | 60 |
| | By Niclas Hällström, What Next Forum | |
| 2.8 | Decent work for all by 2030: taking on the private sector | 68 |
| | By Matt Simonds with substantial inputs from Paola Simonetti, Yorgos Altintzis, and Theo Morrissey, ITUC | |
| 2.9 | Industrialization, infrastructure and clean technology: at the heart of structural transformation but blocked by binding constraints in the international free trade regime | 73 |
| | By Bhumika Muchhala, Third World Network | |

Table of contents

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---|------------|
| 2.10 | Will inequality get left behind in the 2030 Agenda? | 80 |
| | By Kate Donald, Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) | |
| 2.11 | Towards a New Urban Agenda | 87 |
| | By Sandra Vermuyten, Public Services International | |
| 2.12 | Corporate capture subverts production and consumption transformation | 94 |
| | By Chee Yoke Ling, Third World Network | |
| 2.13 | The climate change battle in Paris: putting equity into action | 101 |
| | By Meenakshi Raman and Chee Yoke Ling, Third World Network | |
| 2.14 | Policy choices for helping or hindering the poor | 110 |
| | By Christine von Weizsäcker, Ecoropa | |
| 2.15 | “There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development” | 115 |
| | By Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War | |
| 2.16 | Beyond the current means of implementation | 122 |
| | By Stefano Prato, Society for International Development | |
| 2.17 | International Trade and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development | 130 |
| | By Ranja Sengupta, Third World Network | |
| Measures and indicators | | |
| 3.1 | Measuring Accountability: The politics of indicators | 141 |
| | By Barbara Adams, Roberto Bissio and Karen Judd | |
| 3.2 | Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard | 148 |
| | By Roberto Bissio, Social Watch | |
| Abbreviations | | 186 |

Figures

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 2.7.1 | 61 |
| The correlation between energy use and human well-being | |
| Figure 2.7.2 | 63 |
| From conventional centralized to smart, distributed renewable, people-centered energy models | |
| Figure 2.14.1 | 111 |
| Neither the State nor the formal Market but Ecosystems provide for the livelihoods of the Poor | |
| Figure 3.2.1 | 151 |
| Basic capabilities increase with more money... up to a point | |
| Figure 3.2.2 | 152 |
| Income and gender equity do not correlate completely | |
| Figure 3.2.3 | 153 |
| The equitable share of the climate bill | |
| Figure 3.2.4 | 155 |
| The Kuznets curve | |
| Figure 3.2.5 | 155 |
| Palma Ratio does not follow the Kuznets curve | |
| Figure 3.2.6 | 160 |
| “Social intensity of carbon” | |

Boxes

| | |
|---|-----|
| The Sustainable Development Goals | 13 |
| Leaving no one behind calls for far-reaching changes in the way development agencies operate | 29 |
| By Xavier Godinot, International Movement ATD Fourth World | |
| Stop funding for-profit private schools | 47 |
| The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative | 65 |
| “Leave No One Behind” | 82 |
| Tinkering with “sustainable or eco tourism” hides the real face of tourism | 96 |
| By Anita Pleumarom (Tourism Investigation and Monitoring Team) and Chee Yoke Ling (Third World Network) | |
| Civil Society Review of INDCs | 102 |
| Implementation of SDG 16 vital for the Middle East and North Africa | 116 |
| By Ziad Abdel Samad, Arab NGO Network for Development | |
| Domestic Resource Mobilization and Illicit Financial Flows | 124 |
| By Dereje Alemayehu, Global Alliance for Tax Justice | |

Table of contents

| | |
|---|------------|
| Multi-stakeholder STI Mechanisms at the UN: Fad or Trap? | 127 |
| By Neth Daño, ETC Group | |
| TTIP – a threat for the 2030 Agenda | 138 |
| By Hubert René Schillinger, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Geneva | |
| Beyond GDP in Italy | 144 |

Tables

| | |
|---|------------|
| Table 3.2.1 | 157 |
| The Top 10 in the Global Militarization Index | |
| Table 3.2.2 | 157 |
| Intentional homicides per 100,000 persons and Palma ratio (select countries) | |
| Table 3.2.3 | 158 |
| Financial Secrecy Index 2015 – Top 10 | |
| Table 3.2.4 | 162 |
| Basic Capabilities Index, GDP per capita and Human Development Index | |
| Table 3.2.5 | 166 |
| The Gender Equity Index – Richer doesn't make women more equal, economic and political empowerment does | |
| Table 3.2.6 | 170 |
| The Social Protection Floor Index | |
| Table 3.2.7 | 172 |
| The equitable share of the climate bill | |
| Table 3.2.8 | 175 |
| The Palma Ratio | |
| Table 3.2.9 | 176 |
| Index on Militarization | |
| Table 3.2.10 | 178 |
| Financial Secrecy Index – 2015 Results | |
| Table 3.2.11 | 181 |
| The “Social Intensity of Carbon” | |

The online version of this report, available at www.socialwatch.org, includes civil society contributions from: Afghanistan, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, United States, Venezuela, and Yemen.

1

Overview

The 2030 Agenda – a new start towards global sustainability?

BY JENS MARTENS ON BEHALF OF THE REFLECTION GROUP ON THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Barbara Adams (Global Policy Forum), Gita Sen (DAWN), Hubert Schillinger (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Nicole Bidegain (DAWN), Thomas Mättig (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Roberto Bissio (Social Watch), Wolfgang Obenland (Global Policy Forum), Chee Yoke Ling (Third World Network), and Ziad Abdel Samad (ANND) contributed to this article.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted unanimously at the United Nations by world Heads of States and Governments in September 2015 is highly ambitious. If taken seriously it has the potential to change the prevailing development paradigm by re-emphasizing the multidimensional and interrelated nature of sustainable development and its universal applicability.

A window of opportunities

The 2030 Agenda offers the opportunity to correct the errors and omissions of the ‘MDG approach’ – an approach that has reduced the development discourse to a focus on the symptoms of extreme poverty and the provision of basic social services in poor countries. While – without doubt – these issues are extremely important, the MDG approach failed to address adequately the structural flaws of the global economic and financial systems, the imperative of ecological sustainability and the responsibilities of the global North.

The 2030 Agenda offers the opportunity to respond in an integrated manner to urgent global problems, such as accelerating global warming and growing inequalities. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) contained in the 2030 Agenda incorporate a commitment to reduce inequalities within and among countries, a clear demand for sustainable consumption and production patterns and the aspiration for peace, fair governance and justice.

The 2030 Agenda is universal, not just because the SDGs are global in scope, but also because all coun-

tries have to do something to achieve them. No country can deem itself to be sustainably developed and having already done its part to meet the SDGs. The 2030 Agenda offers the opportunity to challenge the idea that development is a phenomenon that occurs only in countries of the global South while the North is already ‘developed’.

Obstacles and contradictions remain

However, the 2030 Agenda is not free of contradictions and fails to adequately address a number of goals and targets, particularly when it comes to their means of implementation. The 2030 Agenda represents a compromise among 193 governments and is far from perfect. But for the first time in an intergovernmental document, it acknowledges the “enormous disparities of opportunity, wealth and power”¹ as immense challenges to sustainable development.

Disparities and inequalities also have detrimental human rights effects. Even the IMF recently confirmed that income inequality is, for example, highly correlated with gender inequality.² Therefore, overcoming gender inequality requires, *inter alia*, challenging economic policies and institutions that have entrenched social inequalities and undermined the capacity of states to meet their commitments to women’s rights.

¹ United Nations (2015), para. 14.

² Cf. Gonzales et al. (2015).

But there are further severe obstacles to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and overcoming them is a prerequisite for achieving the SDGs and fulfilling the commitments made to human rights and sustainability:

For too long, economic policies have been shaped by acceptance of neoliberal policies “without alternatives”. But taking the title of the 2030 Agenda, “Transforming our World”, seriously implies that its implementation should lead to structural transformations instead of being led by the interests and advice of those governments, elite class sectors, corporate interest groups and institutions which have taken us down paths that are unsustainable and continue to create global obstacles to the implementation of the agenda.

Thus, it is irritating that the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) as coordinator of the Global Business Alliance for 2030 (an umbrella group of major global industry associations and business organizations) can claim to play a key role in implementing the 2030 Agenda, offering “comprehensive engagement with the full diversity of business expertise.”³

Corporate lobby groups such as the ICC have been advocating for exactly those trade, investment and financial rules that have destabilized the global economy and exacerbated inequalities in both the global North and the global South.

Furthermore, a plethora of bilateral investment treaties as well as a new generation of free trade agreements in conjunction with the multilateral Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have not only reduced the policy space of governments to implement sound social, environmental and developmental policies but in numerous instances seriously undermined existing social, environmental and human rights standards. These and other domestic policies in the spirit

of the dominant neoliberal paradigm have further strengthened the power of investors and big corporations and, by the same token, weakened the role of the state and its ability to promote human rights and sustainability. The 2030 Agenda does not provide an adequate response to these challenges.

In the name of “international competitiveness” countries continue to compete in a race to the bottom, offering lower taxes and cheaper labour so as to attract investments. Tax havens allow for tax evasion. The leak of the “Panama Papers” published in 2016 illustrated how wealthy individuals are using a global net of secretive offshore companies to hide financial assets, and to avoid or evade tax payments. So too did the “Luxleaks” scandal in 2014 uncovering corporate tax evasion on an “industrial scale”, as well as the Mbeki Report of 2015 on illicit financial outflows from Africa, conservatively estimated at US\$ 60 billion a year and predominantly business-related through trade mispricing or abusive transfer-pricing by multinational corporations. These practices seriously undermine the ability of states to finance and implement the 2030 Agenda.

Finally, the obsession with growth, backed up by the dominant economic regime, provides the drive to exploit nature, relies on fossil fuels and depletes biodiversity, undermining the provision of essential services.

The decision in the 2030 Agenda (SDG Target 8.4) to improve progressively global resource efficiency and to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, is a necessary, but by no means sufficient response to the transgression of the planetary boundaries. Here, as in other areas a combination of low levels of ambition, inadequate and contradictory goals, targets and indicators makes it impossible to stop or reverse the damage done to the global environment and scale down human demands on the earth’s ecosystem. This lack of a serious political agenda presents a virtually insurmountable impediment to the realization of the 2030 Agenda.

Without addressing the structural obstacles and in-built contradictions it will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve the SDGs by 2030.

3 Cf. www.sdgfund.org/getting-architecture-right-attracting-business-expertise-and-action-sustainable-development-road and www.gbafor2030.org/.

Worsened global political and economic environment

Indeed, in the first year of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda it seems that the global political and economic environment for its implementation has become even worse.

Negotiations on multilateral trade and investment agreements are well underway, with the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) signed on 4 February 2016 in

Auckland, New Zealand, and awaiting only ratification and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union and the United States to be finalized by the end of 2016. In their current form these agreements could seriously undermine important goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda. These agreements regard social, environmental and human rights standards as potential non-tariff barriers to trade and investment, which have to be 'harmonized' or removed.

The Sustainable Development Goals

- I **Goal 1.** End poverty in all its forms everywhere
- I **Goal 2.** End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
- I **Goal 3.** Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
- I **Goal 4.** Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
- I **Goal 5.** Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
- I **Goal 6.** Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
- I **Goal 7.** Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
- I **Goal 8.** Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
- I **Goal 9.** Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
- I **Goal 10.** Reduce inequality within and among countries
- I **Goal 11.** Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
- I **Goal 12.** Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
- I **Goal 13.** Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*
- I **Goal 14.** Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
- I **Goal 15.** Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
- I **Goal 16.** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
- I **Goal 17.** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development

*Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

The investor-state dispute settlement system, even if relabeled as an investment court system, gives foreign investors the power to effectively undermine regulations, such as those designed to protect public health or to reduce carbon emissions, by suing governments for lost future profits even if it goes against the rulings of domestic courts of law, or even national constitutions.

While the United States and the European Union follow a strict liberalization agenda with regard to the free flow of goods and services, many of their leading politicians have successfully pressed countries to build new border fences to keep out people, be it migrants or refugees. Governments committed in Target 10.7 of the SDGs to facilitate orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people, but, so far, the European Union has failed to adopt, let alone implement well-planned and managed migration policies based on the principle of solidarity and has failed to prevent the death of thousands of refugees in the Mediterranean.

The current ‘refugee crisis’ is not a kind of natural disaster but has very concrete internal and external causes. These range from corruption, clientelism, nepotism, and policies of discrimination and exclusion in countries of origin, to the devastating external effects of climate change and the economic and agricultural policies of rich countries. If governments do not address these issues adequately in their implementation strategies for the 2030 Agenda, global inequalities will increase further, with seriously detrimental impacts on global peace and stability.

The increasing global concentration of corporate power will exacerbate all of these trends if governments continue to regard such power as inevitable. In 2015 the merger and acquisition activities of transnational corporations reached an all-time high. The merger of Heinz and Kraft formed the world’s fifth largest food and beverage company; Anheuser-Busch InBev took over SABMiller in a deal that combines the world’s two largest beer makers; US chemical giants Dow Chemical and DuPont announced plans to merge by the end of 2016; and in May 2016, the German pharma and chemical company Bayer offered

to acquire Monsanto, creating the world’s largest producer of chemicals and seeds with an estimated global market share of 30 percent.

These and many more mega-deals have been supported or even initiated by a small group of corporate ‘control-holders’, particularly transnational banks and investment funds, with no effective government opposition. The resulting concentration of economic power distorts the functioning of financial and labor markets and undermines democratic decision-making processes, threatening the ability to implement the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs and rendering some of them (such as SDG 2 on food and agriculture, SDG 3 on health and SDG 12 on sustainable consumption and production) essentially meaningless.

But there are positive signals

Despite these numerous alarming trends there are also some positive signals. In many countries discussions and consultations have started about how to use the 2030 Agenda as a reference framework for shaping national policies and adapt it to specific national realities. A total of 22 countries, from the global North as well as South, have agreed to conduct national reviews and to present their national strategies for implementing the 2030 Agenda at the UN High Level Political Forum in New York in July.⁴

Even the G20 under the Chinese presidency made the implementation of the 2030 Agenda to one of its key agenda items. In his message on the G20 presidency, Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested that all G20 members develop national plans for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, “based on which a G20 collective action plan could be collated.”⁵ However, this must not undermine the UN and its High-Level Political Forum as core institution in the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda.

Also positive is the fact that civil society organizations and networks have started to create cross-

⁴ Cf. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf>.

⁵ Cf. www.g20.org/English/China2016/G202016/201512/P020151210392071823168.pdf, p. 13.

toral alliances at national and international level, bringing together a broad range of environment, development and human rights groups as well as trade unions and social justice organizations.

Even at local level, citizen groups and local authorities have started consultations on sustainability goals and strategies for their cities and communities. These discussion processes are much more than just a ‘trickle down effect’ of the SDG process at global level. Social change cannot be decreed top-down either by governments or by the UN. The critical engagement of civil society groups and the broader public will be essential for triggering the necessary change towards global sustainability.

Independent monitoring and review indispensable

The political success of the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs will depend on the adoption of appropriate strategies and policies, available resources and other means of implementation. Accountability mechanisms are important tools for strengthening political commitment and effectiveness. Thus the successful process relies a lot on the effective monitoring of progress or regressive developments in achieving the goals.

The 2030 Agenda includes a special chapter on “follow-up and review” at national, regional and global levels. Governments agreed only to the voluntary sharing of experiences and peer learning and failed to introduce an effective intergovernmental monitoring mechanism, building, for instance, on the experience of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the human rights field.

It is important to ensure that the monitoring and review process, like the implementation strategies themselves, not be dominated by the rich and powerful, including both countries and multinational corporations. In this regard, it is particularly worrying that in some cases not only the implementation of certain goals and targets but also their monitoring is being outsourced to “partnerships” involving funders, corporations, foundations and civil society organizations. This self-monitoring undermines independent and objective assessment.

These developments underline the need for strong independent monitoring efforts on the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs. However, monitoring and review should not be reduced to the implementation of the SDGs and their related targets, often measured by inadequate indicators. Previous experience clearly shows that monitoring of outputs or outcomes alone is by no means sufficient. Rather, policies and policy changes (and not just outcomes) in the follow-up of the 2030 Agenda should be scrutinized. These analyses are by their very nature qualitative rather than purely quantitative.

Civil society organizations have to play a key role as independent watchdogs to monitor the (positive or negative) contributions by governments, international organizations, International Financial Institutions and Multilateral Development Banks as well as transnational corporations to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

This *Spotlight Report 2016* produced by an international alliance of CSOs and networks, intends to contribute to this objective. It analyses and assesses the extent to which policies are framed by the ambitious principles of the 2030 Agenda, particularly the human rights framework. It highlights particularly the role of the rich and powerful actors in the global system, based on their economic influence and political weight in international decision-making. However, it is impossible to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the political implementation of the 2030 Agenda less than a year after its adoption. As implementation of the 2030 Agenda gets further underway, these Spotlight reports will be issued regularly.

References

- Gonzales, Christian et al. (2015): Catalyst for Change: Empowering Women and Tackling Income Inequality. Washington, D.C.: IMF (IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/15/20, October 2015). www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43346
- United Nations (2015): Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York (UN Doc. A/RES/70/1). <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>

Reports from the bottom up: “The road is hazy and full of obstacles”

BY ROBERTO BISSIO, SOCIAL WATCH

When asked about how countries are implementing the 2030 Agenda and the obstacles encountered, civil society groups and coalitions affiliated with Social Watch around the world generally agree that their governments recognize the political weight of the new international consensus. The report from Cyprus (authored by the research and development center CARDET) is the only one identifying the non-binding nature of the agreement as a potential excuse for “a long established government inertia.”¹ Many other difficulties of different nature are identified in different countries, but it is also clear that most governments feel that the 2030 Agenda cannot be ignored and citizens are organizing in new ways to demand accountability towards the promises made.

Growth or the Planet?

“With reference to the 2030 Agenda, there are progress and setbacks,” writes Héctor Béjar on behalf of the Social Watch coalition in Peru. “GDP grew, but inequality grew as well. The mafias that exploit drug trafficking, illegal mining and smuggling continued to concentrate wealth, which then left the country through profits of foreign companies that enjoy lower taxes than national companies. Monetary poverty of less than US\$ 1.25 a day has declined, but multidimensional poverty has risen to critical levels. Maternal and infant mortality were reduced, but the anemia of women and children, unwanted and premature adolescent pregnancies and deaths from abortion and postpartum hemorrhage have remained.”

The growth vs. the planet dilemma is true in Peru as in many other countries: Since the start of this century, Peru has experienced sustained economic growth

Every year groups and coalitions affiliated to the global Social Watch network report on their countries’ progress or regression towards the internationally agreed development goals. As the new 2030 Agenda starts being implemented, many UN member states are still trying to figure out what this new global consensus means for them and how to rebalance among different demands and priorities. In that process, the voices of citizens need to be heard. The country reports 2016 are available at www.socialwatch.org

due to rising prices of gold, copper and other products exported by transnational companies operating in the country. GDP growth has been achieved at a high environmental cost and with a strong social polarization between, on the one hand, the mining, fishing and logging companies (virtually the entire territory is given in concession to extractive industries) and, on the other, local populations. As a result, Peru is on the list of the ten countries with the most environmental conflicts in the world.

A very similar situation is reported by Pakorn Lertsatienchai, Ranee Hassarungsee, Taticarn Dechamong and Pattraporn Chuenglertsiri from the Social Watch coalition in Thailand: “In the interests of development, local resources are extracted and exploited in many ways, including petroleum extraction facilities, deforestation, large-scale land purchasing, water management, and even tourism. Around the Thai Gulf development plans include construction of industrial estates, deep-water ports, several nuclear and coal power plants, steel manufacture and other factories. People in the study area angrily expressed that, ‘fending for ourselves and families is hard enough, but we still have to fight capitalists, authorities and the state that supports the capitalists.’”

¹ For the full text of the country reports quoted in this article as well as the complete identification of their authors and associated institutions, see www.socialwatch.org.

In Hungary, this contradiction between economic growth and sustainable development is recognized by the new National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development (NFSSD) 2012–2024, issued in 2013. This strategy has adopted the term “good life”, first coined in Latin America as “buen vivir” and promotes the “decoupling” of economic growth and environmental destruction. However, Matyas Benyik from ATTAC Hungary comments that it has so far not led to a reduction of the global environmental load in absolute terms (about 90% of Hungary’s natural ecosystem diversity has already been lost) and socially it faces the problem of a rapidly shrinking population, with increasing poverty and social exclusion, that in turn relates to poor health and education services.

Money flows up, not down

At the other extreme, population growth is a big problem for Jordan, where the high fertility rate (population grew by 3.86% in 2014) and the influx of one million Syrian refugees are increasing deterioration in the quality and quantity of the poorly managed water resources of one of the world’s most water-starved countries. Nevertheless, Ahmad Awad from the Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, identifies “lack of good governance” as the main obstacle to achieving the SDGs in Jordan. “Political participation, freedom of the press, the status of women, and the role of civil society still constitute outstanding challenges.”

However, in Bangladesh, the report (prepared by EquityBD with the contribution of Synergy Bangladesh and Unnayan Shamannay) states that “since the 1990s, when democracy was reinstated and some major economic reforms were made, the economy has experienced impressive growth, and the country has made praiseworthy progress in education, health and gender equity.” The 1991–92 poverty rate of 56.7 percent was reduced to 31.5 percent in 2010. But this is still a very high number and with a national budget deficit of 5 percent of GDP it cannot be eradicated in fifteen years without international support. In terms of climate change alone, in 2011 it was estimated that the direct annual cost to Bangladesh for natural disasters over the previous 10 years was between 0.5 and 1 percent of GDP –plus another US\$ 5.7 billion in

adaptation costs, owing to increased risks of cyclones and inland monsoon floods by 2050.

Bearing almost no, or very minimum responsibility for global warming or climate change, Bangladesh is one of the most affected countries from this phenomenon. It is obvious to Bangladeshis that “funds should come from the countries which are historically responsible for the impact of climate change, along with needed technology and capacity building support.” But this has not happened. Bangladesh needed foreign assistance of at least US\$ 3 billion per year, but from 1990–91 to 2013–14 it only received on average US\$ 1.74 billion per year in ODA.

In addition, Bangladesh also experiences high levels of Illicit Finance Flows (IFFs) to other, mainly developed, countries. It is estimated that in 2013, IFFs reached about 7 percent of GDP, a sum 11 times greater than the foreign assistance received that year. The Central Bank of Switzerland observed that while overall, illicit financial flows to Switzerland are declining, at the same time they are skyrocketing out of Bangladesh.

Malta is one of the tax heavens channeling illicit flows out of poor or impoverished countries, ranking 27th in the list of countries listed as tax havens in 2015 by the Financial Secrecy Index. J. M. Sammut, from the Maltese NGO Kopin condemns tax evasion and money laundering as “two major causes of global poverty and injustice”. Recently, Malta was linked to corruption scandals “exposing the use of Malta as a tax haven for companies which are not paying any tax money in countries that have high poverty and inequality rates, such as Angola and Brazil. These companies are legally allowed to avoid paying any tax in their homeland, whilst paying a small percentage to a developed country, in this case, Malta.” Since the principle of redistributive taxation has an important role to play in sharing the common good and building equitable and just societies, the Maltese call on their Government, as part of the 2030 Agenda strategy, “to do their utmost to highly penalize tax evaders.”

Switzerland ranks first in the global Financial Secrecy Index computed by the Tax Justice Network and the Swiss Social Watch report, prepared by Eva

Schmassmann and Jürg Staudenmann, on behalf of the NGO coalition Alliance Sud argues that “there is no Swiss strategy to stop the outflow of tax money out of developing countries. (...) Swiss banks held 2,300 billion Swiss francs in foreign deposits and a tax haven Switzerland hosts the headquarters of hundreds of transnational corporations and is responsible for the outflow of private fortunes from developing countries as well as the transfer of corporate profits made in Southern countries. Swiss tax and financial policies facilitate a global race to the bottom, further reducing global corporate taxation and forcing many states to cut their budgets even more.” Alliance Sud concludes that Switzerland’s business model will continue to contradict the goals of the 2030 Agenda so long as “only the minimum OECD and G20 tax transparency requirements are applied”, arguing that the country should “proactively promote tax transparency in financial accounting as well as corporate reporting, both of which should also benefit developing countries.”

The issue of tax havens and IFFs appears often in this year’s country reports. For example, Social Watch Philippines writes that “corporations rule Philippine development, aided by government policies and public-private partnerships (PPPs).” Corporations control the commanding heights “surrendered by the government” in areas such as land, water, electricity, transportation and communication, banking and finance, media, schools, hospitals, sports and entertainment. They run an economy powered by fossil fuels. They take the lion’s share of wealth and income of the nation. They are beneficiaries of tax incentives and may also be responsible for illicit financial flows which run into billions of forgone revenues.

In Argentina, newly elected President Mauricio Macri started at the end of 2015 with drastic changes in economic policies, including a permanent cut in export taxes that economists Joseph Stiglitz and Martin Guzman called “a large transfer to the wealthy, at great cost to ordinary workers. Whatever the efficiency

benefits, the distributive consequences and development implications cannot be ignored.”²

These changes, according to the Argentinian Social Watch report, authored by Valeria Chorny, Bárbara García and Vilma Paura from FOCO and Luna Miguens, Leandro Vera Belli, Santiago Sánchez and Eduardo Reese from CELS, include “the devaluation of the peso of almost 60 percent, the reduction or elimination of export taxes and the elimination of controls and the reduction of taxes on luxury goods. The result was a surge in inflation and a massive transfer of resources to the powerful. Further, the liberalization of imports, the reduction of credits to small and middle enterprises and the rise in interest rates (to slow down the increase in the value of the dollar) are a main obstacle to the medium and small scale production system that creates the most jobs.”

Scandals and more scandals

In Guatemala in 2015 hundreds of thousands of peaceful demonstrators forced the resignation of the president, general Otto Pérez Molina and the vice-president, Roxana Baldetti, accused of having organized a corruption network at the highest level. “It was a victory for mobilized civil society, made possible by the action of national prosecutors and the support of the international community through the “International Commission against Impunity”, an ad hoc body of the United Nations in Guatemala to strengthen the justice system and fight the parallel bodies and underground machinery imbedded in the State” report Helmer Velasquez and Arlyn Jimenez from Congcoop.

“The social task of reforming the State is only starting and it will be a long process to strengthen public institutions and at the same time find solutions to the centuries old deprivation of the majority indigenous populations,” comments the Guatemalan Social Watch coalition.

2 Stiglitz, Joseph/Guzman, Martin (2016): Argentina’s Uncertain Prospects. Project Syndicate 29 January 2016 (www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/macri-argentina-economic-uncertainty-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-and-martin-guzman-2016-01).

This process has been inspiring for the Central American region and in neighbouring Honduras a new social movement has emerged, brought together by the fight against corruption. The movement is formed by different social organizations at the margin of political parties and institutionalized civil society, and several demonstrations of the “indignados” (outraged) demanded the creation of an internationally supported investigation commission similar to the one in Guatemala.

Suyapa Martinez, from the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer details in the Social Watch report the need for improved social auditing in Honduras: Last year women’s advocacy succeeded in including in the budget articles aimed at earmarking for gender-specific budget items. But those articles have not been implemented. Similarly, although laws were passed to institute Credimujer, a loans programme for rural women, no budget has been approved to make it happen. The law requires that 5 percent of the transfers to municipalities should be spent in programmes and projects aimed at women, but those resources have been channeled instead to the “better life” programme of the First Lady.

Globally, the “Panama Papers” brought the issue of corruption, tax avoidance and money laundering to the forefront of international attention, but outrage does not always lead to action. In the Czech Republic, for example, it has been reported that “the Government welcomes the reform of the global tax rules and standards that significantly affect the ability of governments to collect taxes and will prevent the utilitarian transfer of profits to countries with more favourable taxes”.

But the national Social Watch report, edited by Tomáš Tožička, argues that although the Czech Government agrees with the involvement of developing countries in negotiations on tax issues, it “does not support the efforts to promote and extend the current mandate of the UN Committee of Tax Experts” to create an intergovernmental authority for tax issues. Although the Ministry of Finance supports the adoption of the automatic exchange of information “with as many jurisdictions as possible”, the inclusion of developing countries has not been explicitly mentioned.

And while the fight against tax evasion is one of the priorities of the Government, little attention is paid to the avoidance of tax obligations on the part of large corporations.

“One of the first challenges for effective implementation of actions to meet the SDGs is to secure ongoing State funding, which requires a fair tax reform that makes it possible to implement needed social programmes,” argues the report from El Salvador. Over the last three years, civil society organizations in El Salvador have promoted the need for tax justice through proposals to curtail tax evasion, which in 2013 was estimated at 28 percent of all taxes due.

While some countries suffer from massive tax evasion, others just do not bother to levy significant taxes. In Guatemala, for example, total government revenues, at 11 percent of GDP, are one of the lowest in the region. The situation is aggravated by legal mechanisms that grant privileges and tax exemptions, as well as by a parallel financial system that makes tax fraud and tax evasion easy. The resulting budget deficit has to be covered through indebtedness. Social expenditures are a low priority and while small farmers receive a mere US\$ 141.49 per capita per year in total assistance, over 9 percent of the budget is directed towards the police and the military.

In Paraguay, Verónica Serafini Geoghegan from Decidamos, reports that poor revenue is the result of an implicit and at times explicit deal, where the rights of citizens (to health, education, housing, security, etc.) are never met and the struggle against inequalities, corruption and massive prevalence of poverty is made impossible. Again, debt is the mechanism to fund infrastructure. Roads are built that mainly benefit large agriculture exporters. When the World Bank and the IMF warn about the unsustainability of that debt, PPPs are introduced as a solution. The problem with PPPs, argues the report from Paraguay, is that they end up generating liabilities for the State that were not approved in any budget law. “PPPs lack transparency and the governmental guarantees for private projects are never properly registered or accounted for, all of which can only increase inequalities in the future.”

Inequalities

Inequalities, frequently associated with unfair tax systems and other structural asymmetries in power and access to resources is an obstacle identified by many country reports. Even in Finland, which is listed among the countries with the best income distribution in the world, the national NGOs, grouped in KEPA, report to Social Watch that SDG 10 will be “a challenge” since “inequality in income has doubled in the last 10 years.” As a result, “halving poverty in Finland by the year 2030 will also require strong efforts as 17 percent of the population is considered at risk of poverty and social exclusion.”

In Kenya, a post-colonial African society still faces today inequalities rooted in colonialism. The Kenyan Social Watch report by Edward Oyugi (Sodnet) and Oduor Ongwen (SEATINI) explains:

“The logic went as follows: development policy must follow the regional distribution of so-called high potential economic activities. This concentrated all development resource inputs into the green parts of the country, since agriculture continued to be the main driver of both colonial and post-colonial economies. It follows, therefore, that good roads, good and well-equipped schools, better health facilities and the whole structural weight of state-bureaucratic hegemony provided the template and rationale for unequal distribution of basic public resources and services, leading to overall unequal development and deep-seated inequalities across the board. Together, these factors account for the extraordinary levels of inequality that escapes the attention of the Washington-based multilateral institutions that regularly assess the country’s economic performance.” A similar pattern is identified in the Thai report: “Community self-reliance has decreased in rural areas, along with the loss of local resources that are the basic foundation of life and means of production. As agro-industry takes over, farmers are becoming paid labour or even contract labourers on their own land. Land resources are being excavated by mining and extractive industries by transnational corporations. People from rural areas form a large reserve body of labour, paid less than minimum wage, lacking job security, and easily replaced.”

The report continues: “Current Government development plans call for big projects to facilitate the provision of resources, fuel, energy and transportation to the industrial sector and urban areas. All of this will cause long-term degradation because of under-reproduction of labour and the environment. For labour, families do not have enough means and supports to nurture the next generation of skilled workers and knowledgeable citizens. Children are losing the ability to learn from their earliest years, therefore they have difficulties in improving their skills. With regard to the environment, extractive industry gains resources at the cost of environmental degradation and community conflict; agro-industry depletes the soil so rapidly that it cannot be restored fast enough. Small farmers reproduce a cycle of biophysical override (intensive use of chemical substances to maintain productivity) and new land clearance, leading to invasion of forest land.”

“Social relations on the path of development have become value relations,” concludes the report. “Civil-State (*Pracha-Rath*) policy ironically has built a shared agenda between Government and the industrial and corporate complex, enabling industrial and corporate interests to become the main drivers of development rather than the society and the citizen.”

In the Philippines, “the country’s economic geography illustrates highly uneven development and unequal distribution of wealth and income. Primate cities suck up most of the resources. Metro Manila, with neighbouring Central Luzon and Calabarzon, would claim from one-half to two-thirds of GDP. These regions are getting richer at the expense of regions like Bicol, Eastern Visayas, Cagayan Valley and, most especially, Mindanao. No wonder small savings deposited in faraway rural banks eventually end up in the vaults or ledgers of big banks in Metro Manila and are then lent to big borrowers who prefer to invest in already highly-developed areas.”

In Honduras, out of a total of 8 million inhabitants, 2.2 million are rural women. Two thirds of them suffer poverty and over one third live in extreme poverty due to lack access to land (only 12% have access) or to credit (only 11% receive it). Land is concentrated

in the hands of agriculture exporters while small farmers have less than two hectares to plough on average. It is not surprising that in a context of extreme inequalities Honduras also has the highest number of homicides in countries not at war, with 90 deaths for every 100 thousand inhabitants in 2014. That number fell to 68 in 2015, but this ‘success’ was mainly attributed to a new ruling that makes all records of deaths by the police confidential.

The United States is one of the most unequal countries among OECD member countries and while on the domestic front, economic growth seems to have recovered faster after the 2008 global crisis than it has in Europe, the Social Watch report warns that “95 percent of income growth since the recovery started has gone to the wealthiest 1 percent.”

Enduring disparities can be stronger when comparing across racial or gender lines. In 2013 the wealth gap between blacks and whites in the United States reached its highest point since 1989, while the wealth of white households was 13 times the median wealth of black households. Labour force participation has not increased among women in the core working age group since 2000, a situation in which the USA is alone among major advanced economies. The trend could be partially attributed to the lack of friendly policies for mothers.

Action on wage and employment policy should obviously be a key priority. There is some good news on this front: since apart from an executive order increasing the minimum wage for Federal contractors, there has been no increase in the national minimum wage. A regulation mandated in the financial reform bill passed in 2011 and challenged by the corporate sector, just entered into effect, forcing companies to disclose pay ratios between employers and workers.

While US federal fiscal policy has some progressive leanings, every state in the United States imposes higher effective tax rates on poor families than on the richest taxpayers. Some call this a strategy of pushing low-income families further into poverty and increasing the likelihood that they will need to rely on social protection programmes – which are

themselves chronically underfunded – the “soak the poor” strategy.

On the global stage, in order to live up to its responsibilities for reducing inequality among countries, the United States will definitely need to do a stronger redesign of its economic policies. The pattern of trade and investment treaties – of which the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are the latest expressions – have supported concentration of profits among a conglomerate of US-based companies that dominate branding, marketing and intellectual property design in several value chains. Weak financial regulation that allowed the socialization of losses in times of crises, while increasing the privatization of benefits in times of boom, is also a key contributor.

Violence and Conflict

Not surprisingly, ongoing conflicts are the main obstacle to sustainable development identified by civil society coalitions in Sudan, Palestine and in Afghanistan. In Sudan, the first priority in the report authored by Madani Abbas Madani and Niemat Kuku Mohamed is “Peace building, conflict resolution and transitional justice through the participation of women at the camps for internally displaced persons and women at grassroots levels in the wars affected areas.”

The Palestinian report, authored by the Social and Economic Policies Monitor (al Marsad) unequivocally states that “the occupation is the primary and absolute obstacle towards the achievement of any development or justice for the Palestinians.” Yet, Palestinian civil society is also critical of its own authorities: “On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority’s development policies still face structural problems, as they are built on the basis of growth and investment, and not on the basis of development and justice. The gender equality gap is still wide, due to laws and regulations restricting women’s ability to work outside the home. Justice in the collection of taxes and the distribution of services faces a fundamental flaw because it burdens the citizens and employees, yet favours prominent companies and investors.”

In Afghanistan, Abdul Sami Zhman from Cooperation for Peace and Development (CPD) explains that “peace and security” was added as a ninth goal to the eight MDGs “in order to recognize the critical role of peace and security in achieving the other MDGs.” Having lost over two decades to war, the government decided to modify the global timetable and benchmarks and 2020 was set for achieving its MDGs instead of 2015. In a country highly dependent on foreign assistance to deliver all of its social services, “this discrepancy between global and local timetables has created confusion and risks diverting the focus away from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

Conflicts, on the other hand, are good business for some: “Since 2001, the export of weapons and military equipment from the Czech Republic has steadily increased, reaching a record value of US\$ 487 million in 2014,” estimates the Czech report. “In addition to the sales of old inventory from the Cold War, export growth also reflects the revival of the armaments industry since the 1990s. This growth in production and export of weapons is largely due to arming undemocratic and dictatorial countries.”

In Italy the report authored by Soana Tortora, Jason Nardi and Tommaso Rondinella denounces a three-fold increase in arms exports in 2015, “reaching a record of over 8.2 billion euros in sales since World War II – even to countries at war, despite national laws that explicitly forbid it.”

Hundreds of thousands of people are risking their lives every day to escape conflict and dictatorship. This movement of people is seen as a “refugee crisis” in Europe and has had an enormous, if less publicized impact on neighbouring countries. Jordan currently hosts more than 1.3 million Syrians and the Syrian refugees’ community has been reported to constitute fully 20 percent of the population living in Jordan, to the extent that in some areas in the North of the country, Jordanians now are a local minority. This imposes “severe stress on Jordan’s economy, host communities, fiscal position and public services” that have not been compensated by an adequate increase in the support of the international community. In the report on Lebanon, the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) concludes that “despite the lack

of accurate statistical data about the Syrian refugees in Lebanon some conclusions can be predicted: the negative impact on the environment, the high degree of uncertainty and its negative impact on investment, the brain drain, the degradation of the infrastructure, the political instability, the threat on the social cohesion and the mounting xenophobia and racism tendencies, the pressure on the labor market etc. These factors should be taken into consideration while planning and adopting a comprehensive and proper response to the crisis.”

The international community, state and non-state donors and implementing agencies are not meeting pledges undertaken at international conferences. According to ANND, this is because “they distrust the integrity and the ability of Lebanese institutions to manage the situation. The political crisis in Lebanon is harming its reputation as a democracy with effective accountability mechanisms. This reality is in fact the main argument used by the international actors to bypass the national system undermining the principle of national ownership. This in turn is causing a lack of coordination and policy coherence, waste of resources and energy, lack of transparency and a limited short term impact.”

Similarly, Svetlana Aslanyan, from the Center for the Development of Civil Society, the Social Watch partner in Armenia, reports that the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh “has created uncertainty and reluctance by the international community to invest in the country. Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, over 1 million people – almost a third of its population, have left the country, primarily in search of work.”

In the Dominican Republic, hundreds of thousands of migrants have arrived from neighbouring Haiti. After a lot of tension in recent years, Ruth Paniagua, from Fundación Étnica Integral reports for Social Watch that during 2014 and 2015 the Government instituted a process of immigrant regularization, benefiting 288,000 undocumented immigrants (about 3% of the total population), which will enable them to access basic services and work regularly, thereby helping to reduce the number of people in

poverty.” In proportion to the population, this would be the equivalent of Germany regularizing over 2 million refugees, which is double the effort – in a much poorer country – than that of the European country that is hosting by far the largest number of refugees.

Who is in charge?

In their recommendations to the Mexican Government for the first year of implementation of the 2030 Agenda, civil society organizations are emphatic in their demand for participation in the discussion and design of the national implementation plan and the instruments and mechanisms for measuring, monitoring and review. They also stress that during the first year significant efforts should and can be devoted to ensure wide public dissemination and appropriation of the 2030 Agenda, which needs to be known by public servants at all levels, but also mean something to people, as expressed by the commitment to leave no one behind.

As civil society organizes to defend and promote the SDGs, frequently the first question is whom to address their views and demands. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel has publicly adopted the 2030 Agenda as her agenda, thus requiring all ministries to align their programmes to the SDGs, and a discussion was started as to how to “translate” the international goals into German realities. But this is the exception, rather than the rule.

In Spain, Pablo Martínez Osés from Colectivo La Mundial, reports that support for the 2030 Agenda is restricted to the “shrinking space of development cooperation. Neither the Foreign Ministry nor any other governmental body has taken stands or implemented actions related to the challenges of the SDGs.” The Spanish Social Watch report argues that “to support a 2030 Agenda oriented towards transformation, equity and the transition to policies that promote fairness and sustainability would be incompatible with policies aimed solely at fiscal austerity and the promotion of exports.”

In Canada the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives reports that “the newly-elected federal Liberal

Government has committed to working towards achieving the goals set out in the 2030 agenda ‘both at home and abroad.’ However, this Government inherits a country that has been profoundly shaped by the conservative economic and social policies of the past decade. It will have to overcome the challenges posed by a much-diminished federal government, social and income inequality, and an economy based on growing wealth rather than wages in order to deliver on its commitment to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.”

In Cyprus, public figures have been vocal about their commitment to the 2030 Agenda and the narrative put forth is that there is the political will to adopt them and make a real impact. In practice, however, the Department for the Environment of the Ministry of Agriculture has become the focal point for the SDGs. CARDET reports that “there is no task force to help with an interdepartmental coordination between ministries and jurisdictions, providing a coherent strategy for achieving the targets or even declaring if it would focus its efforts locally or internationally, make a consultation with the civil society (CSO) community or even put out a number of best practices for each ministry to follow as general principles. Furthermore, the same ministry (Agriculture) has shortly after the declarations took some hotly contested decisions about demarking part of national parks for tourism development, providing licenses for heavy industries in light industry areas close to communities, and assuming industry positions through the EU Trialogue process on conflictive mining legislation.”

Support to the 2030 Agenda is also prominent in Switzerland, where the Government officially declared it to be the “new universal reference framework” in terms of human well-being and sustainable economic development both internationally as well as domestically. However, in October 2015, three weeks after the approval of the 2030 Agenda, Switzerland announced important spending cuts, including a reduction of 115 million francs in the 2016 budget for international cooperation. “Savings are made at the cost of the poor and the country distances itself even more from the target of dedicating 0.7% of national income to development cooperation” comments Alliance Sud.

In Sudan “the lack of awareness on SDGs among policy-makers, CSOs and mass media will affect the citizen engagement negatively and the participation on policy making and decision taking is expected to be very minor.” Similarly, ANND reports that “Lebanon does not have a national strategy for development or a national economic plan or a poverty reduction strategy. Over the past 10 years, various Lebanese ministries have suggested sectorial policies supporting selected sustainable development goals with implementation plans. Planning and implementation of these policies lack comprehensive sectoral and geographical approaches. They are limited to some targeting interventions with a special focus on specific groups. It is also lacking of an inclusive, participatory mechanisms.”

In El Salvador, a National Council for Sustainable Development was created, composed of representatives from the Government, the United Nations, civil society and the private sector. Meanwhile in Jordan, the Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies wrote that “to date the Government has not taken any concrete step towards the promotion and realization of Sustainable Development Goals, and no specific unit, institution or ministry has been assigned to take charge of this process, indicating both a lack of institutional capacity as well as a lack of political will.”

In Egypt, the Egyptian Center for Economic & Social Rights reports that “the defining feature of the framework for Egypt’s national sustainable developmental strategy is the lack of a detailed roadmap to achieve several key goals, especially reducing poverty and unemployment and tackling the informal sector, for which it also lacks indicators. This is in addition to the lack of clarity in implementation mechanisms and the lack of consistency among the goals, despite the overarching strategy. The indicators used to measure the goals reflect the Government’s continuation of the neoliberal approach, which is contingent on the development of the private sector and dependent on it to finance the development goals. Thus, for example, to reduce the deficit, the strategy does not include raising taxes on companies, instead opting to tax consumers, such as with the 10 percent value added tax (VAT). The strategy also differs in important

ways from previous development strategies, none of which were discussed in Parliament or through any sort of social dialogue.”

In Belgium all levels of government, from the federal level to regional governments to local authorities, will be involved in setting up the national strategy for the SDGs. The Inter-Ministerial Conference for Sustainable Development (IMCSD) has the mandate to implement this strategy. The three regions and the federal government have each their own strategies and policy to advance sustainable development. “We cannot state nothing happened in Belgium,” reports 11.11.11 to the Social Watch network. “Nevertheless at this pace – the first half a year of implementing the SDG’s is already behind us – we can only dream of first steps of real implementation, meaning policy actions, in 2017. As civil society we are concerned about this slow pace. Belgium should have had a head start. Already in 1997, Parliament passed a law on the coordination of the federal policy on sustainable development. The law states that the federal government should set out a plan for sustainable development, taking into account the long-term vision and international commitments. The 2030 Agenda could easily be integrated into this action plan. The law also states that the plan should be ready within one year after the installation of a new parliament. This meant October 2015. A draft has been prepared by the Interdepartmental Commission on Sustainable Development (ICSD) but unfortunately it has been blocked for more than a year now.”

A benchmark to measure progress already exists in Italy: “In 2013, following a thorough participatory process, Italy has adopted a set of indicators for measuring equitable and sustainable well-being (BES).” The BES allows the analysis at the provincial and municipal levels and is now the basis for measuring national well-being in the academic world. However, the Government has not decided yet which body will be responsible for a sustainable development strategy and a national report, as requested by Agenda 2030.

In South Korea, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) reports that “a Sustainable Development Committee (SDC) was established by presiden-

tial order in 2000, followed by passage of the Sustainable Development Act as a fundamental law in 2007. From 2000 to 2008, the SDC acted as a presidential advisory body, and the Government and national assembly worked together on strategies for sustainable development implementation. However, by 2010, the law had been downgraded, assigning the committee to the Ministry of Environment. Thereafter five-year sustainable development plans have been concentrated in the area of the environment, no longer covering the general state of the nation.”

In Nepal the institutions were ready and the country had already prepared a preliminary report on country-specific targets and indicators with a Vision 2030 blueprint when it faced in 2015 a devastating earthquake which not only reversed development gains but also added an additional financial burden of around US\$ 8 billion to which slightly over US\$ 4 billion is pledged by development partners. According to the report submitted by Nepal’s Rural Reconstruction Movement, the country “faces dual challenges of a robust leadership in terms of state restructuring through the implementation of the new constitution which will expedite local governance and effective people’s participation as well as a meaningful global partnership for development to achieve the SDGs and its graduation target by 2022.”

“Graduation” is the term used in development jargon to describe the moment when a country labelled as “least developed” is upgraded out of that category. There are currently 48 countries defined by the UN as LDCs. According to the civil society coalition LDC-Watch “LDCs are countries with special needs and vulnerabilities and hence require special attention in the implementation of the SDGs. LDCs are characterized not only by low income, weak human development and economic vulnerabilities but also by geographical and environmental constraints such as those of the Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States included in the category. LDCs are home to 30 percent of the global population living with hunger while deaths associated with climate-related disasters in the LDCs comprise 67 percent of the world total. Given the universality of the SDGs, the LDCs surely cannot be left behind. Both country leadership as well as ownership and global

partnership in delivery of means of implementation is key to achieving SDGs in the LDCs.”

The institutional problem is quite different in the Central African Republic, where the SDGs are seen as essentially another new bright idea of foreigners. “The SDGs were discussed while the country was in war,” reports Clotaire Rodonne Siribi, pastor and leader of the Groupe d’Action, de Paix et de Formation pour la Transformation. “There is no serious national appropriation of the goals. The country now has the SDGs, the Istanbul Plan of Action for the LDCs and the Agenda 2063 of the African Union. How can we synchronize these programmes in a national plan? If the Government and the international community are not rigorous in their actions, the Central African Republic will not meet any SDG, just as happened with the MDGs”.

In wrapping up the Social Watch report for Perú, Héctor Béjar made a summary that describes the state of the SDGs in many countries: “A growing economy with ups and downs, a decrease in monetary poverty but worsening multidimensional poverty, serious environmental problems, prosperity of the higher sector of the middle classes, concentration of wealth, many emerging economies arising from export agriculture, drug trafficking, human trafficking and arms smuggling and a political system full of corruption. Progress has been made in circulation of money and electronic and telephone connectivity, but there is a decline in quality of life and public safety. Corruption has invaded democracy. Crime is taking over streets and cities. Citizen organizations have multiplied, but they must face diverse forms of discrimination and repression. The road to achieving the 2030 Agenda is hazy and full of obstacles.”

2

Spotlights on the SDGs

SDG 1

End poverty in all its forms everywhere

The new goal on poverty: A welcome paradigm shift

BY ROBERTO BISSIO, SOCIAL WATCH

The first goal in the new sustainable development agenda is very ambitious and sets a high standard for the international community: End poverty in all its forms everywhere.

Ending poverty is an aspiration that is implicit in the 1945 United Nations charter that includes in its preamble the determination “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1947) established “freedom from fear and want” as “the highest aspiration of the common people.” And in 1973 Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank, speaking to his board of directors in Nairobi, proposed a concrete target:

“We should strive to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of this century. That means in practice the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy, the reduction of infant mortality, and the raising of life-expectancy standards to those of the developed nations.”¹

McNamara had a clear notion of the relation between poverty and inequalities:

“The basic problem of poverty and growth in the developing world can be stated very simply. The growth is not equitably reaching the poor. And the poor are not significantly contributing to growth (...).

“Despite a decade of unprecedented increase in the gross national product of the developing countries, the poorest segments of their population have received relatively little benefit. Nearly 800 million individuals – 40 percent out of a total of 2 billion – survive on incomes estimated (in U.S. purchasing power) at 30 cents per day in conditions of malnutrition, illiteracy, and squalor. They are suffering poverty in the absolute sense.”²

To confront this problem, he said, developed countries should commit to increasing ODA up to 0.7 percent of their GDP by 1975, as pledged in a 1970 General Assembly resolution and improve the terms of trade of developing countries. The latter should, in turn, tackle internal inequalities, particularly through land reform, since absolute poverty was then mainly a rural problem.

By the end of the twentieth century none of those targets were met. Only a few developing countries seriously tackled inequalities (and those that did became the economic ‘miracles’ of the following years), trade negotiations did not reduce agricultural subsidies or non-tariff barriers in the North for the products of poor countries and ODA never surpassed half of the pledged 0.7 percent except in a handful of countries. As a result, the 2000 Millennium Declaration estimated the number of people in absolute poverty, renamed “extreme poverty” at 1 billion. The Millen-

1 Cf. McNamara (1973).

2 Ibid.

2.1 The new goal on poverty: A welcome paradigm shift

nium Declaration, unanimously adopted by Member States, promised to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected.”³ But the target agreed upon in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was not to end poverty, but only “to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.”⁴

Later the baseline for that promise was changed to the year 1990, by which some 400 million Chinese who had been lifted from extreme poverty in the last decade of the 20th century could be included in the accounting. Thus, by 2015 the number of people living on under US\$ 1.90 a day (the revised extreme poverty line announced by the World Bank in October 2015) is still estimated by the World Bank at over 900 million people, but because the world population has grown the proportion living in extreme poverty has been halved or more than halved and the mission was declared accomplished.

In April 2013, long before the SDGs had been agreed, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim announced that the new “highly ambitious” target of his institution was to be “ending extreme poverty in the world by 2030.”⁵ This would be what he called a “historic opportunity” and “a chance – for the first time ever – to end extreme poverty within a generation.”⁶

Actually, for the World Bank experts “ending extreme poverty” means keeping it below 3 percent, rendering the target less ambitious. According to the World Bank’s own projections, poverty under the new line of US\$ 1.90 a day was already below 10 percent of world population in 2015. If current growth rates are maintained and inequality does not get worse, the

goal could be attained globally before 2030 (but still leaving extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa at 15%)⁷ – without any major effort or changes in current policies. Moreover, if growth rates decrease, the target could still be achieved through only slightly better income distribution.

Thus, when the diplomats met in New York to agree on the commitments to include in the 2030 Agenda, civil society pressure for a more ambitious goal led them to formulate SDG 1 itself as to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere.” This formulation acknowledges very clearly that poverty cannot be defined only by income poverty, and that it is not concentrated only in low-income countries.

When it came to the targets, the World Bank definition of extreme poverty was identified as the first target, but a second target commits countries to “by 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.”

Thus Member States have committed themselves to address poverty in “rich” countries as well as “poor” ones, an objective that was part of the Social Summit resolution of 1995 but not picked up by the MDGs.⁸ According to the way in which the US Census Bureau, for example, calculates poverty, 46.7 million people in the US (15% of the population) were poor in 2015.⁹ The European Union estimates that a total of 120 million people (24% of its population) are at risk of poverty and social exclusion, including one of every four children and one of every five people over age 65.¹⁰ In Japan poverty affects 16 percent of the population.¹¹ In a number of rich and poor countries, poverty has increased since the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and subsequent austerity pol-

3 Cf. UN (2000).

4 Ibid. para. 19 (emphasis added).

5 Cf. Kim (2013).

6 Ibid

7 Cf. World Bank (2015).

8 “We commit ourselves to the goal of eradicating poverty in the world, through decisive national actions and international cooperation, as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind.” Commitment 2 of the World Summit for Social Development, cf. United Nations (1995).

9 Cf. DeNavas-Walt/Proctor (2015).

10 Cf. Eurostat (2015).

11 Cf. The Economist (2015).

icies. To reverse that trend and cut poverty by half in fifteen years would surely require a major revision of current policies.

Even though Target 1.2 mentions “poverty in all its dimensions”, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is not yet among the proposed indicators. The

MPI is computed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative¹² for non-OECD countries and has been included in UNDP’s Human Development Report since 2010. The World Bank poverty study ac-

¹² Cf. OPHI (2016).

Leaving no one behind calls for far-reaching changes in the way development agencies operate

BY XAVIER GODINOT, INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT ATD FOURTH WORLD

For some development agency staff, involving people living in poverty in development programmes appears to be too difficult, time-consuming and costly. Some have developed forms of ‘willful blindness’ over the exclusion of the poorest people in the projects they finance, classified as such and analyzed by Jean-Michel Séverino, former Vice-President of the World Bank and former Chief Executive Officer of Agence Française de Développement. Refusing to see this exclusion as problematic makes it possible to avoid difficulties, while exacerbating inequalities and the marginalization of the poorest people.

Encouraging and even facilitating the voluntary participation of people living in poverty should not be regarded as an optional choice in development projects, as it is an obligation under human rights principles. The Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty

and Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2012, states in article 38: “States must ensure the active, free, informed and meaningful participation of persons living in poverty at all stages of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of decisions and policies affecting them.”

New mechanisms of participation, empowerment and transparency need to be created at local, national and international levels. For example, in designing all development projects, directors should be encouraged to identify and involve people who are experienced in relations with marginalized populations (representatives of residents, representatives from associations, professionals, etc.) in order to convey the expectations of the latter to leaders and donors and implement participation in the field. This participation is impossible if the efforts made

by project managers to get the poorest populations involved are not encouraged and supported by the managers of development agencies, and if they in turn are not encouraged and supported by the line ministries in partner countries. It requires calling into question the standard performance criteria, which are often those of a bank: substantial and rapid disbursements, short-term results and visibility.

“Leaving no one behind” in development, as called for by the 2030 Agenda, involves designing long-term programmes that can reach those hardest to reach segments of the population. This requires profound changes in the rationale for the way in which development agencies operate. A first step in this regard should be creating staff incentives towards increasing people’s participation, especially the most vulnerable, in achieving all of the goals.

2.1 The new goal on poverty: A welcome paradigm shift

knowledges that the MPI “is one possible implementation” of Target 1.2 and that “demand for harmonized multidimensional poverty assessment at the country and global levels is likely to rise.”¹³ Adoption of this indicator would likely make the poverty figures higher, as the study concludes: While “the poor tend to be simultaneously deprived in multiple dimensions (...) a person may be considered to be non-poor according to the traditional income-based measure despite being subject to multiple deprivations in other dimensions.”

Target 1.3, on social protection floors, like Target 1.2, amplifies the definition of poverty and the way it is assessed. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015, published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), explains:

“(S)ocial protection systems have been critical in fostering progress towards the hunger and poverty targets in a number of developing countries. Social protection directly contributes to the reduction of poverty, hunger and malnutrition by promoting income security and access to better nutrition, health care and education. By improving human capacities and mitigating the impacts of shocks, social protection fosters the ability of the poor to participate in growth through better access to employment.”¹⁴

Moreover, this target – and its positive spillover impact on national economies – is equally valid for countries in the global North. Traditionally, the development machinery has thought of antipoverity efforts in the South and strengthening of social protection in the North as contradictory objectives. When Social Watch started to make the case, in 1995, that the commitments made in the Social Summit also required rich countries to improve social protection in their own societies, a development cooperation minister from a Nordic country pointed out that “if you insist on that point what you will get is a reduction of the ODA budget because problems at home should have priority.”¹⁵

In practice, though, what happens is the opposite. The same social and political forces that defend social security, health and education expenditures in OECD countries are those that defend development cooperation from budget cuts. And in the last several years emerging economies such as China and Brazil that have been carrying out massive and successful anti-poverty programs at home have also simultaneously increased their own South-South cooperation initiatives.

According to the ILO, “a basic floor of social transfers is globally affordable at virtually any stage of economic development”¹⁶ and thus its implementation is mainly an issue of political will.

Target 1.4 completes the paradigm change by mentioning “equal rights”, including those to land and resources in a poverty context. This formulation echoes the Guiding Principles on Poverty and Human Rights, approved by the United Nations in 2012:

“Poverty is an urgent human rights concern in itself. It is both a cause and a consequence of human rights violations and an enabling condition for other violations. Not only is extreme poverty characterized by multiple reinforcing violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, but persons living in poverty generally experience regular denials of their dignity and equality.”¹⁷

Target 1.5, on reducing vulnerability in face of climate-related disasters anchors this goal in the context of sustainable development, where the people living in poverty are victims of catastrophes that they had no responsibility in creating.

Targets 1.a and 1.b, which focus on means of implementation are perhaps vague, but they are coherent and logical. Resources have to be mobilized and for least developed countries this means assistance from their richest peers. Further, everywhere appropriate institutional frameworks are needed if we are to ensure, for example, that the rich are properly taxed

13 Cf. World Bank (2015).

14 Cf. www.fao.org/hunger/key-messages/en/ and FAO (2015).

15 Interview with the author.

16 Cf. ILO (2016).

17 United Nations (2012), para. 3.

so that the resources needed to implement the goals can be mobilized.

SDG 1 and its targets are thus a major departure from conventional thinking: they address poverty in all countries and in its multiple dimensions, they open the gates to alternative measures of poverty, such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index, they link the elimination of poverty to human rights and climate change and they point to the means that need to be mobilized to make it all happen.

But in the ongoing debate about how to measure those commitments the targets on means of implementation risk being diluted or even distorted. Target 1.b, for example, aims at creating policy frameworks based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, but the current indicator

looks only at public spending at national level, ignoring the regional and international support aspect of the target.

After the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, the initial countercyclical surge in government expenditures was short lived and was soon replaced by austerity programmes recommended by the IMF that encouraged governments to cut spending. Countries will have to choose between following those recommendations – frequently linked to loan conditionalities – or expanding the pro-poor spending as mandated by the 2030 Agenda.

The June 2016 issue of the IMF's quarterly magazine, *Finance & Development* includes an article by well-known IMF research economists Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri on

Targets for SDG 1

- 1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$ 1.25 a day
- 1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions
- 1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable
- 1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance
- 1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters
- 1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions
- 1.b Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions

the negative impacts of fiscal austerity policies.¹⁸ They argue:

“The notion that fiscal consolidations can be expansionary (that is, raise output and employment), in part by raising private sector confidence and investment, has been championed by [economists and policy makers]. However, in practice, episodes of fiscal consolidation have been followed, on average, by drops rather than by expansions in output (...). The increase in inequality engendered by financial openness and austerity might itself undercut growth, the very thing that the neoliberal agenda is intent on boosting. There is now strong evidence that inequality can significantly lower both the level and the durability of growth.”¹⁹

Thus, what is good for the economy and what is good to fight poverty and reduce inequalities are finally converging. Even if more than four decades later than originally promised, the 2030 Agenda and its goal to end poverty in all its forms everywhere provide the opportunity to become really transformational and signal an historic turn towards justice and sustainability.

18 Cf. Ostry et al. (2016).

19 Ibid.

References

- Eurostat (2015):** People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, Data extracted in December 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion
- FAO (2015):** The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Rome www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/c2cda20d-eb94-4467-8a94-038087fe0f6e/
- ILO (2015):** Social Protection: Affordability. Geneva. www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.action?id=2526
- Ostry, Jonathan D./Loungani, Prakash/Furceri, Davide (2016):** Neoliberalism: Oversold? In: Finance & Development, Vol. 53, No. 2, June 2016. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm
- Kim, Jim Yong (2013):** Within Our Grasp: A World Free of Poverty – World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim’s Speech at Georgetown University, April 2, 2013. www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2013/04/02/world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-kims-speech-at-georgetown-university
- McNamara, Robert S. (1973):** The Nairobi speech. Address to the Board of Governors by Robert S. McNamara, President, World Bank Group, Nairobi, Kenya, September 24, 1973. http://www.juerg-buergi.ch/resources/Archiv/Entwicklungspolitik-Archiv/Dokumente-zur-Entwicklungspolitik/McNamara_Nairobi_speech.pdf
- OPHI (without year):** Policy – A multidimensional approach. www.ophi.org.uk/policy/multidimensional-poverty-index/
- The Economist (2015):** Japan’s working poor – Struggling. Printed edition of April 4, 2015. www.economist.com/news/asia/21647676-poverty-worsens-more-japanese-work-non-permanent-contracts-struggling
- United Nations (2012):** Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights. Geneva (UN Doc. A/HRC/21/39). www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/Pages/DGPIntroduction.aspx
- United Nations (2000):** United Nations Millennium Declaration. New York (UN Doc. A/RES/55/2). www.un.org/Docs/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/55/2
- United Nations (1995):** Resolution of the World Summit on Social Development. New York (UN Doc. A/CONF.166/9 of 19 April 1995). <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/aconf166-9.htm>
- DeNavas-Walt, Carmen/Proctor, Bernadette D. (2015):** Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014. Current Population Reports, P 60-252. Washington, D.C.: US Census Bureau. www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf
- Cruz, Marcio/Foster, James/Quillin, Bryce/Schellekens, Philip (2015):** Ending Extreme Poverty and Sharing Prosperity: Progress and Policies. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/policy-research-note-03-ending-extreme-poverty-and-sharing-prosperity-progress-and-policies

SDG 2

End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture

Towards the transformation of our agricultural and food systems

BY LIM LI CHING, THIRD WORLD NETWORK

The world faces numerous problems related to agriculture and food. Among these are persistent undernourishment and malnutrition for some while others are obese and overweight; environmental degradation and pollution that threaten the very resource base that agriculture is dependent on; the loss of agricultural biodiversity; high levels of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change; inequalities in access to food; and policies and laws that marginalize small farmers, their practices and rights – all symptoms of a broken food system.

However, instead of addressing the systemic problems, policy-makers are focused on technical fixes and so-called solutions that further entrench and extend the dominant global industrial, corporate-controlled food and agriculture system.

That system, perhaps embodied best in the Green Revolution, has enabled increased yields, but at a tremendous cost to the environment and greater social equality, while doing little to address the root causes of persistent hunger.¹ In 2015, the number of people who go hungry, while declining at a slow pace, was still unacceptably high, at 795 million.²

From industrial agriculture to agroecological systems

For the world to meet the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2, no less than a transformation of our agricultural and food systems is needed. This entails a paradigm shift from specialized industrial agriculture to diversified agroecological systems, as most recently articulated by the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems.³

These two systems, of course, represent two ends of a wide spectrum, with most farms somewhere between the two. The vast majority of farms in the global South are small farms, with many family farmers, most of whom are women, cultivating plots of less than two hectares. Yet, small-scale farmers provide over 80 percent of the food consumed in the developing world.⁴ In contrast, industrial agriculture systems occur largely in the global North (with some notable exceptions) and tend to be devoted to large areas of specialized commodity crops or industrialized feedlots for livestock. Whatever the starting point, the transition to diversified agroecological systems is necessary; however, countries in the global North bear a particular responsibility to change their practices.

1 Cf. IAASTD (2009).

2 Cf. FAO (2015b).

3 Cf. IPES-Food (2016).

4 Cf. IFAD/UNEP (2013), p. 6.

Specialized industrial agriculture is a model characterized by monocultures, genetically uniform varieties, intensive use of external inputs, maximization of yield from a single or limited number of products, and production of large volumes of homogenous products typically within long value chains. Agroecology, on the other hand, applies ecological principles to the design and management of agricultural systems. Its practices diversify farms and farming landscapes, increase biodiversity, nurture soil health and soil biodiversity, and stimulate interactions among different species, such that the farm provides for its own soil organic matter, pest regulation and weed control, without resort to external chemical inputs.

As early as 2009, the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) called on the international community and national governments to systematically redirect agricultural knowledge, science and technology towards sustainable, biodiversity-based ecological agriculture and the underlying agroecological sciences. Agroecology has consistently proven capable of sustainably increasing productivity, ensuring adequate nutrition through diverse diets and has far greater potential for fighting hunger and poverty, particularly during economic and climatically uncertain times.⁵ Evidence is particularly strong on the ability of agroecology to deliver strong and stable yields by building environmental and climate resilience.⁶

Agroecology draws on the knowledge and experiences of farmers. Many answers lie in farmers' fields and in farmers' knowledge; for example, how to create healthy soils that store more water under drought conditions and how to grow a diversity of crops to create the resilience needed to face increased unpredictability in weather patterns. Critically, agroecology also bypasses the industrial food and agriculture system, with food sovereignty promoting more localized food systems and farmer participation.⁷ Agroecology is not simply about changing agricultur-

al practices, but is also about promoting fundamentally different farming landscapes and livelihoods, and radically reimagined food systems.⁸

Agroecology is also ideally placed to meet some of the key targets for SDG 2. For example, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food demonstrated in his report to the UN Human Rights Council 2010,⁹ that agroecology, if sufficiently supported, can double agricultural productivity in entire regions within 10 years,¹⁰ thereby helping to advance the objective of Target 2.3, to “double the agricultural productivity and income of small scale food producers”. Agroecology is also specifically designed to achieve Target 2.4, to “ensure sustainable food production systems and resilient food production practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality”.¹¹ Because a key pillar of agroecology is agricultural biodiversity, aiming to enhance species and genetic diversification of the agroecosystem in time and space at the field and landscape levels,¹² it is able to maintain, in situ, “the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species,” as specified in Target 2.5.

‘Lock-ins’ supporting the dominant industrial model

Nonetheless, the odds are still stacked against those seeking alternatives. According to the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food), an interdisciplinary initiative to inform the policy debate on how to reform world food systems, the challenges facing agriculture and food systems are generally perpetuated in vicious circles

5 Cf. Altieri et al. (2012), UNCTAD (2013), FAO (2015a).

6 Cf. IPES-Food (2016).

7 Cf. Altieri/Nicholls (2008).

8 Cf. IPES-Food (2016).

9 Cf. De Schutter (2010).

10 See ‘Eco-Farming Can Double Food Production in 10 Years, says new UN report’, 8 March 2011 (www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/press_releases/20110308_agroecology-report-pr_en.pdf).

11 Cf. Altieri et al. (2015).

12 Cf. Altieri/Nicholls (2004).

that act to lock in the dominant industrial model.¹³ A series of powerful feedback loops extending well beyond the world of farming serve as ‘lock-ins’: current incentives in food production and consumption systems unfortunately keep farmers (and consumers) locked into the structures and logics of industrial agriculture, while locking out the reforms that are needed. It is therefore imperative that the power imbalances running through food systems, which reinforce the power of dominant actors, and consequently, decision-making, are exposed and addressed.¹⁴

In its 2016 report, IPES-Food identifies eight such lock-ins:

- I **Path dependency**, by which industrial agriculture becomes self-reinforcing through the investments it requires, and the need to see a return on those investments;
- I **Trade and export orientation**, which are major drivers of highly-specialized and industrial modes of agriculture, kept in place by policies and incentives;
- I **Expectations of cheap food**, which industrial agriculture is uniquely positioned to provide, encouraging farmers to further specialize and industrialize their production in order to supply large volumes of specific commodities at low costs;
- I **Compartmentalized thinking** that governs the setting of priorities in politics, research and business but are ill-equipped to respond to the cross-cutting challenges facing food systems;
- I **Short-term thinking** dominating political and business cycles, thereby pushing short-term solutions to the forefront and keeping these actors firmly wedded to existing systems – even as they generate increasing problems;
- I **‘Feed the world’ narratives** that claim that the same systems and same actors driving the Green Revolution-style productivity increases of the past must remain at centre stage, while deflecting attention away from the failings of industrial agriculture;
- I **Measures of success** that undervalue the benefits of agroecology; and
- I **Concentration of power** that reinforces all the lock-ins. Food systems, in their current forms, allow value to accrue to a limited number of actors, reinforcing their economic and political dominance, and thus their ability to influence the policies, incentives and imperatives guiding those systems.

One key lock-in that deserves further discussion goes to the question of indicators. Unfortunately, the benefits of diversified agroecological farming are systematically undervalued by classical measures of agricultural productivity.¹⁵ It would be therefore essential to adopt and systematically use a broader range of indicators in assessing the performance and success of agriculture and food systems. These indicators should reflect what matters in the longer term and for society at large, such as long-term ecosystem health; total resource flows; sustainable interactions between agriculture and the wider economy; the sustainability of output; livelihood resilience; true food and nutrition security; and the economic viability of farms with respect to debt, climate shocks and so on.

In other words, what are needed are indicators for *sustainable food systems*.¹⁶ Measures such as nutritional quality, resource efficiency, impact on biodiversity, provision of ecosystem services and impact on livelihoods and equity, are highly relevant. These need to be reflected in the discussions on indicators for the targets in SDG 2. A failure to incorporate a more holistic set of indicators than those presented to the UN Statistical Commission in March 2016¹⁷ risks, once again, privileging industrial agriculture at the expense of agroecology.

13 Cf. IPES-Food (2016).

14 Cf. IPES-Food (2015).

15 Cf. IPES-Food (2016).

16 Ibid.

17 Cf. UN Doc. E/CN.3/2016/2/Rev.1 (<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/2016-2-SDGs-Rev1-E.pdf>).

Another lock-in that deserves deeper scrutiny is that of the concentration of power, which can be viewed as the ‘mother of all lock-ins’ as all the identified lock-ins are reinforced by this. It is no secret that in the realm of food and agriculture, corporate concentration is the order of the day:¹⁸ The world’s top three commercial seed corporations (Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta) control over half (53%) of the world’s commercial seed market; the top 10 control over three-quarters (76%). Just six firms hold 76 percent of the global agrochemical market and the top ten pesticide companies control almost 95 percent of the global market. The top 10 firms control 41 percent of the global fertilizer market. These corporations wield a disproportionate amount of power, essentially deciding what we grow, where and how we grow it, what we buy, what we eat and how much we pay for it.

It is clear then that to achieve SDG 2, tinkering around the edges is not going to help much. While the UN claims that the proportion of hungry people in developing countries has been “almost” halved, thus achieving the MDG target on hunger, it will be extremely difficult to eliminate the remaining proportion of people living in extreme poverty and hunger. What makes countries think that they can end hunger and ensure access to sufficient nutritious food by 2030 so long as the same structures that support the same failed agriculture models remain in place? Powerful feedback loops operate to shut out the alternatives and keep food systems aligned to industrial agriculture. Therefore, what is needed is to agree on a systemic transition that would shift the incentives, thereby empowering farmers to step firmly off the treadmill of industrial agriculture.¹⁹

Steps towards sustainable food systems

Given that many industrialized food systems are in countries of the global North, largely propped up by massive agricultural subsidies, these countries have a particular responsibility to embrace such a transition. In addition, rich countries need to reduce their

demand for animal products and biofuels, as large areas of farmland in the South are used to cultivate these biofuels or to feed the livestock that will satisfy burgeoning meat consumption.²⁰ In rich countries, moreover, food is wasted in huge quantities – the average European or North American throws away more than 100 kg per year – because food expenditure is mere sliver of their household budgets. The sad state of affairs in our globalized food system today is that wealthy consumers can command the resources that will allow their lifestyles to continue unchallenged, even as others are deprived of basic calories.²¹

While for their part, developing countries can do much to support small-scale farmers with the land, credit, technology and market access they need, including to transition to diversified agroecological systems, these reforms cannot be made in a vacuum and will not succeed fully without the corresponding action in the North.

The type of change envisaged would lead to the emergence of what are essentially new food systems with new infrastructures and new sets of power relations. The key is to establish *political* priorities, namely: to support the emergence of alternative systems that are based around fundamentally different logics centred on agroecology, and which, over time, generate different and more equitable power relations. The 2016 report by IPES-Food gives seven pragmatic recommendations for this shift:

1. Develop new indicators for sustainable food systems;
2. Shift public support towards diversified agroecological production systems;
3. Support short circuits and alternative retail infrastructures;
4. Use public procurement to support local agroecological production;

18 Cf. ETC Group (2013).

19 Cf. IPES-Food (2016).

20 Cf. De Schutter (2014).

21 Ibid.

5. Strengthen movements that unify diverse constituencies around agroecology;
6. Mainstream agroecology and holistic food systems approach into education and research agendas;
7. Develop food planning processes and ‘food policies’ at all levels.

Finally, because food security and sustainable agriculture are cross-cutting goals, it is worth noting that progress in achieving the other SDGs will also be important in realizing Goal 2. SDG 5 on gender, SDG 6 on water, SDG 12 on sustainable consumption and production, SDG 13 on climate change and SDG 15 on biodiversity are particularly relevant in this respect.

Targets for SDG 2

- 2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round
- 2.2 By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons
- 2.3 By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment
- 2.4 By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality
- 2.5 By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional and international levels, and promote access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as internationally agreed
 - 2.a Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries
 - 2.b Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round
 - 2.c Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility

2.2 Towards the transformation of our agricultural and food systems

References

- Altieri, M.A./Nicholls, C.I. (2004):** An agroecological basis for designing diversified cropping systems in the tropics. In: Clements, D.R./Shrestha, A. (Eds) (2004): *New Dimensions in Agroecology*. New York: Haworth Press.
- Altieri, M.A./Nicholls, C.I. (2008):** Scaling up agroecological approaches for food sovereignty in Latin America. In: *Development* 51(4): 472–480.
- Altieri, M.A./ Nicholls, C.I./Funes, F. et al. (2012):** The scaling up of agroecology: spreading the hope for food sovereignty and resiliency. A contribution to discussions at Rio+20 on issues at the interface of hunger, agriculture, environment and social justice. Latin American Scientific Society of Agroecology (SOCLA).
- Altieri, M.A./Nicholls, C.I./Henao, A./Lana, M.A. (2015):** Agroecology and the design of climate change-resilient farming systems. In: *Agronomy for Sustainable Development* 35(3): 869–890. <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13593-015-0285-2#page-1>
- De Schutter, O. (2010):** Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, 17 December 2010. Geneva: UN Human Rights Council (UN Doc. A/HRC/16/49). <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/A-HRC-16-49.pdf>
- De Schutter, O. (2014):** Ending hunger: The rich world holds the keys. In: *The Ecologist*, 25 March 2014. http://www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2333245/ending_hunger_the_rich_world_holds_the_keys.html
- FAO (2015a):** Agroecology for food security and nutrition. Proceedings of the FAO International Symposium, 18 and 19 September 2014, Rome, Italy. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. www.fao.org/3/a-i4729e.pdf
- FAO (2015b):** The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf
- IAASTD (2009):** Agriculture at a Crossroads. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. <http://www.agassessment.org>
- IFAD/UNEP (2013):** Smallholders, food security, and the environment. Rome. www.ifad.org/documents/10180/666cac24-14b6-43c2-876d-9c2d1f01d5dd
- IPES-Food (2016):** From uniformity to diversity: A paradigm shift from industrial agriculture to diversified agroecological systems. International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems, Brussels. www.ipes-food.org
- IPES-Food (2015):** The new science of sustainable food systems: Overcoming barriers to food systems reform. International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems, Brussels. www.ipes-food.org
- UNCTAD (2013):** Wake up before it is too late: Make agriculture truly sustainable now for food security in a changing climate. Trade and Environment Review 2013. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

SDG 3

Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

The “Health SDG”: Some progress, but critical concerns remain

BY DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES WITH WOMEN FOR A NEW ERA (DAWN)

The final decisions on SDG 3, the “Health SDG”, occurred after intense, multi-cornered contestation among UN member states, the for-profit sector, civil society, and private foundations. Each of these groupings did not represent a single interest and there were many differences and schisms among them.

In the end these differences of ideology and interest were covered over, and the multiple MDGs on health were brought together under the single umbrella of SDG 3. SDG 3 has thus been claimed by champions of “universal health coverage” (UHC) to be a victory for an approach focused on strengthening public health systems. This is an important advance over the MDGs which treated health related goals separately, thereby operating to undermine a systemic approach. But the schisms are deep, and it is not clear whether they have genuinely been overcome, or merely papered over.

Among the major challenges bedeviling global health at present, the following are likely to be crucial in determining whether or not the SDG 3 targets are met, particularly Targets 3.7 and 3.8.

Funding

Funding for health, national and global, has been restricted ever since the 1980s – the early years of the neoliberal policy regime, with its cuts in national health budgets, its push towards privatization, and liberalization of regulatory structures. The years since then have witnessed a plethora of alternative

funding mechanisms that have led to disease-focused silos, however well-intentioned, at the expense of strengthening the health system overall, and also at the cost of insufficient attention to primary health care.

National funding restrictions have been matched in the last decade by a severe squeeze by key member states on core funding for the World Health Organization (WHO), perhaps because it is viewed as insufficiently open to private for-profit interests. The WHO is a bureaucracy with typical bureaucratic limitations and rigidities, all too easy to blame for inadequate responsiveness (as in the case of the recent Ebola crisis), but it must be remembered that its core funding has been under severe stress for too long, its morale undermined, and its role in setting norms and standards for global health under attack.¹

Private foundations have stepped into the breach, with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) becoming one of the largest health funders both within and outside WHO. While such funding has been welcomed by many in the climate of inadequate funding by UN Member States there is a severe accountability deficit as private funders are not accountable to anyone outside themselves.²

¹ Cf. Adams / Martens (2015).

² Cf. Martens / Seitz (2015).

2.3 The “Health SDG”: Some progress, but critical concerns remain

The tension between BMGF’s belief in technology-driven, disease-focused approaches focused on targeted ‘quick wins’, versus a comprehensive universal health care approach is embodied in SDG 3’s substantive targets, the majority of which seem to follow the former, while only Target 3.8 specifically talks about UHC. It may be argued that the implementation targets (especially Targets 3.b, 3.c and 3.d) complement the UHC target. The devil, however, is in the details. While Targets 3.1 – 3.4, and 3.6 are numerically specified, this is not true for the UHC-linked targets that are not quantitative but use vaguer verbs such as “strengthen”, “support”, and “substantially increase”. Round 1 seems to have gone against health systems strengthening.

Growing corporate influence

Corporate, for-profit influence in shaping global health agendas has been growing considerably in recent years, after being on the defensive during the intensive anti-corporate drive against breast milk substitutes and tobacco. Four large industries – big pharma, tobacco, alcohol and sugar (including soft drinks) – are deeply interested in how global and national health norms are determined. The tobacco industry’s fingerprints are already present in Target 3.a where the call to “strengthen the implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries” has been qualified by the words “as appropriate”, which in UN language implies a significant watering down.

The “morphing” of for-profit interests from within the health sector into non-profit and philanthropic guises, raises many unresolved questions about accountability and where the lines lie between profit-making and non-profit benevolence. BMGF’s role and influence on health agendas has already raised many questions, but its own funding largely comes from outside the health sector. Not so in the case of Merck for Mothers, a 10-year, US\$ 500 million initiative focused on improving maternal health, that is an offshoot of one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies.³

3 Cf. <http://merckformothers.com>.

Starting in 2011, and made more urgent after the Ebola crisis, the WHO embarked on an effort to develop a Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA). Adopted by the 69th World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2016, FENSA is meant to guide WHO’s interaction with both for-profit and non-profit organizations. It includes a general framework of engagement and separate policies for NGOs, the private sector, academic institutions and philanthropies, which cover participation, resources, advocacy, evidence, and technical collaboration. Early analysis suggests key weaknesses among which para 27bis may be the most problematic because it appears to water down due diligence and risk assessment. The suggestion of a pooled fund to avoid undue influence by individual donors was also dropped in the final agreement.⁴

Public-private partnerships (PPPs), including the proliferating number of global multi-stakeholder partnerships operating in the health sphere, are among the most under-regulated, unaccountable and poorly analysed of institutional mechanisms, not only in relation to large physical infrastructure projects, but also in the health sector. While PPPs may have differing objectives, their chief aims include improved efficiency and the provision of needed health products or services where these may not already exist. International product development partnerships in health have proliferated.⁵ While they may bring needed resources to the table when tackling major diseases, uneasy questions remain about conflicts of interest in the role of industry partners, donations in kind that require high national inputs, and take-over of national policy space.⁶

The European Commission’s Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health adopted an opinion in 2014, based on a review of 15 PPP cases in European countries by an independent consultant, that

4 Cf. Gopakumar (2016).

5 Examples, some of which date back to the 1990s, include Roll Back Malaria, the PATH Malaria Vaccine, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (the former Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, to name only a few.

6 Cf. www.who.int/trade/glossary/story077/en/.

“public disclosure of data and analyses behind PPP investments is very poor, inconsistent and not standardized. (...) The Expert Panel has not found scientific evidence that PPPs are cost-effective compared with traditional forms of public financed and managed provision of health care.”⁷ The above challenges may engender policy incoherence among the agreed targets of SDG 3, especially between the push for UHC (including for access to medicines as agreed in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO) on the one side and the growing influence of the private sector in relation to the first six targets, on the other. But this is not all.

The challenge of equity and equality

Target 3.8 seeks to achieve universal health care but (understandably perhaps) says relatively little about the pathways by which this should happen. Yet, there is growing concern that those pathways may be critical to determining whether those responsible for implementing the UHC approach, nationally and globally, limit themselves in the foreseeable future to picking low-hanging fruit, or tackles the more difficult challenges that confront the health of those at the very bottom of social and economic hierarchies.⁸ The UHC approach has traditionally been concerned with economic inequality and whether or not the health system protects and promotes the health of the poor. But, at the bottom of most socio-economic ladders, inequality is not only economic but is reinforced by such factors as gender, caste, race, ethnicity, disability, gender identity or sexual orientation to name some. This kind of intersectional inequality is often impervious to universalizing approaches, and requires specific targeted approaches. A complementary mix of the two types of approaches may be essential if the UHC pathways are not to bypass those at the very bottom.

Such complementarity would require more serious delving into the ways in which different root causes of inequality interact with each other, resulting in fun-

damental differences in the ways in which different groups interact with health systems. For instance, how families negotiate health insurance and who benefits the most from them is relatively under-researched. Issues such as violence or the threat of violence from intimate partners or in domestic settings may have many physical and psychological implications for children and women, but in most countries is rarely recognized as a public health concern, at least until recently. Those at the very bottom of caste or ethnic hierarchies may be especially at risk of disrespectful or abusive health care, but this is only weakly integrated, if at all, into the training of health providers. Suicide has become one of the main killers of adolescents but its roots in gender or other social systems of power are rarely viewed as concerns for UHC.

Inequality is one of the most important of the social determinants of health, but it is all too often wider than SDG 3 seems to recognize. An illustrative example is the case of adolescent girls. In 2010, six United Nations organizations – UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, UNIFEM, ILO, and UNESCO – put out an unusual Joint Statement on *Accelerating Efforts to Advance the Rights of Adolescent Girls*.⁹ The six organizations were members of the UN Adolescent Girls Task Force, set up to fill a major gap in global policy direction. They recognized that “many of the 600 million adolescent girls living in developing countries remain invisible in national policies and programmes (...), live in poverty, are burdened by gender discrimination and inequality, and are subject to multiple forms of violence, abuse, and exploitation (...).”¹⁰

The statement identified five strategic priorities: education, health, freedom from violence, building leadership capacities, and strengthening the evidence base through better data collection, analysis and use. What was special about the Joint Statement was that it was the first of its kind on the subject. It brought together the heads of the UN agencies responsible for child survival, health, sexual and reproductive health and rights, gender equality, labour rights, and education and culture – all key to the survival

7 European Commission Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health (2014), p. 36 and 39.

8 Cf. Sen/Govender (2015).

9 Cf. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001871/187124e.pdf>.

10 Ibid.

2.3 The “Health SDG”: Some progress, but critical concerns remain

and well-being of adolescent girls. It also prioritized the needs of younger adolescents aged 10–14 years, who along with the pre-adolescent group (5–9 years), often slip through policy and programme cracks. Civil society organizations, and especially women’s organizations in many countries and globally,

had been highlighting the plight of adolescent girls for many years before the UN Joint Statement. But serious and concerted attention at the policy level is a recent phenomenon. Nor is this attention very consistent or sustained as yet. For instance, despite the attempt by UNFPA and others to push for a goal on

Targets for SDG 3

- 3.1** By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births
- 3.2** By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1,000 live births
- 3.3** By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases
- 3.4** By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being
- 3.5** Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol
- 3.6** By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents
- 3.7** By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes
- 3.8** Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all
- 3.9** By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination
- 3.a** Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate
- 3.b** Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all
- 3.c** Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States
- 3.d** Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks

adolescents as part of the SDGs, this did not come to fruition. Nor is the health of adolescents specifically mentioned in the targets of SDG 3.

Women's and girls' health and human rights

Target 3.7 of SDG 3, although not fully part of the UHC approach, marks a significant breakthrough for the many who have attempted to integrate the sexual and reproductive health and rights agenda into a larger health and rights agenda. To be included in the health goal instead of being segregated is indeed an advance. But achieving this target was no mean feat, against the concerted opposition of conservative religious forces.

The past three years have witnessed not only the intense discussions about the 2030 Agenda, but also the 20th year reviews of the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo), and of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing). The latter two were the site of continuing opposition by religious conservatives to women's human rights and especially to sexual and reproductive health and rights. In these battles women's and young people's groups formed strong alliances that included multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination in their key concerns, but very few of the health groups concerned mainly with economic inequality made common cause with them. Achieving Target 3.7 as part of the broader UHC agenda will be difficult in the face of conservative opposition unless broader alliances and coalitions are made.

Which way forward?

Among the key challenges to achieving SDG 3, we have identified four critical concerns: the problem of health funding in terms of both amounts and patterns; the poorly regulated and growing role of private parties taking multiple forms; the intersectional nature of inequality and the limitations of many current approaches to UHC focusing only or largely on economic inequality; and the challenge of the conservative religious opposition to women's human rights, and to sexual and reproductive health and rights generally.

SDG 3 represents some forward movement, but these four challenges must be tackled if “healthy lives and (...) well-being for all at all ages” are indeed to be achieved. Yet, health may be on the back-foot yet again if the failed efforts to make the FENSA agreement stronger with regard to relationships with non-UN partners, particularly in the corporate sector is anything to go by.

Much will depend in this somewhat gloomy scenario on the way in which civil society can mobilize to use the positive advances contained in some of the SDG 3 targets, and to push for policy coherence of other health actions and actors with these targets. Much will also depend on the ability of health groups with different antecedents and interests to make common cause to truly work towards “health for all”.

References

- Adams, Barbara/Martens, Jens (2015): Fit for whose purpose? Private funding and corporate influence in the United Nations. Bonn/New York: Global Policy Forum. www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Fit_for_whose_purpose_online.pdf
- European Commission Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health (2014): Health and Economic Analysis for an Evaluation of the Public-Private Partnerships in Health Care Delivery across Europe. Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/health/expert_panel/opinions/docs/003_assessmentstudyppp_en.pdf
- Gopakumar, K. M. (2016): WHO: Health Assembly adopts framework for non-State actor engagement. TWN Info Service on Health and UN Sust. Dev., 31 May 2016. Geneva: Third World Network. www.twn.my
- Martens, Jens/Seitz, Karolin (2015): Philanthropic power and development: Who shapes the agenda? Aachen/Berlin/Bonn: Brot für die Welt/Global Policy Forum/Misereor. www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Philanthropic_Power_online.pdf
- Sen, Gita / Govender, Veloshnee (2015): Sexual and reproductive health and rights in changing health systems. In: Global Public Health, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Special Issue), pp 228–242.

SDG 4

Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all

Access to quality education, the new paradigm

BY JORGE OSORIO-VARGAS, PROFESSOR AT THE ESCUELA DE PSICOLOGÍA, UNIVERSIDAD DE VALPARAÍSO (CHILE)

Goal 4 of the 2030 Agenda reflects the aspirations and demands of parents, educators and civil society organizations to meet the educational and learning needs of the poor, discriminated and exploited populations in every country in the world. Its formulation goes far beyond the scope of the MDGs, which focused on achieving universal primary education in MDG 2 and on closing the gender gaps in education as the measure of gender equality in MDG 3. In adding the equitable, inclusive and quality dimensions to the goal on education, SDG 4 reflects what was already agreed by governments in the Education for All (EFA) strategy of the Jomtien Summit (1990)¹ and most recently in the Incheon Declaration (2015).²

The new goal seeks to ensure “inclusive, equitable, free and quality primary and secondary education” (Target 4.1) and to “eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations” (Target 4.5). As such it recognizes the disparities in access to inclusive, just and quality education that persist in all countries.

The provision of skills that qualify people for decent work and quality jobs, access to equal and effective

higher education and the adoption of the “lifelong learning” approach are all vital conditions for sustainability. Societies that aim to be prosperous and fair need to include adult education and identify new literacies that enable people to succeed in everyday life. They also need to value and adopt educational initiatives carried out through so-called “non-formal” education, including community learning, environmental learning and non-traditional curricula designed to serve those unreached by formal educational institutions.³

Since universal access to quality primary education has not been achieved, it is imperative to accelerate global political, institutional and financial action to enable children and young people in every community to access educational institutions, and thereby benefit from science and technology. Current times demand creative and sustained responses: the prosperity of a sector of the world population with high cultural capital is not in line with the situation of many groups whose rights to an inclusive and quality education have been infringed.

For this reason, SDG 4 must be contextualized politically, supporting all countries to accelerate measures to make progress towards educational equity and justice. The provision of equitable and quality education cannot wait or slow down. It has to respond to the continuous transformations of the so-called knowl-

1 Cf. UNESCO (1990).

2 Cf. UNESCO et al. (2015).

3 Cf. <http://infed.org/mobi/what-is-non-formal-education/>

edge society. What today may be a weak or failed response to a demand for educational justice, in a short time could be classified as a serious omission and an overall failure of social and economic justice.

For the same reason, the effective expansion of access to public and free secondary education and to vocational training, as mandated by Targets 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5, has to include the learning of new skills required for people and their communities to reach prosperity, well-being, a “good life” and to enjoy global cultural goods. A change of direction is required for educational policies to build capacities and develop quality services that encourage inclusive societies in order to promote freedom and human rights in a comprehensive way.

SDG 4 and its targets require new paradigms for the organization and management of educational systems and policies. For example, Target 4.2 commits governments to “ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education”. It will be important that this is complemented by primary and community health programmes – including through the provision of infrastructure and professional resources.

To implement this, Target 4.a specifies the upgrading of “education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent inclusive and effective learning environments for all.” These targets need to be adapted to different age groups, cultures and territories.

To enable young people to acquire the relevant skills for decent jobs and entrepreneurship, as mandated in Target 4.4, and to enable them to integrate successfully into civic life and culturally diverse societies, as specified in Target 4.7, teacher training programmes are essential. These not only need to be substantially increased, including through international cooperation (Target 4.c) but also need to include a variety of different and culturally sensitive methods in order to enable teachers to reach the broadest number of people.

In addition, educational services and programmes need to be created that strengthen the capacity of

non-formal and community education. The UNESCO document *Rethinking Education. Towards a global common good?*⁴ should generate movements and discussions that will lead to a more relevant paradigm for a comprehensive approach to education guided by the 2030 Agenda.

Comprehensive targets, narrow indicators

Despite this comprehensive vision, detailed in a set of 10 targets, the indicators for SDG 4 are totally inadequate to measure its achievement. In March 2016, the Global Campaign for Education, in a joint statement with 214 civil society organizations, academics and educational professionals, voiced the concern that the indicators for education threaten the commitment of Goal 4 for every child to complete 12 years of free primary and secondary education.

Teopista Birungi Mayanja, Deputy Director of Uganda Education Services and former Education International board member, encouraged civil society to unite and challenge ‘teaching to the test’ and international assessments promoted by some testing companies and private providers.

“None of the indicators selected for Goal 4 captures either the importance of completion of primary and secondary education, which obliges countries to attend to the population of out-of-school children, nor that these 12 years must be free. The omission of these two critical components significantly alters the nature of Target 4.1 and lowers the agenda’s overall ambition.”⁵

Looking forward: realizing the vision, not its indicators

Just and sustainable societies will only be possible where all people have effective cultural capital and the ability to participate in the common cultural life. This makes it necessary to extend the scope of educational processes and to define specific targets

⁴ Cf. UNESCO (2015).

⁵ Cf. www.campaignforeducation.org/docs/statements/Education_Civil_Society_IAEG_SDGs_FINAL_EN.pdf.

“The incredible efforts of governments, UN bodies, and civil society activists – working collectively – resulted in a Sustainable Development Goal for education which we all believed would give every child, adolescent, youth and adult a serious chance to realize their right to free, inclusive, quality education. The unanimous adoption of the SDGs was a moment we celebrated, but today, just six months later, this vision is being threatened. Our demands are not controversial – we simply want an indicator which reflects the goal and targets to which the world has already agreed.”⁶

Camilla Crosco, President,
Global Campaign for Education, 4 March, 2016

⁶ Cf. <http://bit.ly/29jYXpd>

for schools at primary, secondary and tertiary levels within the framework of the SDGs, and according to a concept of inclusive, participatory, and intercultural schooling. This should be done through local and national participatory consultation processes involving residents of every community, and their political representatives and authorities.

Civil society organizations working on education in countries in both the global North and the global South have developed criteria to promote critical thinking and local advocacy on the part of educators, authorities, policy-makers and teachers’ and students’ movements.

It will be necessary to demand accountability of educational institutions and also to promote professional and volunteer activism of civil society organizations that practice an “expanded education” through new communication technologies, social networking and local forms of education, in which the various communities convey their knowledge. From this same perspective, it is important to note that adult education, according to the “lifelong learning” approach recognized in the SDGs, is essential to ensure that “no one is left behind.” People and groups that fail to get a

quality education must not be labeled disposable and irremediably excluded, being unable to handle the new cognitive codes and lacking citizenship skills.

A key challenge is to ensure that access to public education really means receiving a quality education, as stated in SDG 4. The goal cannot be deemed to be achieved by the expansion of enrollment in primary and secondary education if, at the end of their years of schooling, children and youth fail to understand what they read, do not know how to develop basic mathematical operations, are illiterate in matters of citizenship and participation; or during their school days have suffered discrimination and the destruction of their lifestyles and cultural languages because of monocultural, gendered and or racist educational systems.

The quality of education should also be assessed according to the ability of the education systems to provide shelter for children and youth in high risk situations, such as natural disasters, war and armed conflict, neighbourhood violence or gendered, racial and religious aggressions.

Further, it is important to assess the quality of education systems by evaluating their ability to retain students in schools, confronting risk factors of drop-out, such as the need to work in order to contribute to family income, the responsibility of girls and young women to assume the tasks of care and domestic work, teenage pregnancies, large distances between the place of residence and the location of the school, cultural and linguistic differences, authoritarianism and a culture of punishment that still remains the rule in some societies and communities. In this regard it is important to recognize the escalating crisis of education and work in urban youth cultures that are stalked by gang violence, organized crime and the lure of the narco-industry that provides income and an illusion of prestige among the youth.

Inclusion and quality are vital aspects of educational justice that must be advanced – as mandated by SDG 4. For this a key political requirement is that local and national societies appropriate the meaning and content of this goal in a way that associates urgency, cultural relevance, participation and public deliber-

ation and a deep commitment to the health and sustainability of the planet as a common home in which “learning” is synonymous with human development.

Stop funding for-profit private schools

The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) has recommended, in its observations released on 9 June 2016,¹ that the UK Government stop investing in low-fee private schools in developing countries. Low-fee, private and informal schools run by for-profit business enterprises are multiplying rapidly in developing countries. The UNCRC noted that “rapid increase in the number of such schools may contribute to sub-standard education, less investment in free and quality public schools, and deepened inequalities in the recipient countries, leaving behind children who cannot afford even low-fee schools.”²

The UK Department for International Development (DfID), through its development finance institution CDC, has invested US\$ 21 million in the low-fee, for-profit private school chain Bridge International Academies (BIA), since December 2013. BIA,

which also receives millions of dollars from the World Bank, the UK-based Pearson Corporation (the largest book publisher in the world), and billionaires Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg, has recently been in the global press for its heavy-handed tactics to stop a respected academic researcher accessing information on its business and operational practices in Uganda. The researcher, who was working on behalf of the world’s largest professional organization, Education International, was arrested on false allegations, but was released after two days of questioning and all charges were dropped.³

BIA presents itself as “a chain of nursery and primary schools delivering high-quality education for just US\$ 5 a month (on average).”⁴ Referring to the huge number of families living in extreme poverty, it claims that “prior to Bridge International Academies, no one had put together a viable business model that demonstrated that educating the world’s largest

market was possible.” In order to ensure “this massive market opportunity” they explain that “we would need to achieve a scale never before seen in education, and at a speed that makes most people dizzy.”

The Global Campaign for Education, a civil society movement active in 80 countries, notes that this type of for-profit private schools favoured by the World Bank, philanthropy and big donors can have a huge, negative impact on children’s right to a quality education. GCE Vice-President Rasheda K. Choudhury, who is also the director of the Campaign for Popular Education in Bangladesh, warned that “education is becoming more and more of a commodity being sold in the market rather than a public good. This worrying sign is becoming more prominent when we see the ever-increasing quality divide in education.”⁵

1 Cf. GCE (2016) and www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20078&LangID=E.

2 Cf. UN Doc. CRC/C/GBR/CO/5 (3 June 2016), para. 16.

3 Cf. GCE (2016).

4 Cf. www.bridgeinternationalacademies.com/

5 Cf. <http://campaignforeducation.org/en/news/global/view/680-education-for-global-citizenship-achieving-the-sustainable-development-goals-together>.

2.4 Access to quality education, the new paradigm

References

Global Campaign for Education (GCE) (2016): Stop funding for-profit private schools and prioritise free, quality, public primary schools instead: UN's request to UK government supported by GCE. News feature available at www.campaignforeducation.org/en/news/global/view/682-stop-funding-for-profit-private-schools-and-prioritise-free-quality-public-primary-schools-instead-un-s-request-to-uk-government-supported-by-gce

UNESCO (2015): Rethinking Education: Towards a global common good? Paris. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232555e.pdf>.

UNESCO (1990): World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs. Adopted by the World Conference on Education for All, Jomtien, Thailand, 5-9 March 1990. www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-for-all/the-efa-movement/jomtien-1990/

UNESCO et al. (2015): Education 2030. Incheon Declaration. Towards inclusive and equitable quality education and lifelong learning for all. Paris. www.unesco.org/education/Documents/incheon-framework-for-action-en.pdf

Targets for SDG 4

- 4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes
- 4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education
- 4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university
- 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship
- 4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations
- 4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy
- 4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development
- 4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all
- 4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries
- 4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing States

SDG 5

Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Overcoming Global Structural Obstacles and Preventing Negative Spill-over Effects for Realizing Women's Human Rights

BY DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES WITH WOMEN FOR A NEW ERA (DAWN)

The 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a step forward compared to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Unlike the latter, which included only one target by which to measure progress, there are several, interrelated targets under the stand-alone goal to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (Goal 5). In addition, there are also specific targets under 11 of the other goals which link women's rights to the three dimensions of sustainable development (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17).

However, the SDGs do not explicitly recognize the link between women's human rights, gender equality, and the structural reforms needed in global economic governance and policies. As a result, gender equality and women's rights are envisioned as 'domestic issues' rather than global ones. But gender relations are embedded in and reinforced by international financing and development patterns. Therefore, in the implementation of the SDGs a broader interlinkages approach needs to be applied in order to overcome global structural obstacles to realizing women's rights and gender equality.

A bold enough framework?¹

While the language of some of the SDGs might be seen as supporting efforts to revert the trends towards financialization and global instability, as well as creating enabling conditions to realize women's rights and equality,² the 2030 Agenda does not overall explicitly recognize the links between women's human rights, gender equality, and global economic governance and policies. For instance, the dynamic of financialized globalization, which is at the root of macro-economic instability, persistent economic crises, and their negative impacts on women, is still not strongly challenged or confronted.

Furthermore, instead of providing targets to enhance the regulation of the private or corporate sector and to prevent a next phase of the 'global race to the bottom' in labour, human rights, gender equality and environmental standards, the 2030 Agenda explicitly endorses the private sector as the key 'development actor'. Within this framework, multi-stakeholder partnerships are being promoted, not only by governments but by the UN, with no accountability mechanism attached.

¹ This section draws on Bidegain Ponte/Rodríguez Enríquez (2016).

² See for instance Targets 10.5, 10.6, 17.5 and 17.13.

Finally, while there is a stand-alone goal to reduce inequality between and within countries, there is no clear quantitative commitment to mobilize additional and sufficient international public resources for sustainable, equitable and gender just development. One of the major inconsistencies in the rich countries positions during the negotiations was their portrayal of themselves as champions of human rights and gender equality while at the same time strongly resisting efforts to establish an intergovernmental tax body, to agree on binding regulations for the operation of transnational corporations (TNCs), to remove global obstacles to domestic resource mobilization and to ensure additionality, predictability and non-conditionality of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In practice, these are factors that will shape the realization of women's human rights in all countries, but especially in developing countries.

Challenges in the implementation phase

In the implementation phase of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development there is a need to tackle some gaps in this global framework. The first gap is that between the principles outlined in the Preamble and the goals and targets to achieve them. Another is the gap between the goals and targets and the indicators to monitor their progress. These two gaps can clearly be identified in SDG 5.

While human rights, including the right to development, are recognized in the Preamble and in different paragraphs of the 2030 Agenda, it is not possible to identify a human rights-based approach in all SDGs. SDG 5, for example, does not make explicit reference to women's rights, even though some of these are incorporated in the targets. This is the case with Target 5.6 on sexual and reproductive rights, and Target 5.a on women's rights to economic resources, as with targets in other goals, such as Target 1.4 on equal rights to economic resources, and Target 8.8 on labour rights, in particular for women migrants. Moreover, while the targets outlined in SDG 5 cover different dimensions of women's rights they are still limited compared with the comprehensive international women's human rights agenda agreed in the last decades, notably CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action.

Preventing negative spill-over effects

An interlinkages approach can be used to avoid trade-offs between different goals and targets, and to prevent negative spill-over effects in the implementation phase. This approach is key to ensure that progress in achieving some SDGs is not made through means that may hinder achievements in other SDGs, especially in the goals and targets related to gender equality and the empowerment of women.

The use of an interlinkages approach can help to overcome the problems of the 'silos' approach identified by women's rights advocates³ and to analyze the trade-offs and synergies, taking into account not only the impacts of policies on the 'here and now', but also those in other countries as well as in the future.⁴

An interlinkages approach to taxes, gender, and international cooperation

Depending on how Target 17.1 on domestic resource mobilization is implemented, it can have either negative or positive impacts for the realization of SDG 5. Although stressing the need to strengthen domestic resource mobilization, the target does not specify that this should be done by progressive means, leaving governments the option of reaching it in ways that impede progress on gender quality. It is difficult for many countries of the global South to substantively mobilize additional domestic resources without international tax cooperation. Nor is it possible to reduce the gender gap without removing the gender bias of tax policies at national and international levels. If domestic resources are enlarged without taking this into account, it might happen that women, who are over-represented in the lowest quintiles of the income distribution, end up bearing a disproportionately high tax burden while big corporations and rich individuals continue to benefit from tax avoidance and evasion.

In order to avoid these risks, Target 17.1 should be implemented in line with SDG 5, as well as with Target

³ Cf. Sen / Durano (2014).

⁴ Cf. OECD (2014), p. 16.

10.4, that calls for governments to adopt fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality, and with Target 16.4, which aims to significantly reduce illicit financial flows. All of these efforts would be more achievable if an inter-governmental body of international tax cooperation was to be put in place.

An interlinkages approach to decent work, industrialization and trade

Target 8.5 commits governments to achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men by 2030, and SDG 9 seeks to promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (SDG 9). However, the implementation of both of these commitments entail complex challenges.

For instance, promoting sustainable industrialization in a world ruled by unbalanced international 'free trade' agreements might further the industrialization of one region through the de-industrialization, or 're-primarization' of other regions (which seems to have happened in some countries of Latin America in trade with China during the last decade).⁵ This, in turn, results in less women's employment creation as well as the destruction of small-scale agriculture and local community production for domestic

⁵ In the case of Latin America, the sustained growth of China over the past decade resulted in a high demand for commodities with strong impacts in the region in terms of production structure, sustainability, labor heterogeneity and socio-environmental conflicts, cf. ECLAC (2014).

Targets for SDG 5

- 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere
- 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation
- 5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation
- 5.4 Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate
- 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life
- 5.6 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences
- 5.a Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws
- 5.b Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women
- 5.c Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels

consumption, thereby reducing their livelihoods, and restricting women's access to resources. Likewise, industrialization and economic growth can be based on export-led models that benefit from low wages and poor working conditions as a comparative advantage, as in the case of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and maquila production, which have opened up jobs for women in some cases but at serious risk to their health and well-being.⁶

Furthermore, the key role given by the 2030 Agenda to the private and corporate sector as a development actor, with little commitment to regulating its operation, is also dangerous, given that positive links between private sector investment, job creation, gender equality and sustainability are far from automatic. In this regard, instead of promoting the effective regulation of TNCs, the 2030 Agenda promotes private sector engagement and multi-stakeholder partnerships. Two targets under SDG 17 explicitly promote multi-stakeholder and public-private partnerships (Targets 17.16 and 17.17).

Several such multi-stakeholder partnerships, including those initiated by the Secretary-General, have already been launched in key areas of women's rights such as health, education and food, without attaching clear accountability mechanisms. Two examples are the Secretary-General's Scaling Up Nutrition and Every Women Every Child (with its Global Financing Facility) initiatives, both of which have generated parallel processes of reporting that do not adhere to UN norms and standards, including CEDAW and the Beijing Platform.⁷

In order to avoid spill-over effects and to promote equitable patterns of production, trade, consumption and distribution there is an urgent need for international agreement on the regulation of the corporate sector. Instead, the 2030 Agenda is silent on three core issues: efforts in the UN Human Rights Council to develop a legally binding instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other businesses in international human rights law; the

need to establish mandatory *ex ante* and periodic human rights and gender equality impact assessments of all trade and investment agreements; and the importance of reviewing investor-state dispute settlement clauses to ensure that the right of states to regulate in critical areas for sustainable development is protected. Nothing in the new global development framework prevents foreign investors from suing governments for implementing policies designed to help achieve the SDGs, particularly those on health, energy and the environment but may limit potential corporate profitability.⁸ A stronger commitment by governments is needed to ensure private sector compliance with human rights, including women's rights.

Promoting positive synergies towards 2030

Using an interlinkages and rights-based approach to SDG implementation, the creation of positive synergies could also be assessed and promoted. Progress on some goals can contribute to the fulfilment of other goals. For instance, how progress towards more democratic global economic governance can contribute reducing systemic vulnerabilities and inequalities among countries or respect policy space can be analyzed. Assessments can also be made of how advancing universal access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education (Target 4.2) can support progress in reducing the burden of unpaid work of women (Target 5.4).

Focusing on what is needed by the UN, stronger coordination mechanisms between the Financing for Development Forum, the Commission of the Status of Women and the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development should be promoted to tackle the structural obstacles that hinder women and girls' rights and promote positive synergies to realize human rights, equality and sustainability for all.

⁶ Cf. for instance Giosa Zuazúa/Rodríguez (2010).

⁷ Cf. Adams / Martens (2015).

⁸ Cf. Bidegain Ponte / Durano / Rodríguez Enríquez (2015).

References

Adams, B./Martens, J. (2015): Fit for whose purpose? Private funding and corporate influence in the United Nations. Bonn/New York: Global Policy Forum. www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Fit_for_whose_purpose_online.pdf

Bidegain Ponte, N./Durano, M./Rodríguez Enríquez, C. (2015): Shifting Responsibilities without Changing the Balance of Power: What Chance of Equality with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda? UNRISD: Geneva (News & Views, Think Piece Series The Road to Addis and Beyond). www.unrisd.org/UNRISD/website/newsview.nsf/%28httpNews%29/7C29E461AFC163ACC1257EBD0058E76A?OpenDocument

Bidegain Ponte, N./Rodríguez Enríquez, C. (2016): Agenda 2030: A bold enough framework towards sustainable, gender-just development? *Gender & Development*, 24(1) <http://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2016.1142227>

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2014): Compacts for Equality. Towards a Sustainable Future. Santiago de Chile. www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/8/52718/SES35_CompactsforEquality.pdf

Giosa Zuazúa, N./Rodríguez, C. (2010): Estrategias de desarrollo y equidad de género: una propuesta de abordaje y su aplicación al caso de las industrias manufactureras de exportación en México y Centroamérica. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, CEPAL, Div. de Asuntos de Género, http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/5825/S0900807_es.pdf?sequence=1

OECD (2014): Better Policies for Development 2014: Policy Coherence and Illicit Financial Flows. Paris. www.oecd.org/pcd/Better-Policies-for-Development-2014.pdf

Sen, G./Durano, M. (2014): The remaking of social contracts: the promise of human rights. In: *The Remaking of Social Contracts. Feminist in a Fierce New World*. Zed Books, <https://www.dawnnet.org/feminist-resources/content/remaking-social-contracts-feminists-fierce-new-world?tid=25> (last checked by the authors 12 June 2016)

United Nations (2015): Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York (UN Doc. A/RES/70/1). www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

SDG 6

Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

Whose rights to water will the 2030 Agenda promote?

BY MEERA KARUNANANTHAN, COUNCIL OF CANADIANS,
IN COLLABORATION WITH DEVIN TELLATIN AND THE NGO MINING WORKING GROUP

Among the myriad of problems the United Nations is attempting to address over the next 15 years through its 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development is that of access to water and sanitation: SDG 6. However, as Member States develop strategies to implement this goal they need to keep in mind that how they plan to solve the global freshwater crisis depends largely on whose freshwater problems they want to solve. On the one hand, there are hundreds of millions of people without access to essential services, small farmers unable to feed their families and communities and a dying planet whose watersheds are being poisoned and over-extracted. On the other hand, there are big businesses needing greater access to freshwater supplies to sustain large-scale agricultural and industrial production and the accumulation of private wealth. There are not sufficient freshwater supplies to meet essential human and environmental needs while feeding the neoliberal growth agenda that is responsible for the crisis.¹

During the SDG negotiation process, water justice organizations including the Blue Planet Project and the NGO Mining Working Group campaigned for safeguards against corporate abuses of freshwater sources, the sovereignty of local communities over their natural resources and universal access to public water and sanitation services. This culminated in a petition by 621 organizations worldwide calling for

the explicit recognition of the human right to water and sanitation as a basic strategy to achieve these objectives. Although attempts to frame the goal itself in human rights language were not successful, water justice organizations worked with Member States to ensure that the human right to water and sanitation was explicitly referenced in the preamble of the 2030 Agenda. Because water is a cross-cutting issue, this was seen as a major victory.

With the World Bank now positioning itself as a leader in the implementation of the SDG on water, groups who fought for a rights-based perspective are deeply concerned that the agenda will very quickly be steered away from human rights objectives in favour of a plan to manage water in line with the World Bank's vision for economic growth, which depends heavily on the use of water-intensive agricultural and industrial strategies.

When the World Bank argues that freshwater demand will outstrip supply by 40 percent in 2030, the numbers are based on its own projections for GDP growth.² Its solution to meet this gap is largely to find strategies to maintain this level of economic growth by redistributing dwindling water supplies in order

1 Cf. Barlow (2008).

2 This is the finding of a World Bank-led policy consortium called the 2030 Water Resources Group whose data and methodology are detailed in this 2009 report: www.mckinsey.com/~/media/.../charting_our_water_future_full_report_ashx.

to prioritize large-scale users, judged to be “high value,” an approach that will only deepen the social and environmental aspects of the crisis. The World Bank has also aggressively promoted private sector participation in water and sanitation services as a strategy to address the gaps in access despite evidence that this strategy has failed the most vulnerable segments of the population in every country where it has been adopted and failed to bring investments where the needs are greatest in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.³

On 21 April 2016, the World Bank announced that together with the UN it will convene a new high-level panel whose mandate will be to articulate a strategy for the implementation of SDG 6 and mobilize the resources to do so. In the context of a tug of war between two competing strategies for water within the SDGs, this development has raised the ire of water justice advocates.⁴

The World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes in the water sector have had devastating effects for decades. In 1999, the World Bank demanded that in exchange for a US\$ 300 million loan, Indonesia adopt a new water law that would facilitate greater privatization of water and sanitation services and easier access to water resources by foreign investors.⁵ In 2015, the constitutional court annulled the World Bank-imposed law, ruling that it had resulted in violations of constitutional provisions recognizing water as a common good and a human right.

Indonesia’s story is not unique. Through its new corporate-led policy consortium, the 2030 Water Resources Group (WRG) involving multinational corporations such as Cargill, Nestlé and Coca-Cola as well as bilateral agencies such as SIDA and USAID and international development banks, the Bank is pushing policies that give corporations easier access to scarce freshwater resources, using the environmen-

tal crisis as a justification.⁶ In India, Mexico, South Africa, Jordan, Bangladesh and China, among other countries, policies are designed to engage corporate stakeholders in decision-making and prioritize “high value” use of water to ensure that GDP growth targets are not impeded by drought and scarcity.

Not surprisingly, many of the same countries targeted by the 2030 Water Resources Group are among the dozen involved in the World Bank/UN high-level panel, which will be co-chaired by Mauritius and Mexico.⁷ In addition, a technical advisory group that refers to itself as the “Friends of the Water Panel” will engage corporate lobbyists like the World Water Council and proponents of corporate-friendly water policies such as the World Economic Forum, which hosts the WRG, and the Global Water Partnership.

Challenges and risks in implementing the water targets

Water justice groups that have engaged in the SDG process over the past two years must now find strategies and channels not only to advance a rights-based approach but also to counter the efforts by proponents of the neoliberal growth agenda to find opportunities to promote their vision through the SDGs.

One of the major concerns is Target 6.5 on water management, particularly the strategy of integrated water resources management (IWRM), promoted international financial institutions since the 1990s. Based on the premise that the river basin or catchment is the most appropriate unit for water resource management, IWRM risks handing regulation over to multi-stakeholder entities with limited capacity to monitor environmental impact. While the Global Water Partnership for example promotes it as a silver bullet solution,⁸ there is concern that it is a vague “catch-all” concept that has been inconsistent in application⁹ and that its one-size-fits-all strategies have

3 Cf. Hall / Lobina (2012).

4 Cf. <http://canadians.org/blog/global-water-justice-movement-challenges-world-banks-attempt-promote-privatization-water>.

5 Cf. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/17/000094946_99051205341366/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.

6 Cf. <http://www.2030wrg.org>.

7 Cf. <http://sd.iisd.org/news/un-world-bank-announce-members-of-high-level-panel-on-water/>.

8 Cf. <http://www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM/>.

9 Cf. Moss (2010).

A human-rights based analysis of the targets of SDG 6

| Target | Analysis |
|---|--|
| <p>6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all</p> | <p>While the language here is largely consistent with a human rights framework, it fails to include the criteria of sufficiency, needed when corporations compete with communities for scarce water supplies. Proponents of the growth perspective would rather talk about water scarcity in terms of “gaps” between availability and projected economic growth demands. The criteria of sufficiency would therefore be helpful and may be included in the indicators developed to define “access”¹.</p> |
| <p>6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations</p> | <p>Although largely consistent with a human rights-based approach, the target omits the criteria of affordability, necessary in a context where privatization is being promoted as a strategy to address financing gaps.²</p> |
| <p>6.3 By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally.</p> | <p>Measures to protect watersheds from pollution, dumping and hazardous chemicals and untreated wastewater are intricately linked to the human right to water and sanitation. However, municipal services need to be adequately funded in order to avoid forcing cash-strapped local governments to seek private sector solutions.</p> <p>The call to halve the proportion of untreated wastewater is inadequate for all countries, but particularly for wealthier economies, which have the capacity to do better.</p> |
| <p>6.4 By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity.</p> | <p>By focusing on efficiency the target fails to distinguish between consumptive and non-consumptive uses. Local food production keeps water within the watershed, whether it is used “efficiently” or not. A beverage corporation extracting local water resources for export diminishes local supplies regardless of any improvements in water efficiency. The same standards cannot apply to both.</p> <p>While measuring water stress and ensuring that withdrawals do not exceed watershed capacity is important, a hierarchy of water use that prioritizes environmental needs and human rights (including water for productive purposes) above commercial use is essential.</p> |

1 However, some have argued that the criteria of sufficiency is implicit in the use of the term “access” which implies sufficient supplies to meet domestic needs available reliably close to the home. Cf. Murthy (2016).

2 Ibid.

| Target | Analysis |
|---|---|
| <p>6.5 By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate.</p> | <p>Integrated water resources management (IWRM) promoted by IFIs is broadly based on the premise that the river basin or catchment is the most appropriate unit for water resource management. However, its use runs the risk of handing regulatory powers over to multi-stakeholder bodies with limited capacity to monitor environmental impacts or whose interests do not represent those of the broader public.</p> |
| <p>6.6 By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes.</p> | <p>As with Target 6.3, the failure to identify process and structural indicators that would further a human rights agenda leaves this target open to market environmentalist measures such as pricing nature in order to limit access, thereby prioritizing commercial users and dispossessing land-based communities and indigenous peoples whose lives and livelihoods depend on these ecosystems.</p> |
| <p>6.a By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies.</p> | <p>Tax breaks and conditionalities attached to ODA have served to pry open markets for foreign investors and prevent governments from investing in public services.</p> <p>While development assistance is needed to address funding gaps in LDCs, all states require the economic sovereignty and political will to ensure greater public financing for basic services. Therefore global tax justice and debt relief strategies would go much further towards enhancing the capacity of states to finance water and sanitation services that serve the public interest rather than the needs of foreign investors or donors.</p> |
| <p>6.b Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management.</p> | <p>This target represents an important achievement as it emphasizes the participation of local communities as opposed to the neoliberal water governance discourse which emphasizes multi-stakeholder participation.</p> <p>The human right to water and sanitation calls for public participation in decision-making. In addition, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention 169 establish the rights of indigenous peoples to free prior and informed consent, as well as the right to exercise control over their economic, social and cultural development.</p> |

2.6 Whose rights to water will the 2030 Agenda promote?

ignored local knowledge, norms and realities.¹⁰ It will be important to insist on a human rights-based water resource management strategy that prioritizes the role of rights-holders in decision-making rather than corporate stakeholders.

Another issue concerns financing. In the means of implementation targets (Target 6a and 6b) for example, states must be held accountable to human rights obligations in development assistance as per Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on ESCR. This includes the rights of recipient communities and indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making and the obligation of donors to “do no harm.”¹¹

In addition, targets calling for “substantially increasing” or “substantially reducing” as with Target 6.3 and 6.4, are simply too vague to meaningfully hold governments accountable to their responsibilities to protect freshwater quality. Similarly, a focus on efficiency, as done in Target 6.4, rather than socially and environmentally sustainable water use,¹² will do little to address the root causes of the water crisis, which are related to the unsustainable and unjust allocation of scarce water resources. Such a focus also often fails to distinguish between uses that retain water within the watershed (i. e., local food production) and those that do not (e. g., export-oriented monoculture or bottled water). For this reason it is important that watershed protection strategies include local communities in decision-making.

The table above examines the targets of SDG 6 to highlight some of the ways they are consistent with a rights-based approach to implementation as well as the risks they imply for ignoring such an approach.

The human right to water and sanitation, when applied in the broadest sense can provide tools for communities seeking to challenge attempts to neoliberalize water policies through the development agenda. Unless Member States are held accountable

to the commitment to ensure that the SDG agenda is consistent with a rights-based approach the language framing goals and targets is far too vague to preclude the dominance of private over public interests.

In implementing the goal of sustainable water management in partnership with the World Bank, the UN risks reinforcing global power dynamics that have led to natural resources flowing towards Northern economies while leaving Southern communities dry. Export-oriented crops produced for Northern markets leave Southern countries particularly vulnerable to recurring food crises. The large water footprint of developing economies is the consequence of demands imposed on them by foreign direct investment (including extractive industries), export-oriented agriculture, beverage production, and the increased energy production required for these industries.

The UN and Member States must instead support implementation strategies at the international and local levels that empower frontline communities. In an era of deepening freshwater crisis, the UN must support a strategy that is centred on needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized segments of the population, not on those of the corporate elite. Respecting, protecting and fulfilling their obligations with regards to the human right to water and sanitation would be an important place to start.

¹⁰ Cf. Molle (2008).

¹¹ Cf. Rosa (2010).

¹² Cf. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/10464Karanunanathan.pdf>.

References

Barlow, M. (2008). *Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water*. New York, NY: The New Press.

Hall, David/Lobina, Emanuele (2012): Financing water and sanitation: public realities. A report for Public Services International for the 6th World Water Forum, Marseille, March 2012. Greenwich: PSIRU. www.psiru.org/sites/default/files/2012-03-W-finance.docx

Karunanathan, Meera (2015): A Stormy War of Position: An Investigation of the Use of Human Right to Water and Sanitation Discourse to Legitimate Accumulation by Dispossession. Ottawa. www.ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/32407/1/Karunanathan_Meera_2015_thesis.pdf

Molle, Francois (2008): Nirvana Concepts, Narratives and Policy Models: Insights from the Water Sector. In: *Water Alternatives* 1(1): 131–156. www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/allabs/20-a-1-1-8/file

Moss, Timothy (2010): Managing water beyond IWRM – from paradigm to pragmatism. Presentation to 1st Water Research Horizon Conference. Berlin. 13–14 July 2010. Erkner: IRS.

Murthy, Sharmila (2016): Draft Memo for Mining Working Group. New York.

Rosa, Giorgiana (2010): A Human Rights Framework for Development Assistance. In: Canadian Council for International Cooperation (2010): *A Time to Act. Implementing the ODA Accountability Act. A Canadian CSO Agenda for Aid Reform*. Ottawa. www.cci.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/002_aid_2010_05_a_time_to_act_chapter_3_e.pdf

SDG 7

Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all

Energy at a crossroad

BY NICLAS HÄLLSTRÖM, WHAT NEXT FORUM

Energy is a cross-cutting issue that is fundamental to all of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and central to development, security and climate change challenges. Access to energy underpins all aspects of human well-being, be it health, education, food production, transportation, communication and any productive activity. The dominant energy system based on fossil fuels is of course the paramount sector contributing to climate change, which means that a radical overhaul of the global energy system towards 100 percent renewable energy is urgently required. But efforts to address this need are also highly politically charged in that this fossil-fuel based energy system is heavily centralized with a few concentrated points of extraction and generation controlled by limited number of powerful corporations and states, making it a centrepiece of geopolitical turmoil and tension.

Energy may very well be the largest and most daunting sector to tackle in terms of implementing the SDGs, given the enormous changes that need to take place over a very short time period, the powerful vested interest that are set to defend their profits and, ultimately, societies' deep-seated obsession with wasteful, high-energy use models of development.

However, energy may also prove to be the key to unlocking transformational change, and a shift towards sustainability, equality and people-centred development. We see the emergence of a ground-swell movement that is likely to escalate and shake global politics and economic structures in the years to come.

Civil society, social movements, religious leaders and people across the globe are increasingly demanding that fossil fuels be left in the ground while calling for a renewable energy revolution. Households, communities, cities, civil society organizations (CSOs) and companies at all scales are building this new future by investing in renewable energy here and now. Countries and local governments in both the global South and the global North are beginning to formulate bold goals of achieving 100 percent renewable energy societies.

We are at a crossroads, with the potential to choose the road to the renewable energy futures that are a prerequisite for the fulfillment of all other SDGs. We must, however, realize that this vision goes far beyond simply changing fuel sources while leaving present power structures intact. The renewable energy revolution calls for profound changes in terms of how we use energy, who owns and produces energy, and how it is distributed. A renewable energy future calls for a huge increase in the number of smaller-scale consumers who are also producers, such as homes with rooftop solar panels, wind turbines owned by farmers or community cooperatives, and public institutions such as schools, hospitals and universities as well as commercial enterprises using their roofs and land for solar and wind. This would mean expansion of distributed and decentralized power generation that provides access to those in need and direct benefits to local development, job creation and building resilience. The energy model of the future must be a people-centred one.

Energy access, development and sufficiency

Ensuring energy access is in itself an imperative. Up to a point, increasing access to energy is the most decisive factor for increasing well-being and standards of living – while at higher consumption levels there is no such correlation (see [Figure 2.7.1](#)).¹

The UN energy statistics are staggering: 1.3 billion people without access to electricity and 2.7 billion mainly relying on traditional biomass for cooking.² Even so, these numbers do not convey the reality and conceal an even more bleak situation. Meaningful energy access is not delivered with a theoretical, minimum access to limited energy services for sporadic, short periods of time. Neither should energy access be considered achieved when a community is grid-connected but individual households are not. Energy access does not mean energy is available, but

too expensive and thus out of reach for people in poor living conditions. Thus the number of people lacking real access to energy is in fact much larger than the official figures indicate.

The right to sufficient energy is a human right and must be assured and supported by all countries as well as by the global community.

The word ‘sufficient’ is key here. It means that definitions of energy access must be clarified and ramped up in ambition to mean ensuring energy access for all, 24 hours a day and at a scale that allows for both basic and aspirational needs.


It is much more than merely provision of, for example, limited household lighting. Energy access as a human right should entail basic essential energy services such as lighting, adequate level of comfort, clean drinking water, clean and adequate cooking energy, transportation and communication needs as well as entertainment – on demand and through the most efficient energy systems and appliances.

1 Cf. Banuri / Hällström (2012).

2 Cf. International Energy Agency (2015).

Figure 2.7.1

The correlation between energy use and human well-being



Source: UN DESA (2009).

Sufficiency also works the other way – recognizing the need to curb excessive consumption of energy by the world’s elites and middle classes. Electricity use is among the starkest indicators of global inequality there is and the numbers are staggering. It is absurd, that an average Swede, for example, consumes over 200 times more electricity than does an average Tanzanian. An average U.S. citizen, in turn, consumes roughly double the amount of energy a European would, without any higher quality of life.³

The wasteful, overconsuming lifestyles of the richest strata of the world’s population constitute one of the biggest threat to the fulfillment of the SDGs. There is no way the present high levels of energy consumption by the rich can be maintained and constitute everyone else’s aspirational goal.

Over time, therefore, it is necessary for average per capita energy use across countries to converge on a band of ‘responsible well-being’ (taking into consideration variations in local circumstances, such as heating and cooling needs). Unfortunately, this equity dimension of energy access is not recognized in SDG 7, and must be urgently introduced into the public debate, popular movements and policy recommendations.

Energy and climate: 100 percent renewables

Target 7.2, which mandates governments “to increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix” by 2030, is disturbingly vague and lacking in concrete ambition, which implies delayed and weak action. From a climate and carbon budget point of view we must recognize that a shift to 100 percent renewable energy must be initiated immediately, with concrete and ambitious targets for the near term. To have an even outside chance of keeping warming below a very dangerous 2°C, not to speak of the slightly less dangerous 1.5°C, requires rich, developed countries to move to 100 percent renewable energy by 2030 with developing countries following suit shortly thereafter.

3 Cf. Friends of the Earth International (2013).

Climate negotiations and interpretations of the IPCC findings are needlessly convoluted and conceal the urgent reality of what needs to be done. Most climate models so far have included veiled assumptions of ‘negative emissions’ through geo-engineering technologies such as Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) that are not yet proven to work and assume vast land areas in developing countries that do not exist.⁴ Using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) carbon budgets for 2011 onwards, the 1,000 Gt CO₂ remaining for a 2 in 3 (extremely risky) probability to keep below 2°C leaves less than 650 Gt CO₂ for future energy use (after subtracting emissions since 2011 and unavoidable emissions from forests, agriculture and cement production).⁵ This means that less than 15 years of current emissions level globally remains; for 1.5°C there is hardly any budget left.⁶

The conclusion is crystal clear: we are already on overtime and there is *no* time to wait. Rich countries must embark on the most radical transformation conceivable of their entire energy systems, including an immediate stop to all fossil fuel investments and early retirement of existing fossil fuel power plants.

They must immediately boost investments in renewable energy and set up bold, ambitious incentives schemes such as feed-in tariffs that enable and guarantee all actors – from households to cooperatives to farmers to municipalities, utilities and companies – to invest in renewable energy immediately. And they must recognize that such a renewable energy revolution would still takes years to implement, and that immediate behaviour changes, usage bans and regulations are also crucial in order to avoid catastrophic climate change.

For developing countries, the goal must be the same – achieving 100 percent renewable energy systems as quickly as possible. This means changing priorities

4 Cf. www.nature.com/news/talks-in-the-city-of-light-generate-more-heat-1.19074.

5 Cf. Nature Geoscience <http://rdcu.be/eoQY>.

6 Cf. www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-only-five-years-left-before-one-point-five-c-budget-is-blown.

and mindsets from old, dirty and backward centralized models based on large fossil fuel installations, to modern, distributed and intelligent renewable energy systems that can flourish wherever there are communities. Such systems can directly serve both productive sectors and industries and people wherever they live. This leap-frogging must be led and initiated by developing countries themselves, but massively supported and enabled by rich, developed countries in line with their long-standing obligations to provide finance, technology and capacity-building to enable climate-friendly development trajectories. Indeed, this is exactly what is now happening through the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) (see Figure 2.7.2).

How to boost renewable energy investments?

A transformation towards renewable energy is indeed underway, and there are many encouraging examples from both developing and developed countries. Hundreds of cities, municipalities, local govern-

ments and communities have already achieved 100 percent renewable energy.⁷ As the costs of renewable energy technology have dropped much faster than predicted, renewables are becoming increasingly attractive and economically achievable. Costs of solar PV modules have dropped 99 percent since 1976 and 80 percent since 2008,⁸ and are now in many cases competitive with fossil fuels on a life-time basis. Models and strategies need to be updated to take account of these new realities and opportunities (and effectively address factors such as intermittency and battery/storage constraints).


However, extrapolating current trends to the future shows a pace of change that is dangerously and unnecessarily slow. To reach a 100 percent renewable energy future before it is too late will require a

7 See e.g. the Global 100% RE campaign www.go100re.net for overview.

8 Cf. Bloomberg (2016).

Figure 2.7.2

From conventional centralized to smart, distributed renewable, people-centered energy models



Source: Figure adapted from the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research - CSIR in Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (2015).

massive scaling up of efforts and ambitious, government-led policy measures and incentive schemes.

It is essential to understand the cost structure and economics of renewable energy. Unlike for fossil fuels, with solar, wind and hydro almost all the costs lie in the initial construction, with no running fuel costs at all. This means that anyone investing in renewable energy, even if total lifetime costs are relatively low, must take a considerable economic risk in the initial investment. Once done there is no way out. The money has been spent and must be gained back over time. This speaks to the setting up of ambitious, government-led and financed guarantee schemes so that any investor or developer, and in particular inexperienced and less-resourced smaller actors (e.g., households, communities, small and medium-sized companies, municipalities etc.) can safely make the move. By ensuring tariff guarantees (i.e., the producer is guaranteed a set price for each kWh produced over, e.g., 20 years) and off-take guarantees (i.e., the producer is guaranteed to sell all the energy), the investment is safe.

Variations of this simple logic exist in abundance and have proven to be the most effective ways to stimulate renewable energy investment. By being open to all actors, and by not setting any ceiling for how many can enter the scheme and how much investments can be made, this policy approach can usher in an exponential, truly revolutionary increase in renewable energy development.

The catch is of course the financial resources that are needed. With relatively little money, these kinds of guarantees will leverage investments many times larger from both public and private actors. For developed countries the money for these guarantees must be sourced through re-direction of fossil fuel subsidies/cross-subsidization from non-renewable energy and general tax revenues. In the case of developing countries most of these resources must be provided through public climate finance, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility under the UNFCCC and SDG 17.⁹ It is a true in-

vestment, however. Every dollar spent will be earned back multiple times over – both through leverage of vastly larger investments, and through ultimately mitigating the infinitely costly consequences of catastrophic climate change.

The world needs no less than a global effort, a kind of ‘Global Marshall Plan’ or programme for ‘Global Renewable Energy and Energy Access Transformation (GREEAT)’¹⁰ that can spur a renewable energy transition at the scale and speed that is required. All developing countries should be encouraged to formulate comprehensive country-wide programmes and incentive schemes – including ambitious efforts for capacity-building and energy efficiency – to enable a rapid transition to renewables. Through ambitious regional initiatives such as the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative and/or directly through the Green Climate Fund, all developing countries should be financially supported to set such ambitious plans in place. Rich, developed countries must likewise step up to the plate and challenge each other to a race to the top in which they exchange their best practices, policies and radical emissions reductions schemes. A global partnership can provide a space for all these initiatives to meet and boost each others’ efforts, while ensuring the allocation of sufficient public finance.

Ensuring environmentally sound and people-centred solutions

As the world embarks on a renewable energy revolution, it is imperative that this process is undertaken with precaution, safeguards and genuine participation by civil society, policy-makers and individuals as well as a socially responsible renewable energy sector. Only through people-centred planning, decision-making and implementation processes will the renewable energy transformation succeed.

This is no small challenge. The vested interests of both large fossil fuel corporations and investors as well as large renewable energy corporations and

⁹ See also Climate Equity Reference Project (2015).

¹⁰ Cf. Centre for Science and Environment / Friends of the Earth International / What Next Forum (2015).

The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative

The Africa Renewable Energy initiative (AREI) was launched at the COP21 in Paris, endorsed by 54 African Heads of State, and has two main goals:

1. to help achieve sustainable development, enhanced well-being, and sound economic development by ensuring universal access to sufficient amounts of clean, appropriate and affordable energy.
2. to help African countries leapfrog to renewable energy systems that support their low-carbon development strategies while enhancing economic and energy security.

AREI is set to add at least 300 GW renewable energy (i. e., adding more than double current energy generation on the continent) by 2030, and an initial 10 GW by 2020 (a doubling of current rates). It explicitly outlines a transformation towards people-centred, equitably distributed renewable energy with vastly expanded ownership structures enabling households, communities, cooperatives, farmers, small- and medium scale enterprises, municipalities as well as larger companies to become both producers and consumers of electricity.

Among the nine essential work areas in its ambitious Action Plan, AREI emphasizes the need for coordination and mapping of existing initiatives, capacity-building, and provision of bold, programmatic country-wide incentives and regulations, including guarantees for long-term investment security such as tariff- and off-take guarantees (feed-in tariffs).

AREI also highlights the importance of civil society participation and multi-stakeholder involvement, as well as social and environmental safeguards and precautionary technology assessments.

The initiative is unique in its ambitious goals, its developing country leadership, and its simultaneous grounding in both energy access and climate change mitigation.

AREI has evolved within the climate negotiations in Lima in 2014 where the Africa Group of Negotiators called for a global partnership on renewable energy. It has already helped inspire a more collaborative-oriented mode in the negotiations as well as the emergence of other similar initiatives on other continents and by country groupings as for example the Least Developed Countries. These complementary and mutually supported initiatives may come together to form the beginning of a global programme/ partnership.

AREI also speaks to the concrete provision for substantial means of implementation, including public finance, for developing countries. In connection with the AREI launch at COP21 in Paris, G7, Sweden and the European Union issued a joint statement of support, pledging US\$ 10 billion for the first phase of the initiative, until 2020.

AREI is now becoming operationalized with the formation of a fully representative African Governing Board, a trust fund and an implementing agency.

Further information is available at www.arei.org

investors must not overtake and distort efforts for the common good. Through its innovative feed-in tariffs the first phase of the German ‘Energiewende’ led to a very diverse renewable energy landscape with the four large utility companies controlling only 5 percent of the market in contrast to their 85 percent control of the fossil fuels sector. The renewable energy revolution was mainly led by farmers (50% of the ownership), cooperatives and communities, and millions of households. Germany is now seeing a reversing of these policies away from feed-in tariffs towards auctioning that largely benefits larger actors and sets a cap on the renewable energy ambition. Observers agree this is mainly a result of large business pushing back to contain and gain larger markets shares in the renewable energy sector.¹¹

Experiences from around the world show that local energy solutions where people are involved in energy production are much more sustainable, gain wide acceptance by local populations, and generate a vast number of development co-benefits.¹²

¹¹ Cf. www.power-to-the-people.net/2016/06/parliamentarians-can-revive-german-energiewende/.

¹² <http://www.communitypower.eu/en/>

The energy revolution can also drive and provide hooks for revolutions in other important SDG areas. To make this a reality, however, the many encouraging examples of people-centred energy must guide, and even trump, policy-making across a whole range of other decision-making areas.

Stringent environmental and social safeguards are essential, and must also be formulated in genuine, participatory decision-making processes at all levels. National and local governments must be empowered and have the legal right to prioritize local investment and local manufacturing of renewable energy technologies, overturning current and future trade and investment agreements when needed.

The collaborative spirit in which particularly African countries have engaged in climate negotiations, and taken leadership on renewable energy, holds major promise for other areas.

By formulating ambitious visions and outlining concrete steps for achieving these, they make a concrete case for substantial contributions on their own terms, and set the ground for genuine collaboration that can also inspire other regions across other relevant sustainable development goals.

Targets for SDG 7

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix

7.3 By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency

7.a By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy,

energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology

7.b By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States, and land-locked developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support

References

Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (2015): Africa Renewable Energy Initiative Framework. <http://www.arei.org/>

Anderson, Kevin (2015): Duality in climate science. Nature Geoscience. Vol 8, December 2015. www.nature.com/news/talks-in-the-city-of-light-generate-more-heat-1.19074

Anderson, Kevin (2015): Talks in the city of light generate more heat. Nature. Vol 528, issue 7583. <http://rdcu.be/eoQY>

Banauri, Tariq and Hällström, Niclas (2012): A global programme to tackle energy access and climate change. In Hällström (ed.) (2012): What Next Volume III. Uppsala, pp. 265–179.

Bloomberg (2016): Bloomberg New Energy Outlook 2016. New York. www.bloomberg.com/company/new-energy-outlook/

Centre for Science and Environment / Friends of the Earth International / What Next Forum (2015): Programme for Global Renewable Energy and Energy Access Transformation (GREEAT). Uppsala. www.whatnext.org/resources/Publications/Energy/GREEAT_Final.pdf

Climate Equity Reference Project (2015): Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs. Berkeley, CA / Stockholm. <http://civilsocietyreview.org/report>

Friends of the Earth International (2013): Good Energy Bad Energy? Transforming our energy system for people and the planet. Amsterdam. <http://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Good-energy-bad-energy.pdf>

Hällström, Niclas (ed.) (2012): What Next Volume III: Climate, Development and Equity. Uppsala. www.whatnext.org/Publications/Volume_3/Volume_3_main.html

International Energy Agency (2015): World Energy Outlook 2015. Paris. www.worldenergyoutlook.org

Roberts, J. Bodman, F. and Rybski, R. (2014): Community Power: Model Legal Frameworks for Citizen-owned Renewable Energy. ClientEarth: London. http://www.communitypower.eu/images/Clientearth_report.pdf

UN DESA (2009): World Economic and Social Survey 2009 – Promoting Development, Saving the Planet. New York www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/2009wess.pdf

SDG 8

Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

Decent work for all by 2030: taking on the private sector

BY MATT SIMONDS WITH SUBSTANTIAL INPUTS FROM PAOLA SIMONETTI, YORGOS ALTINTZIS, AND THEO MORRISSEY, ITUC

SDG 8 on sustainable and inclusive growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all and its respective targets are incredibly ambitious. Late into the negotiations of the Open Working Group, this goal and its targets were still two separate focus areas: economic growth and employment. The desire to limit the number of goals resulted in the two areas being merged into a single SDG with ten targets and two additional targets related to means of implementation. Despite this merge, the international labour movement can feel pleased that the priorities for the world of work are enshrined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The major challenge under SDG 8 will be realizing the Decent Work agenda in all its dimensions (job creation, social protection, social dialogue and workers' rights, including those of migrant workers), in a manner that is consistent with environmental, social and even economic imperatives.

Within this overarching challenge there are many multi-faceted and multi-dimensional challenges. Governments and businesses will have to adapt their approach to employment creation and employment policies if they are to tackle these issues and meet this goal and its targets.

The current global employment outlook, in both the short and medium term, is cause for concern and action. The ILO estimates that unemployment will continue to increase over the next five years, while inequalities will continue to become more deeply

entrenched, particularly for young people.¹ This is true for developing and developed countries alike. The cause for this dreary employment outlook is in large part due to slowed economic growth globally, exacerbated by a shortfall in aggregate demand, which is directly linked to stagnant (or declining) worker wages. Labour's share of national income has been on a steady decline for decades and even conservative corners of the economic spectrum have concluded that high and rising income inequality has a significant social and economic cost.²

For the international labour movement these trends are a natural corollary of the deliberate and systematic efforts to erode labour market institutions and the building blocks of a socially just society. Minimum wage rates, collective bargaining, labour rights, employment protections and trade unions have all been targeted in virtually all countries over the past number of years. The dominant model that has produced these attacks, a combination of an over-reliance on exports and consumer borrowing for economic growth with the "financialization" of the global economy, has proven to be unsustainable, leading to global economic stagnation. In order to achieve a meaningful economic recovery, countries need to increase domestic demand based on rising wages and a more equal distribution of income. There is therefore a strong economic case for wage-led economic

1 Cf. ILO (2015).

2 Cf. Kumhof / Rancière (2010).

growth, to support aggregate demand and build stronger and more resilient economies. Together with the implementation of universal social protection floors, strengthening labour institutions would raise sustainable aggregate demand and would create new jobs. Decent work for all requires workers to have a voice; strong and functioning labour market institutions are part of the solution.

Macro trends, policy making and the influence of the private sector

Achieving Goal 8 requires change to happen on a macro scale. The drivers of our current economic system have continued to deepen inequality both within and between countries. International economic and financial policies need to be set against an overall objective of delivering social justice and decent livelihoods for all. The complexity and depth of SDG 8 requires fundamental changes to how economies function and interact, and significantly increase the relative importance of progressive social and environmental policies.

The private sector will have a major influence on the implementation of SDG 8. If the targets under this goal are to be achieved, however, it must fundamentally change the way it operates. A move away from a model built upon maximizing profit through exploitation of labour to one built upon human and worker rights and adherence to ILO Conventions will be key. Regrettably however, things are moving in the opposite direction.

The integration of national economies into global markets and the expansion of global supply chains have intensified competition, increased labour migration and caused leading firms to cut labour costs through restructuring, outsourcing and off-shoring, along with efforts to shift workers from full time employees to various forms of contract work. This, in turn, has increased downward pressure on wages and working conditions. In a number of countries, these changes were accompanied by the deregulation of labour markets and a rollback in government support for protective labour market institutions and collective bargaining. These shifts, together with the increased mobility of capital, have tipped bargaining

power away from workers and their representatives and consolidated it within the corporate sector. The current model of global supply chains is based on low wages, insecure and often unsafe work.

The first challenge facing governments and the international community is how to get the private sector to do more to promote fiscal accountability and transparency. As indicated in Target 8.4, it is important to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, nationally and globally. Effective taxation of profit-making and capital accumulation can potentially drive trillions of dollars into productive investment, including towards environmental sustainability, and a “just transition” to green and decent jobs for workers. A global tax framework is needed in order to eliminate tax evasion and avoidance practices, including transfer (mis)pricing, and guarantee that taxes are paid where profits and value added are generated. In addition to the governments who see their revenues decrease, the real losers under the current tax system are the workers of those multinational companies which practice this aggressive tax planning. Workers receive neither a fair compensation for their efforts and productivity nor a share of company’s profits to which they are entitled, since it is taken before it can be redistributed. The days of self-reporting and self-assessment by financial institutions must come to an end and should be replaced by mandatory and transparent country-by-country reporting.

Together with ensuring fair and progressive taxation, a global framework is needed to address the behaviour of financial markets, for instance through the implementation of the G20 commitment to “ending too-big-to-fail groups”³ by taking structural measures to shield retail commercial banking activities from volatile investment banking and market trading. Action should be taken to implement the G20’s Financial Stability Board Action Plan regarding regulating “Over the Counter” derivatives trading, shadow banking and the implementation of

3 Cf. G20 Leaders Declaration, September 2013 (<https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/saint-petersburg/Saint-Petersburg-Declaration.pdf>).

resolution frameworks. Furthermore, global taxation measures (Financial Transactions Tax and bank levies) on short-term transactions are needed so as to prevent speculative behaviour and raise new sources of finance for a more sustainable economy.

Countries with high levels of income and competitiveness are able to open up to global trade, attract investment and expand to markets with new opportunities for export. However, opening trade must not impede a country's capacity to add value or trap the country in low-end processing. Countries and regions that are unable to withstand global competition, because industries and markets are not yet matured, are ill-advised to liberalize trade at the same pace as developed countries. In order to industrialize, developed countries have historically used trade and industrial policies, among other tools.

This allowed them to control investment by imposing requirements on joint ventures, foreign ownership ceilings and local content requirements. Other measures have included using lax regimes for the protection of intellectual property and forced technology transfers, building up state-owned enterprises and conglomerates in order to create competitive products and maintaining a higher level of tariffs to protect their infant industries. Developing countries, and most importantly developing regions, must not make international trade and investment commitments that limit their policy space, and they should actively use this space to promote their structural transformation through national legislation and policies.

Global trade and investment patterns also seriously impact on labour standards. For this reason, international trade and investment agreements should guarantee the enforceability of national labour laws and internationally recognized core labour standards with effective follow up mechanisms. The agreements could also include clear and enforceable responsibilities for foreign investors that apply all the way up supply chains.

In addition, the employment and decent work targets of Goal 8 require bold government action to establish legal responsibility for business in global supply

chains. In particular, stipulating mandatory due diligence for businesses in their supply chain would ensure that business integrates human and environmental costs that are currently not accounted for in business planning. Governments must establish international cooperation and mechanisms for monitoring, inspection, grievance and compensation in order to give effect to business' legal responsibility.

In addition, governments need to do more to protect freedom of association (i.e., the right to join and form trade unions) as well as reinforce social dialogue between worker and employer representatives. This can help establish and expand collective bargaining, promote the linking of wages to productivity and determine or increase minimum wages.

Employment policy frameworks and strengthening labour market institutions

To implement and achieve SDG 8, comprehensive national employment policy frameworks, built upon the principle of policy coherence for development (in particular with regard to decent work), are needed in order to ensure that pro-employment macroeconomic policies are supported by trade, industrial, tax, infrastructure and sectoral policies as well as investments in education and skills development. Such policy frameworks should be developed through tripartite consultations, including governments and social partners (employers and workers' representatives), the pillars to ensure strong and functioning labour market policies and institutions. More specifically, elements of national employment policy frameworks should be appropriately designed wage policies, including minimum wages; collective bargaining; labour inspection (ILO conventions on labour inspection (C81 and C129)); strong employment services; unemployment benefits with strong links to social protection programs; targeted measures to increase labour market participation of women and under-represented groups; as well as, measures to help low-income households to escape poverty and access freely chosen employment.

There is also the need to adopt or reform legislation to deal with the growing number of migrant workers in all regions, as specifically mentioned in Target 8.8.

Similarly, a transformative shift towards sustainable development, including a greener economy and a just transition for workers, requires significant and equitable investment in education, training and lifelong learning. In addition to a global strategy to increase decent work opportunities for youth, specified in Target 8b, there is a need for comprehensive activation strategies to facilitate young people's school-to-work transition, in line with the ILO 2012 call for action and the Global Strategy on Youth Employment.

Governments will need to take extensive measures to ensure the adherence to and respect of ILO core labour standards. It is therefore particularly important in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of sustainable development policies, that governments take measures to enhance social dialogue and participation of social partners.

Policy coherence and accountability requires social dialogue

It is important to make sure that the follow up framework of the 2030 Agenda provides the necessary space and leverage to ensure that needed changes are initiated and to hold actors to their commitments. This requires national ownership of the process at all levels and in all facets from implementation to monitoring.

Among the four pillars of the Decent Work Agenda, social dialogue is the only one not explicitly recognized among the targets and indicators of SDG 8. Since the four pillars are equally important and mutually reinforcing, this omission is a notable oversight, not only with regard to Goal 8 but also to other goals, including ending poverty, advancing gender equality, reducing inequalities and building more just and inclusive societies (Goals 1, 5, 10 and 16).

Social dialogue is an excellent example of how to ensure ownership of policy processes and should inform the way the review processes are actually carried out. At national level, for example, social dialogue can enhance social cohesion and social peace through greater accountability, furthering the objectives of respect for freedom of association and

collective bargaining, independent unions and employer's organizations and the institutional capacity of governments to support such a process.

For social dialogue to be effective, data must be collected to assess its use at country level. At the same time, the national level review processes, which aspires to be an inclusive endeavour, can benefit from the participatory and democratic nature of social dialogue when conducting the reviews.

The role of the ILO, as the specialized agency of the UN on all labour related areas, will be fundamental to the achievement of full and productive employment and decent work for all, particularly with regard to implementation and monitoring, both at the national level and in the official global review process. Its supervisory system for example, a standard-based monitoring system requiring Member States to report regularly on the status of ILO conventions, offering technical support to improve implementation.⁴

However, SDG targets and indicators will only be one part of a larger accountability framework which must incorporate inputs going beyond the limited indicator package. In order to give a complete picture of progress on the SDGs, the information on which progress is assessed will need to come from non-government constituents, including civil society and the specialized UN agencies. In this light, it will be critical that the annual High Level Political Forum fully integrates existing and effective mechanisms of accountability, like the ILO supervisory system into its review process. So, while global indicators will provide a basis for review and follow up, the overall assessment must also take into account and review universally agreed standards in line with international human rights commitments, ILO labour standards and environmental imperatives.

⁴ The supervisory mechanism has a procedure of 'complaints' which aims to ensure that member states are accountable to the conventions they ratify. The 'complaint' procedure has been used successfully in the past when Member States have been unable to uphold different conventions (a complaints and remedy mechanism).

References

ILO (2015): World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2015. Geneva. www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2015/lang--en/index.htm

Kumhof, Michael / Rancière, Romain (2010): Inequality, Leverage and Crises. Washington, D.C.: IMF (IMF Working Paper WP/10/268). www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10268.pdf

Targets for SDG 8

- 8.1** Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries
- 8.2** Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors
- 8.3** Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services
- 8.4** Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in accordance with the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, with developed countries taking the lead
- 8.5** By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value
- 8.6** By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training
- 8.7** Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms
- 8.8** Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment
- 8.9** By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products
- 8.10** Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all
 - 8.a** Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries
 - 8.b** By 2020, develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the Global Jobs Pact of the International Labour Organization

SDG 9

Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

Industrialization, infrastructure and clean technology: at the heart of structural transformation but blocked by binding constraints in the international free trade regime

BY BHUMIKA MUCHHALA, THIRD WORLD NETWORK

The incorporation into the SDGs of inclusive and sustainable industrialization, as well as infrastructure, is a significant achievement for countries of the global South. SDG 9 includes targets to develop regional and transborder infrastructure, raise industry's share of employment and GDP, doubling its share in least developed countries, greater adoption of clean technology and industrial processes and upgrading technological capabilities, innovation and research and development.

Such structural transformation processes were central to economic development policies up to the mid-1970s, focused on productive capabilities, sustained investments in technological and industrial capacities and strategic economic diversification, alongside specialization and exports. However, since the late 1970s the neoliberal model of macroeconomic stability and liberalized markets and borders has downplayed structural transformation and industrial development in favour of export specialization. This model holds that as long as an economy is open to international trade, comparative advantage international competition and privatization will direct capital, labour and material resources to where their contribution to GDP is maximized.¹

However, reality has proven different. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, preferential trade schemes with developed countries, such as 100 percent duty-free quota-free market access by the EU and 60 percent by China, have absorbed a large share of Africa's exports but have done little to help Africa industrialize. The proportion of manufactured goods exported by African LDCs is extremely marginal and did not improve or diversify over 2000-2012 due to the fact that most exports are concentrated in fuels, ores and metals.²

In all developed countries, the state has played a proactive role, by nurturing enterprises, building markets, encouraging technological upgrading, strengthening capabilities, removing infrastructural bottlenecks, reforming agriculture and providing finance. Developing countries have argued that no country has developed without advances in industrialization and productivity, driven by managed investment (both foreign and domestic) and technology.

UN Member States, in agreements such as the Lima Declaration (1975, 2013) and the Istanbul Programme of Action (2016), recognize that industrialization drives development and job creation and thereby

¹ Cf. UNCTAD / ILO (2014).

² Cf. UNECA (2015).

contributes to poverty eradication, gender equality, youth employment, social inclusion and education, among other goals.

The MDGs, which were essentially an aid agenda for poorer countries driven by donor agencies, included no mention of infrastructure or industrialization. The SDGs, while far from ideal, integrate the need for structural transformation, and are universal, obliging all UN Member States to achieve their targets. As such despite the lack of sufficient means of implementation (MOI), they are an advance in global development policy-making.

Infrastructure

At the heart of structural transformation for economic development is national and regional infrastructure, as outlined in Target 9.1, which also specifies affordability and equitable access for all. In the least developed countries (LDCs), limited physical infrastructure, including electricity, water and sanitation, transport, institutional capacity and information and communications technology, is one of the major challenges to development.³ While an inclusive process of consultation and national planning should determine what specific types of infrastructure will best achieve social and economic development (e.g., highways or rural roads), the fundamental implementation challenge for Target 9.1 is financing. Three primary sources of infrastructure investment are official development assistance (ODA), particularly in LDCs, private sector capital and public funds. The sole MOI for infrastructure is Target 9.a, which uses the relatively weak language of “enhanced financial, technological and technical support” without specifying how much and what kind of support.

Likewise, the sole indicator for Target 9.a measures the amount of total ODA that goes to infrastructure. While ODA flows to LDCs are still less than half of the 0.15-0.20 percent of GNI agreed to by developed countries, the bulk of ODA is directed to social sectors, not to building physical and economic infrastructure.⁴

Meanwhile, the primary means of infrastructure financing is through public-private partnerships (PPPs), partnerships between the state and private sector where the upfront financing and implementation is carried out by the private sector while increased costs, risks and liabilities are often borne by the public sector. They have become the status quo vehicle for the World Bank Group, the BRICS New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Chinese and Brazilian national development banks.

While Target 9.1 does not mention PPPs, multi-stakeholder partnerships are promoted under SDG 17, on means of implication (Targets 17.16 and 17.17). Nowhere is there a mention of the disproportionate risks and costs of PPPs to the public sector, which exacerbate inequalities and decrease equitable access to services, including infrastructure.

Various studies have shown these risks, which include:⁵

- PPP financing costs are higher than public costs due to higher interest rates involved in private sector borrowing;
- Debt and fiscal risks, or contingent liabilities, of PPPs are often poorly accounted for, while the public sector must take ultimate responsibility when a project fails or if the private partner goes bankrupt or abandons the project;
- Social and environmental regulation and enforcement, such as workers’ and women’s rights, tax regulation, transparency rules, and environmental safeguards, are often lacking in PPPs;
- Government budgets are constrained by payments required over longer PPP contractual periods (25–30 years in some cases), compared to conventional service contracts (e.g., for refuse collection,

³ Cf. UNCTAD (2006).

⁴ Cf. UN (2011), para. 22.

⁵ Cf. Callan / Davies (2012), Estache / Philippe (2012), Hall (2015).

3–5 years), from higher transaction costs⁶ and from legal constraints against payment reduction schemes.⁷

The appropriateness of the proposed indicators is also questionable. Indicator 9.1.1 measures the “share of the rural population who live within 2 km of an all-season road,” and indicator 9.1.2 measures “passenger and freight volumes, by mode of transport.”⁸ However, Target 9.1 is unlikely to be achieved directly or indirectly from the presence of roads and vehicles. Relevant indicators would include, for example, number of decent work jobs created locally by infrastructure projects, density of health and educational infrastructure projects per capita, and a focus on affordability for the most vulnerable and marginalized in society, including women in the care economy and unemployed and homeless people.

Target 9.5 calls for enhancing scientific research and upgrading the technological capabilities of industrial sectors, Target 9.b calls for support to domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries and the proposed indicator 9.5.1 measures research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP. All three sections of SDG 9 allude to the scaling up of financial resources, public, private, domestic and international. However, recent reports show that 132 countries, across all levels of development, are expected to shrink public budgets even further in 2016 than in other years since the global financial crisis that began in 2007–2008.⁹

By 2020 austerity measures are estimated to impact more than two-thirds of all countries and more than

6 billion people, or 80 percent of the human population.¹⁰ Austerity measures include cuts and caps to the public wage bill, reducing social safety nets and welfare benefits, reforming pensions, reducing or removing public subsidies, privatization, taxing public consumption and services and lowering wages. The weakness of the SDGs in establishing time-bound MOI commitments to scale up international financial resources for the global South, especially LDCs, may well undermine the ability of these countries to address the key goals on structural transformation under these circumstances.

Industrialization

The core of SDG 9 is Target 9.2, which promotes inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and includes three key targets to raise industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030 and to double their share in LDCs.

It is widely recognized that manufacturing activity is positively correlated with GDP and skilled employment, and has a multiplier effect on job creation, as every one job in manufacturing creates 2.2 jobs in other sectors.¹¹ The proposed indicators for this target, manufacturing value added (MVA) and employment as a percentage of GDP, are thus appropriate and relevant.

However, missing in the targets is anything to reduce the constraints developing countries face if they implement the same industrial policies used historically by developed countries. These include infant industry protection and regulations on foreign investment (including performance requirements and local content sourcing) that help domestic enterprises upgrade their technology and labour skills, and increase their domestic value-added (which increases demand for labour and output of other enterprises).¹²

These critical policy tools are increasingly prohibited through legally binding free trade agreements (FTAs),

6 According to data from the European Investment Bank total transaction costs for PPPs can average over 20 percent of the total project value. Contract disputes may further increase these, as “the development of quasi-markets has already led to a contractual playground for lawyers and legal firms.” Quoted in Hall (2010), p. 5.

7 Hall (2015) p. 35 mentions that annual payments to two major road PPPs in Portugal cost 800 million Euros, more than the annual national transport budget of 700 million Euros.

8 Cf. UN Doc. E/CN.3/2016/2/Rev.1;(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/2016-2-SDGs-Rev1-E.pdf).

9 Cf. Ortiz et al. (2015).

10 Ibid.

11 Cf. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>.

12 Cf. Chang / Green (2003).

bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and to a lesser degree, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIM) in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Trade and investment agreements with the U.S. and Canada in particular limit the use of performance requirements by developing countries. Out of 20 US FTAs currently in force, all but two prohibit performance requirements under the investment chapter.

The ability of states to manage foreign investment through performance requirements is crucial for the following purposes:

- promoting domestic manufacturing capabilities in high-value added sectors or technology-intensive sectors;
- stimulating the transfer or indigenous development of technology;
- promoting small and medium-sized enterprises and their contribution to employment creation;
- stimulating environment-friendly methods or products;
- promoting purchases from disadvantaged regions in order to reduce regional disparities; and
- increasing export capacity in cases where current account deficits would require reductions in imports.

FTAs and BITs also extend pre-establishment rights to investors, guaranteeing the right to establish, acquire and expand investments with the same treatment accorded to domestic investors. Some investment treaties also include employment clauses that guarantee foreign investors the right to employ staff of any nation without interference from the host state, thereby constraining the right to development.¹³

Small-scale industrial enterprises

Access to financial services and affordable credit for small-scale industrial and other enterprises, called for in Target 9.3, are measured by two indicators that specify the share of small-scale industries in total industry value-added and with a loan or line of credit. Given that small businesses engaged in industrial manufacturing account for over 90 percent of global business and between 50–60 percent of global employment, access to credit and services is critical. However, again, the roadmap for how to get there is absent. There is nothing about the role of national development banks, state banks and local cooperatives that have historically provided credit and financial services to small businesses. Meanwhile, financial services liberalization under the aegis of FTAs, BITs and the WTO expands the role of multinational banks that lack the mandate or the capacity to ensure affordable credit for small businesses with greater risk profiles than bigger businesses.

A key threat to the survival of small-scale enterprises is the provision of equal treatment to foreign and domestic businesses, under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Under the TTIP, for example, the UK reservation of 25 percent of supplier contracts for industrial SMEs may be rendered illegal.¹⁴ The SME Association of Malaysia estimates that the TPPA is likely to force out at least 30 percent of Malaysia's 650,000 small and medium enterprises that cannot compete internationally with multinational enterprises. Primarily concentrated in local businesses (81%) rather than exports (19%), if foreign products overtake domestic markets small businesses have nowhere to go.¹⁵

Global value chains

Target 9.3 also calls for the integration of small-scale industrial and other enterprises into value chains and markets. However, with regard to global value chains (GVCs), not all enterprises can gain. The great-

¹³ Cf. South Centre (2015).

¹⁴ Cf. Kennedy (2015).

¹⁵ Cf. Foon (2015).

er the technological, manufacturing, service capacities, the larger the firm size, ability to meet international market standards and the level of managerial expertise, among other criteria, determine the ability of a firm to succeed in GVCs.

Currently, 67 percent of global value added occurs in developed countries, with only 9 percent in China, 5 percent in Russia, Brazil and India and 8 percent in all LDCs.¹⁶ Lead firms, the vast majority from developed countries, retain high-value added activ-

¹⁶ Cf. UNCTAD (2007).

ities, such as research, innovation, design, sales and marketing, in their home countries, while outsourcing low-value added activities, such as raw materials and assembly line processing, to developing countries. Rather than integrating into value chains, small-scale industrial firms in developing countries need to deepen their production capacities in order to garner a bigger share of the value added,¹⁷ for which domestic or regional markets often offer better opportunities.

¹⁷ Cf. South Centre (2013).

Targets for SDG 9

- 9.1** Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all
- 9.2** Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries
- 9.3** Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets
- 9.4** By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities
- 9.5** Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending
- 9.a** Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States
- 9.b** Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities
- 9.c** Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020

Clean Technology

Target 9.4 calls for greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes and increased resource efficiency. The fact that technology-dependent growth accounts for approximately 80 percent of the income divergence between rich and poor countries since 1820 indicates that developing countries require increased access to technology, including through concessionary and preferential terms. The key structural obstacle to technology transfer is the international intellectual property rights regime, which is entrenched in trade agreements and the WTO and prevents developing countries from being able to use existing technology without onerous royalty payments. In this regard, the Technology Facilitation Mechanism created at the 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa, has the potential to support developing countries' concrete technology needs.

The development of renewable and clean energy in the South is already being undermined by a recent WTO panel ruling that struck down India's efforts to develop domestic solar energy on the ground that they violated India's national treatment obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the WTO TRIMs agreement. India argued that under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015), it had an obligation to ensure the adequate supply of clean electricity generated from solar power at reasonable prices in order to mitigate climate change and achieve sustainable development.¹⁸ Developing country efforts to secure unrestricted access to technology transfer in the Paris negotiations were also defeated.

Given such power imbalances in international agreements, how are developing countries, even when political will is mobilized, supposed to develop renewable energy for the goal of cleaner industrial processes? Without a cleaner industrialization model, how is the "sustainable" part of the SDGs to be taken seriously?

Conclusion

The structural challenges surrounding industrial policy tools and clean technology are undeniably daunting. At the same time, a diversified, dynamic, inclusive and sustainable industrialization is at the very heart of structural transformation, without which the SDG paradigm remains a patchwork of goals that do not address domestic growth, job creation and local self-sufficiency. Indeed, SDG 9 is at the center of the transformative potential of the SDGs, on par with SDG 10 on inequality and SDG 17 on MOI. The substantive integration of industrialization, which would not have been possible in the formulation of the MDGs, is evidence that the SDGs, while far from perfect, has the potential to address the right to development through structural transformation, where the poorest nations and communities have the opportunity to develop their economies on a foundation of equity, human rights and ecological sustainability.

¹⁸ Cf. Kanth (2016).

References

- Banga, Rashmi (2013):** Measuring Value in Global Value Chains. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Background Paper No. RVC-8. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ecidc2013misc1_bp8.pdf
- Callan, Margaret / Davies, Robin (2013):** When Business Meets Aid: Analysing public-private partnerships for international development. Canberra: Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 28, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. http://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/pdf/papers/DP_28_-_%20When%20business%20meets%20aid%20-%20analysing%20public-private%20partnerships%20for%20international%20development.pdf
- Chang, Ha-Joon / Green, Duncan (2003):** The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: Do as we say, not as we did. Geneva and Cambridge: South Centre/CAFOD. http://www.ecolomics-international.org/n_sd_south_center_doaswesay_notaswedid_03.pdf
- Estache, Antonio / Philippe, Caroline (2012):** The impact of private participation in infrastructure in developing countries: Taking stock of about 20 years of experience. Brussels: ECARES working paper. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-133537.html>
- Foon, Ho Wah (2015):** SMES must buck up for TPPA. In: The Star, 23 November 2015. <http://www.thestar.com.my/metro/smebiz/news/2015/11/23/smes-must-buck-up-for-tppa/>
- Hall, David (2015):** Why Public-Private Partnerships Don't Work: The Many Advantages of the Public Alternative. London: Public Services International. http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/rapport_eng_56pages_a4_lr.pdf
- Hall, David (2010):** More public rescues for more private finance failures – a critique of the EC Communication on PPPs. London: Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU). www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/2010-03-PPPs_FINAL.pdf
- Kanth, D. Ravi (2016):** Countering Climate Change vs. Neo-Mercantilist Goals. Geneva: SouthNews No. 104. <http://www.other-news.info/2016/04/trade-countering-climate-change-vs-neo-mercantilist-goals/>
- Kennedy, Lindsey (2015):** The secret business plan that could spell the end for SMEs. In: SME Insider, 12 February 2015. <http://www.smeinsider.com/2015/02/12/the-secret-business-plan-that-could-spell-the-end-for-smes/>
- Muchhala, Bhumika (2013):** Amplifying the private sector in development: Concerns, questions and risks. Penang: Third World Network (TWN) briefing paper 69. https://www.unngls.org/IMG/pdf/Third_World_Network_-_Private_Sector_Role_in_Development_Oct_2013.pdf
- OECD (2011):** Measuring Aid: 50 Years of DAC Statistics. Paris. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/MeasuringAid50yearsDACStats.pdf>
- Ortiz, Isabel et al. (2015):** The Forthcoming Adjustment Shock. Policy Brief based on The Decade of Adjustment: A Review of Austerity Trends 2010-2020 in 187 Countries. Geneva and New York: ILO/South Centre/Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University. <http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=53243>
- South Centre (2015):** Investment Treaties: Views and Experiences from Developing Countries. Geneva. <http://www.southcentre.int/tag/bilateral-investment-treaties-bits/>
- South Centre (2013):** Global Value Chains (GVCs) From a Development Perspective. Geneva. http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/AN_GVCs-from-a-Development-Perspective_EN.pdf
- UN (2011):** Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020. Istanbul. <http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/ldciv/action.pdf>
- UNCTAD (2006):** The Least Developed Countries Report 2006. New York and Geneva. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ldc2006_en.pdf
- UNCTAD / ILO (2014):** Transforming Economies: Making industrial policy work for growth, jobs and development. New York and Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_242878.pdf
- UN DESA (2007):** Industrial Development for the 21st Century: Sustainable Development Perspectives. New York. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/industrial_development/full_report.pdf
- UNECA (2015):** Industrializing Through Trade. Addis Ababa. http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/era2015_eng_fin.pdf

SDG 10

Reduce inequality within and among countries

Will inequality get left behind in the 2030 Agenda?

BY KATE DONALD, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (CESR)

SDG 10 is arguably the most groundbreaking element of the 2030 Agenda, especially when compared to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Through SDG 10, States commit to tackling inequality *within* and *between* countries. Its targets pledge action on income inequality; social, political and economic exclusion; discrimination; inequalities of opportunity and outcome; key policy determinants of inequality (such as fiscal policy); and reform of global governance.

The inclusion of SDG 10 addresses a central and much-noted weakness of the MDGs, namely, that they pursued and lionized aggregate progress while masking (or in so doing, implicitly encouraging neglect of) disparities and inequalities.¹ Indeed, embracing the need to tackle inequality as a priority ‘development’ issue is long overdue. It has long been evident that many development (and development-related) policies and interventions have exacerbated inequalities.

The goal resonates strongly with core human rights and development priorities. Equality and non-discrimination has long been a cornerstone principle of international human rights law, enshrined at the core of every major convention. The human rights

framework also makes clear that paying attention only to absolute poverty and basic needs is far from sufficient. Tackling inequalities (of opportunity and outcome) and discrimination (direct and indirect), is crucial to move towards the full realization of human rights.

SDG 10 covers several different types of inequality, some more explicitly than others. It should therefore operate as a lever to combat ‘horizontal’ inequality and exclusion of particular groups (including persons with disabilities, women, racial or ethnic minorities), as well as overall levels of economic inequality (i. e., disparities of income and wealth) between individuals and households in society. Traditionally, human rights advocates and standards have focused more on social inequalities between groups. Increasingly, however, the human rights and social justice implications of economic inequality are also being explored.² Extreme economic inequality can be shown to produce many detrimental human rights effects,³ and also interacts with and reinforces almost every other type of inequality. For example, the IMF recently confirmed that gender inequality in both opportunities and outcomes is highly correlated with income inequality.⁴

1 For example, progress on MDG indicators was consistently worse for disadvantaged groups in every region, see e.g. Melamed (2012), as they were for ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, to say nothing of non-conforming sexual identity groups.

2 Cf. the debate on Open Global Rights: Economic inequality – can human rights make a difference? (www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/economic-inequality-and-human-rights).

3 Cf. UN Human Rights Council (2015), pp. 11–13.

4 Cf. Gonzales et al. (2015).

Increasingly, evidence shows that high levels of inequality (especially economic inequality) also impact negatively on economic growth, poverty reduction, health and education outcomes, social cohesion and political stability.⁵ Recent research has shown, for example, that eradicating extreme poverty (SDG 1) will be impossible without tackling economic inequality.⁶ Therefore, energetically tackling inequalities is of crucial importance to progress across the whole 2030 Agenda. This message came out loud and clear in the extensive civil society consultations held on the post-2015 agenda, where a persistent call emerged to include an explicit focus on inequalities, both as a stand-alone goal and as a cross-cutting priority.

The challenge of implementation

In some senses, SDG 10 is the strongest embodiment of the universality of the new agenda. All countries in the world have stark and persistent inequalities, which in many cases have widened in recent decades, and particularly during the period covered by the MDGs. Extreme economic inequality is causing growing public outrage around the world.

However, SDG 10 already seems very vulnerable to strategic neglect or political backlash. Throughout the intergovernmental negotiations there was significant and sustained resistance from some Member States to a stand-alone inequality goal. It was not raised as a priority by any heads of State or Government at the September 2015 Summit for adoption of 2030 Agenda, and initial indications show that it is not being prioritized in nascent implementation plans.

Meanwhile, the global indicators agreed for SDG 10 do not properly cover the scope and intentions of the goal and targets, nor do they incentivize the most important policy actions (see below). This recalcitrance is likely due to the fact that this is one of the goals whose achievement depends most on profound changes to the ‘business-as-usual’ model of

economic growth.⁷ Success will require significant redistribution of wealth, resources, opportunities and power, which in turn means robustly addressing the financial and political privileges of wealthy elites and transnational corporations. This redistribution of power will be necessary at the global and national scales. Reducing inequality *between* countries is a stated aim of the goal, and will in any case be necessary in order to allow poorer countries the fiscal and policy space necessary to tackle domestic inequalities. These kinds of redistributive actions, while profoundly necessary from the point of view of human rights, are needless to say politically unpalatable for many governments.

SDG 10 targets and indicators: what got left behind

The political resistance by some powerful Member States to SDG 10 during the Post-2015 negotiations is manifested in a set of targets that fail to fully reflect the intention of the goal, and to set out a strong and specific action agenda for reducing inequality.⁸ For example, Target 10.4 commits Member States to “Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.” Clearly, not all such policies will be conducive to the desired result. Some - such as fiscal austerity measures - have in fact contributed to the escalation in inequality seen in the MDG years. Revealingly, the word “progressive” was initially meant to be a descriptor before “fiscal, wage and social protection policies”, but was moved due to political bartering over language. A similar dynamic occurred during the negotiations over language on redistribution.

The SDG 10 targets which are intended to focus on economic inequality are also frustratingly vague about naming the issue explicitly, and shy away from focusing on the top end of the wealth and income distribution. Instead, Target 10.1 concentrates on the bottom 40 percent of national populations, ending

5 Cf. e.g. UN DESA (2013), pp. 66–68, and IMF (2014).

6 Cf. Lakner et al. (2014).

7 Cf. Nicolai / Hoy / Berliner / Aedy (2015). In this ODI report SDG 10 is graded as an ‘F’, meaning that “reversal will be needed – complete rethinks in approach, new commitments, and likely public pressure”.

8 Cf. Lustig (2015).

up being more a target about pro-poor growth than economic inequality per se.⁹ Given that inequality is by definition relative, and the accumulation of wealth and income at the top has direct impacts on the situation of those at the bottom, this neglect is counter-productive when it comes to achieving the overall goal.

The indicators agreed to measure SDG 10 suffer from a similar problem. The true extent of inequality may well be underestimated currently, in large part because the world's poorest live beyond the reach of statistical systems, while much of the vast wealth of the world's richest is hidden offshore and therefore uncounted.¹⁰ The SDGs potentially provide an opportunity to address this. Indicators and data are important for accountability because they provide the 'measure of progress' (or lack thereof), against which government policies and actions can be judged.¹¹

9 Cf. Cobham et al. (2015).

10 Cf. Cobham (2015).

11 Cf. Center for Economic and Social Rights (2015).

Indicators are also to some extent political messaging devices. They incentivize certain policy actions at the expense of others. This is why it is so perplexing that the global list of SDG indicators nowhere includes a robust or comprehensive measure of economic inequality, such as the Palma ratio, despite the fact that good methodologies already exist, to say nothing of more far-reaching measures of inequalities not only within but also among countries that are yet to be developed.¹²

The global indicators agreed to monitor the reduction of inequalities between countries are also woefully inadequate, even in combination with the indicators for the related targets under Goal 17.¹³ In particular, the indicators fail to delineate the responsibilities of countries at different points on the global inequality spectrum, and instead focus on broad outcomes.

For example, the indicator for Target 10.6 is "Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations" – a worthy

12 Cf. Donald (2016).

13 Cf. Adams / Judd (2016) p. 1.

“Leave No One Behind”

The exhortation to “Leave No One Behind” has become the overarching rallying cry of the 2030 Agenda. Although it has been widely accepted and repeated, its meaning remains vague and variable depending on who is using it. Moreover, there has been little discussion of the centrality of SDG 10 to the “Leave No One Behind” agenda. Despite its good intentions, “Leave No One Behind” risks being a meaning-

less rhetorical flourish if it is not linked explicitly to SDG 10 and to human rights, both civil and political as well as social, economic and cultural, and if levels of economic inequality are not actively and energetically tackled.

Fundamentally, it will be impossible to ensure no one is left behind without taking proactive and timely steps towards achieving SDG 10 and its targets, in particu-

lar in addressing discrimination, social exclusion and economic inequality. Inequalities between countries will also need to seriously reduced, in particular by dismantling the structural, institutional and policy barriers which severely constrain the policy and fiscal space of the poorest countries, where the greatest number of those most at risk of being left behind live.

end goal, but one that fails to incentivize or pinpoint the action that specific actors need to take to reach it, so that all can easily absolve themselves of responsibility if progress is disappointing or non-existent.

Persistent pressure from civil society and concerned developing countries will be necessary to ensure that the goal to reduce inequalities between countries does not get entirely lost in the monitoring and reporting processes (and therefore, ultimately, in the implementation). The UN and its agencies also have a responsibility to carefully measure and report on this aspect of the goal, building on what was done by the MDG Gap Task Force. Meanwhile, given that the global level is the obvious place to monitor inequalities between countries, the High Level Political Forum should play a proactive role in ensuring a regular, critical examination of progress towards these targets.

Advancing policies to reduce inequalities

Extreme economic inequality is not inevitable. It is created, perpetuated and exacerbated by laws, policies and practices of the sort that have dominated the global policy agenda of the last three decades. It is compounded and reinforced by disparities and discrimination on grounds such as gender, race and disability. In addressing economic as well as social inequalities, and acknowledging that profound policy shifts are needed to tackle these, the 2030 Agenda represents a significant opportunity to reverse course.

Although the exact package of measures for tackling economic inequality will vary by country, there are several types of policies that are generally and particularly indispensable; including social protection, fiscal policy (especially progressive tax policies), public service provision, labour and wage policies, and financial regulation. All of these policies are linked broadly by the idea of redistribution (how economic rewards are shared), and changing the current status quo of where wealth, income, power and resources are concentrated. These policies should be seen as interdependent. Each addresses a different stage or aspect of redistribution.

For example, in order to properly fund comprehensive and human rights-compliant public services and social protection, in most countries additional revenues will have to be raised through taxation (plus related measures such as tackling corporate and elite tax evasion and illicit financial flows, partially stipulated in Target 17.1 and Target 16.4).

Moreover, the particular measures taken will have to be guided by the overarching objective of reducing inequalities. For example, while Target 17.1 calls for support to domestic capacity for tax collection, it does not address the nature of tax policy itself; it is clearly counter-productive to seek to fund pro-poor services through regressive taxation.¹⁴ In every area, policy-makers will also have to carefully consider the impact on gender equality and women's rights; for example, whether they increase or reduce woman's share or amount of unpaid care work.¹⁵

Of course, an equally crucial aspect of SDG 10 is to reduce inequalities *between* (not just within) countries. The two parts of this goal are interdependent; global forces also affect inequality within individual countries,¹⁶ and currently many countries are constrained in terms of the fiscal and policy space they have to tackle domestic inequalities, a product partly of the gross resource and power imbalances between Member States.

The targets under SDG 10 cover several important areas for policies at the international level and cross-border cooperation, including improving the regulation of financial markets, enhancing the voice of developing countries in global financial institutions, facilitating safe migration, and encouraging official development assistance (ODA) and financial flows to those States that most need assistance.

However, they certainly do not go far enough. Substantial reform in global economic governance will

¹⁴ Cf. UN Human Rights Council (2009) on social programs and taxes in Brazil.

¹⁵ Cf. Donald / Moussié (2016).

¹⁶ Cf. UNRISD (2010), p. 71–76 and 79.

be necessary in order to redress the power imbalances among Member States.¹⁷

As recognized in the SDGs and in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), ODA and other forms of financial assistance from rich countries are still an important vehicle for sharing wealth and economic resources more justly. However, there is increasing emphasis on domestic resource mobilization for development. This is welcome in many respects, but disingenuous without recognition that the international context has a huge bearing on the ability of governments – especially in developing countries – to raise and use domestic resources effectively. For example, while the international system facilitates or encourages practices like cross-border tax evasion, tax competition, the use of tax havens and corporate profit shifting, developing countries lose billions of dollars in potential revenue each year – far more than they receive in ODA. These practices therefore perpetuate inequality at a global scale and inhibit progress towards greater equality in the poorest countries.

The achievement of SDG 10 will require substantial efforts by individual Member States and Member States acting collectively to (1) identify and redress harmful ‘spillover effects’ of policies relating to (inter alia) tax, trade, the environment and financial regulation on human rights and sustainable development overseas; and (2) to oversee and regulate transnational corporate actors and the impact of their actions more robustly. Otherwise, national efforts to achieve SDG 10 are likely to be made redundant by global forces. In this respect, rich countries have by far the greater responsibility to act, as their ‘spillovers’ are more far-reaching and most large transnational corporations are under their jurisdictions. Although there have been some limited positive signs of good intent and good practices from rich

countries like the Netherlands and Ireland,¹⁸ and the AAAA (para. 103) did include a pledge to conduct such corporate impact assessments, in general the political will and momentum seems to be profoundly lacking in this area.

Conclusion

In the maelstrom of lofty aspiration, effusive rhetoric and fierce criticism surrounding the 2030 Agenda, the profoundly transformative potential that SDG 10 offers should not be overlooked or underestimated. A global stand-alone goal for all countries that directly addresses inequalities, and firmly places economic inequality on the development agenda, would have been unthinkable 15 years ago, and was only made possible thanks to steadfast civil society advocacy. This opportunity should not be wasted. If prioritized and pursued with commitment, SDG 10 could be part of a much-needed larger paradigm shift in how ‘development’ is conceptualized and pursued – towards societies in which wealth, resources and power are more evenly shared, founded on a human rights-based vision of social and economic justice.

References

- Adams, Barbara / Judd, Karen (2016): 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Indicator framework, monitoring and reporting. New York: Global Policy Watch (Global Policy Watch Briefing #10, 18 March 2016). www.globalpolicywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GPW10_2016_03_18.pdf
- Center for Economic and Social Rights (2015): The Measure of Progress. New York. www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr_measure_of_progress.pdf
- Center for Economic and Social Rights / Third World Network (2015): Universal Rights, Differentiated Responsibilities: Safeguarding human rights beyond borders to achieve the SDGs. New York / Penang. http://cesr.org/downloads/CESR_TWN_ETOs_briefing.pdf
- Cobham, Alex et al. (2015): Top incomes drive inequality – so why does the inequality target ignore them? In: The Guardian, 21 September 2015. www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/sep/21/top-incomes-drive-income-inequality-global-target.

¹⁷ For example, the creation of an intergovernmental tax body within the UN. Unfortunately, this proposal was resisted by developed countries at the Addis Ababa Financing for Development conference in July 2015.

¹⁸ Cf. Center for Economic and Social Rights / Third World Network (2015).

Cobham, Alex (2015): Uncounted: has the post-2015 data revolution failed already. Birmingham: DLP. www.dlprog.org/opinions/uncounted-has-the-post-2015-data-revolution-failed-already.php

Donald, Kate (2016): SDG targets risk missing the mark on inequality. New York: Center for Economic and Social Rights. www.cesr.org/article.php?id=1822

Donald, Kate / Moussié, Rachel (2016): Redistributing Unpaid Care Work - Why Tax Matters for Women's Rights. Brighton/New York: IDS/CESR (IDS Policy Briefing issue 109, January 2016). www.cesr.org/downloads/UnpaidCare_IDS_CESR.pdf

Gonzales, Christian et al. (2015): Catalyst for Change: Empowering Women and Tackling Income Inequality. Washington, D.C.: IMF (IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/15/20, October 2015). www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43346

IMF (2014): Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality. Washington, D.C. (IMF Policy Paper, 23 January 2014). www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/012314.pdf

Lakner, Christoph et al. (2014): Twinning the goals: how can promoting shared prosperity help to reduce global poverty. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/11/20377179/twinning-goals-can-promoting-shared-prosperity-help-reduce-global-poverty>

Lustig, Nora (2015): A missing target in the SDGs: Tax systems should not reduce the income of the poor. London: IGC. www.theigc.org/blog/a-missing-target-in-the-sdgs-tax-systems-should-not-reduce-the-income-of-the-poor/

Targets for SDG 10

- 10.1** By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average
- 10.2** By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status
- 10.3** Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard
- 10.4** Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality
- 10.5** Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations
- 10.6** Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions
- 10.7** Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
- 10.a** Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements
- 10.b** Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes
- 10.c** By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent

2.10 Will inequality get left behind in the 2030 Agenda?

Melamed, Claire (2012): Putting inequality in the post-2015 picture. London: ODI. www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7599.pdf

Nicolai, Susan / Hoy, Chris / Berliner, Tom / Aedy, Thomas (2015): Projecting progress. Reaching the SDGs by 2030. London: ODI. www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9839.pdf

UN DESA (2013): Inequality Matters: Report on the World Social Situation 2013. New York. www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/reports/InequalityMatters.pdf

UN Human Rights Council (2015): Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston. Geneva (UN Doc. A/HRC/29/31). www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Documents/A_HRC_29_31_en.doc.

UN Human Rights Council (2009): Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter. Addendum: Mission to Brazil. Geneva (UN Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.6). <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-33-Add6.pdf>

UNRISD (2010): Combating Poverty and Inequality. Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics. Geneva. <http://socialprotection-humanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/PovRep-small.pdf>

SDG 11

Make cities and human settlements
inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Towards a New Urban Agenda

BY SANDRA VERMUYTEN, PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL

Habitat III, the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, will be convened in Quito, Ecuador, 17–20 October 2016. The objective of this conference is to reinvigorate the global commitment to sustainable urbanization and to focus on the implementation of a “New Urban Agenda.”¹ This agenda can also be seen as the implementation programme for SDG 11 on inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities.

These are the 10 key points for a New Urban Agenda:

- The generation of decent work opportunities for all as a precondition to urban socio-economic inclusion and local economic development;
- Universal access and public investment in essential public services such as water, energy, health care, transportation, waste management, social services, education etc.;
- The protection of public spaces and commons from privatization and gentrification;
- The inclusion of labour and environmental clauses in public procurement and public contract transparency and disclosure;
- The empowerment of local government;

- Decent working and living conditions and capacity-building for public sector and municipal workers who will have to implement the New Urban Agenda;
- An integrated approach to fight corruption;
- Tax justice for local governments and communities;
- The right to housing for all;
- The need for national governments to secure policy coherence between an inclusive New Urban Agenda and their tax and trade policies.

1. Decent employment opportunities for all workers in cities and local communities at the heart of the New Urban Agenda

If city government and urban economic development programmes are to deliver on social and economic inclusion and sustainable livelihoods, they must include opportunities for decent work²

2 Decent work must fulfil the eight ILO core Conventions: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). See also the chapter on SDG 8 in this report.

1 Cf. UN Doc. A/RES/66/207.

and place workers at their heart. Programmes must have a special focus on integrating potentially vulnerable workers, including women, young, elderly, informal, precarious and low-skilled workers, long-term unemployed, the working poor, migrant workers, indigenous communities and LGBT groups. Working people are the actors who build the cities and keep them running, and to do so they need empowerment, rights, protection and the right to organize. Every urban dweller over the minimum employment age is a worker or a potential worker, and it is only by creating decent work opportunities at a local level that national and local governments can sustainably empower urban populations, unleashing their potential to lift themselves and their families out of poverty, while contributing to local economic development, essential public services and social protection systems. The decent work deficit is also a key factor behind the failure of many urban development policies, as people cannot afford to live in cities where they cannot make a living and are pushed into low-income, segregated suburbs and slums. Implementing the ILO's Decent Work Agenda at a local and urban level means creating employment opportunities for all urban workers through active labour market policies and improving existing working conditions, especially for poor and informal economy workers. These employment opportunities must respect fundamental human and labour rights and guarantee:

- Equal treatment and non-discrimination at work;
- Adequate occupational health and safety standards (OSH);
- Universal access to social protection;
- Effective measures to facilitate the transition from informal to formal employment;
- Lifelong access to education, vocational training and skills development opportunities;
- A living wage and sustainable livelihoods.

2. Essential services and infrastructure that are public, accessible to all and democratically accountable to local communities

Universal access to essential public services has a major impact on equality among urban populations and is inextricably linked to respect for human rights. Essential public services are the foundation blocks of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and include: water, affordable energy, sanitation, waste management, health care, education, social services (e.g., child and elder care, social housing), public security (municipal police), emergency services (firefighters, emergency medical responders), culture services (e.g., libraries, museums), public spaces (e.g., parks) and natural resource management. Accessible, affordable quality public services are paramount for building inclusive, sustainable cities and for reducing inequality in urban settings.

These essential public services must be publicly owned. When market dynamics and profit maximization govern their provision, the social and environmental sustainability objectives that public institutions have a mandate and duty to pursue become distorted and are no longer achievable. Public resources and commons become endangered, transparency and democratic civic scrutiny are weakened and the overall economic and social costs to the community rise. There is no evidence that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector, in fact, experience as well as scholarly economic studies have shown the public sector to be as efficient or more so than the private sector.

This finding is consistent across all forms of privatization; be it a one-off sale of assets, outsourcing or concession or public-private partnerships (PPPs).³ Effective alternatives to PPPs include restoring municipal ownership, public-public partnerships and inter-municipal cooperation.

3 Cf. PSIRU (2014), Hall (2015), Jomo et al. (2016).

3. Protection of urban public space, land and natural resources and the development of efficient, sustainable transportation systems

Just like public services, the preservation, accessibility and protection of public space in urban settings are major factors for urban equality and are inextricably linked to human rights.

Urban public space is a prerequisite to inclusive, resilient and sustainable cities, as well as a prerequisite for participatory democracy and civic empowerment. Only by accessing adequate, safe, clean and properly equipped public spaces can people exercise their human right to freedom of assembly and expression and their right to a clean, healthy, sustainable environment. Public space is also key to local development and employment, as it is vital for access to transportation and for economic activities such as open markets, street vending and waste-picking that provide livelihoods for vulnerable workers in the informal economy, most of whom are women. Adequate urban public space is also a key factor in pre-empting the social tensions and security issues that go with social segregation, market-led gentrification, social marginalization and the proliferation of urban ghettos and slums.

Access to public urban land for participatory urban agriculture is also proving critical for building inclusive, sustainable cities and for ensuring access to food. Sound policies are needed to preserve urban heritage and cultural resources for future generations and maintain accessibility as a key vehicle for social inclusion and participation. A green, sustainable, accessible and shared transportation system is a prerequisite to secure the socio-economic connectivity and cultural vibrancy typical of inclusive urban public spaces, while contributing to air quality, safety, employment and active lifestyles.

The New Urban Agenda can achieve this by:

- Halting the privatization and commercialization of public space and commons (e.g. the enclosure of public space by private estate de-

velopers or the charge of a private fee to access a park) through appropriate legal frameworks;

- Requiring that local and municipal authorities provide for and invest in adequate, fairly distributed, safe public space for all in their urban planning, including appropriately separate, well-organized access for public transport, pedestrians, cyclists and commercial deliveries;
- Encouraging, promoting and investing in participatory, gender-responsive approaches for the identification, use and upgrading of public spaces (e.g., slum upgrading, urban food gardens and allotments);
- Investing in and promoting green, sustainable, safe, gender-responsive and shared public transportation systems.

4. Public procurement that is socially and environmentally responsible and accountable

Local governments and municipalities are some of the major clients of the construction industry and can therefore be powerful change agents for progressive changes towards fair, inclusive cities. The public sector has enormous potential to leverage its urban building and infrastructure development policies and purchasing power to demand the respect of social, labour and environmental standards from builders and suppliers, and require both decent work and sustainable local sourcing practices.

Public procurement in the New Urban Agenda must aim to achieve social, environmental and local economic development objectives, and not focus solely on cost considerations. Local governments and municipalities must use their purchasing power to specify social and labour clauses in procurement policies, in line with ILO Convention 94.⁴ These include: explicit references to equal

⁴ ILO Convention concerning Labour Clauses in Public Contracts, 1949 (No. 94).

treatment and conditions for all workers on building sites regardless of their origin and status; mandatory formal employment arrangements; health and safety standards and skills; as well as a chain of liability down the whole subcontracting process. The details of public contracts should be made publicly accessible in order to allow for review and evaluation. Good practices already adopted by several municipalities can serve as models for the New Urban Agenda.⁵

5. Local governments acknowledged and empowered to realize inclusive New Urban Agenda

Local governments are at the forefront of introducing and implementing inclusive, innovative local and urban policies, and of implementing global frameworks such as the Sendai Protocol on Disaster Preparedness, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda. It is therefore essential to ensure the political, fiscal and administrative empowerment of cities, municipalities, regions and other local government entities as key players in the creation of inclusive, sustainable urban development and effective urban risk and crisis management systems.

Local authorities also play a critical role in all decisions related to social inclusion, decent jobs, workers' rights and working conditions, and are essential in facilitating the inclusion of informal economy workers into the formal economy. Local governments therefore need to be empowered to implement the Decent Work agenda at a local level, including with regard to labour inspection, active labour market policies and worker participation in local democracy and decision-making. Additionally, municipalities must not suffer from unfunded mandates. Subsidiarity must be accompanied by adequate and sustainable funding that is not reliant on the vagaries of the political cycle.

6. Decent work and living conditions, skills and capacity-building for public sector and municipal workers

Local governments are not abstract entities: they are made up of working people, and only skilled, well-trained local government and municipal staff, with decent working and living conditions and access to adequate resources, can sustainably deliver quality public services to the communities they serve and successfully confront the many challenges posed by rapid urbanization. While elected local government representatives change with political cycles, professional local public servants often stay on and their work is critical to secure continuity, coherence and long-term sustainability of urban policy implementation. The New Urban Agenda therefore must protect and promote the right of local government workers to organize and bargain collectively⁶ (in line with ILO Convention 151 on Employment Relations in the Public Service), to be free from the threat of unfair dismissal, and must take measures to build their capacity and professionalization, so that local government workers can develop and implement innovative, constructive solutions to make cities socially inclusive, sustainable and safe.

7. An integrated approach to corruption

Coherent, effective, enforceable transparency and accountability regulations and measures, addressing all actors and stakeholders, are needed to prevent and halt corruption and unethical practices in the implementation of the New Urban Agenda, both at national and at local level, including in public procurement procedures. The details of public procurement contracts should be public and accessible to enable transparency, accountability and proper evaluation. This must include adequate measures for proportional and effective sanctions, public seizure of profits and gains attained through corruption and unethical

⁵ E.g., the ICLEI's Respiro Guidelines for Responsible Procurement in Construction, cf. www.respiro-project.eu/.

⁶ As per the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

practices and the protection of whistle-blowers, their families and communities from harm and retaliation.

8. Sustainable financing for the New Urban Agenda involves tax justice for local communities

The New Urban Agenda requires sustainable public financing that includes the payment of a fair share of taxes by the private sector – including multinational corporations (MNCs) operating or sourcing within the jurisdiction of competent local and regional governments. Local government authorities must be involved in tax policy decisions, so that they can ensure balanced agreements with domestic and global business and investors and have the right to a direct say on setting fair returns for local communities in terms of tax revenues, local decent work creation, clean technology transfer, profit reinvestment, fair pricing for commodities, non-abusive dispute settlement clauses and protection of public services to the population.

9. Global social housing shortage requires equitable solutions that uphold the right to housing

When gentrification and real estate speculation, poor social housing and integration policies and the privatization and commercialization of public spaces in urban settings match with socio-economic exclusion and forced evictions, the result is an explosive mix that pushes vulnerable communities to the margins of cities and generates urban ghettos and slums. These socially-segregated, informal settlements reproduce socio-economic inequality, creating a vicious circle of informal employment or work in the informal economy, perpetuating inter-generational poverty, illiteracy and lack of skills and education and increasing threats to public health and security. Slums are also the urban areas that are worse hit by disaster and extreme climate events. Often it is the same workers who build and serve cities on a daily basis (e.g., waste collectors, builders, bus drivers, teachers, nurses, etc.) who cannot afford to live close to their workplaces and have to commute long hours at high cost.

Public housing deficits and unaddressed socio-economic issues related to informal settlements are a major threat to fair cities and to an inclusive New Urban Agenda. What is needed is an urgent, equitable, comprehensive solution that upholds to right to housing and includes the effective regulation of the housing market and equitable land reform, adequate, sustainable social housing for low-income and other vulnerable groups, as well as a halt to forced evictions. A coordinated effort is necessary to mobilize national, regional and local government resources and identify sustainable solutions, including credit and building cooperatives, for financing the development of adequate, affordable housing and to promote participatory slum upgrading. The employment of sustainable, environmentally disposable and renewable local materials, together with energy-efficient technology, must be encouraged for upgrading existing and in any new social housing to reduce carbon emission and enhance environmental friendliness in production and disposal processes.

10. National governments play a critical role in setting an enabling regulatory framework and in ensuring policy coherence for fair cities and the implementation of an inclusive New Urban Agenda

National governments have a major role and responsibility to ensure that local governments and communities are empowered to build fair cities and to successfully implement an inclusive New Urban Agenda, rooted in the generation of decent employment opportunities for all. They can create an enabling environment for local governments to thrive by implementing a domestic policy framework based on the following principles:

- Decentralization to local government in policy areas in which local populations have a direct stake and should have an opportunity to shape through participatory democratic processes.
- Subsidiarity in tax collection to fund local infrastructures and public services, so that local growth and economic development is reinvested in the local economy.

- National frameworks for the regulation of labour relations in the public sector, based on decent work and on ILO Convention 151, and supportive of good labour relations' practices at a local government level.
- Policy coherence, supportive and collaborative approaches with local government, especially concerning common, systemic challenges such as migration, environmental protection, natural disasters and climate change.

National governments also have a responsibility to ensure policy coherence between the New Urban Agenda and the global tax and trade policy framework by:

- Supporting the initiative for the reform of the international taxation system towards an equitable and comprehensive global tax cooperation system to redress the complex financial engineering and tax avoidance schemes designed by multinational enterprises and international

Targets for SDG 11

- 11.1** By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums
- 11.2** By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons
- 11.3** By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries
- 11.4** Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage
- 11.5** By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations
- 11.6** By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management
- 11.7** By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities
- 11.a** Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning
- 11.b** By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels
- 11.c** Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials

investors that starve local and national government of essential resources to service their communities.⁷

- I Opting out of the negotiations on global and regional trade agreements that:
 - I constrain national and local government sovereignty and regulatory powers in favour of business and corporations;
 - I allow foreign corporations to challenge local government regulations and actions by providing the rights to sue for damages in areas such as zoning, liquor licencing, waste disposal and others; and
 - I limit their ability to invest in public services, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), which jeopardize sustainable development efforts through investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms that limit the ability of national and local policy-makers to pursue non-profit objectives such as social and environmental goals in the interest of their communities.

References

ICRICT (2015): Declaration of the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation. www.icrict.org/declaration/

PSIRU (2014): Public and private sector efficiency. A briefing for the EPSU Congress, May 2014. Brussels: EPSU. www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/PSIRU_efficiency.pdf

Hall, D. (2015): Why Public-Private Partnerships don't Work. The many advantages of the public alternative. Greenwich: PSIRU. www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/rapport_eng_56pages_a4_lr.pdf

Jomo KS / Chowdhury A. / Sharma K. / Platz D. (2016): Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Fit for purpose? New York: UN (UN DESA Working Paper No. 148, UN Doc. ST/ESA/2016/DWP/148). <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2288desaworkingpaper148.pdf>

⁷ Cf. ICRICT (2015).

SDG 12

Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

Corporate capture subverts production and consumption transformation

BY CHEE YOKE LING, THIRD WORLD NETWORK

Production systems that create jobs, use appropriate technologies and generate goods and services are central to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Those who develop and control these technologies will shape production systems as well as consumption patterns and lifestyles.

Corporate-centric forces have been driving and shaping consumption and production patterns, often locking in those patterns through corporate capture of politics and policy-making at all levels from the national to the global, and across sectors.

A stark example can be seen in the case of agriculture. Agroecology, biodiversity and farmer-centred agriculture and sustainable food systems¹ are pitted against industrial monoculture, genetic engineering (from genetically modified organisms to synthetic biology and New Breeding Techniques²) and ever-growing corporate concentration.³ Six corporations⁴ control global markets for industrial seeds/

agrochemicals with collective sales of more than US\$ 65 billion a year, and accounting for more than 75 percent of all private sector agriculture research in seeds and chemicals. Three of these companies (Monsanto, Dupont and Syngenta) control 55 percent of the global seeds market while three others (Syngenta, Bayer and BASF) control 51 percent of agrochemical production. Thus, a handful of corporations control the entire chain of production from research to the final products. This market power also enables these corporations to get legislatures to pass laws that turn seeds into private “intellectual property”, penalize small farmers for saving, re-planting and selling seeds, and dilute efforts to regulate genetically engineered organisms.

The same corporate concentration plays out in the pharmaceutical sector. In 2014 Big Pharma, consisting of a handful of corporations earned US\$ 1 trillion, up from annual earnings of US\$ 300 billion in 2006. In 2014 the top revenue earners were Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, Roche and Pfizer. For the first time, a biotech company nudged aside one of the biggest Big Pharma names.

Eli Lilly & Co. was replaced in the top 10 by Gilead Sciences whose skyrocketing sales were fueled by its new blockbuster hepatitis C drug, Sovaldi (generic name Sofosbuvir), more than doubling its revenue

1 www.ipes-food.org. See also Chapter 2.2 in this report on SDG 2.

2 See, for example, Steinbrecher (2015). Also www.etcgroup.org that provides information and trends of the impact of emerging technologies and corporate strategies on biodiversity, agriculture and human rights.

3 Cf. www.etcgroup.org/content/mega-mergers-global-agricultural-inputs-sector.

4 BASF, Bayer, Dow, Dupont, Monsanto and Syngenta.

in 2014 to US\$ 24.5 billion from US\$ 10.8 billion.⁵ Gilead's pricing of US\$ 84,000 for 12 weeks' treatment triggered worldwide protest when generic versions are available for as low as US\$ 101.⁶

As the major players in one of the most lucrative and powerful industries in the world they also succeed in getting countries to adopt monopoly-friendly laws and patent regulations, thus squeezing out generic medicines production. Medicines that can save lives and cure diseases are a dream for hundreds of millions of people because patents have become a tool through which Big Pharma is able to demand exorbitant prices.

When governments act to protect the public from the ill effects of such monopoly power, corporations challenge them under the terms of trade and investment agreements. Laws passed by Uruguay and Australia to implement their obligations under international law⁷ to reduce cigarette consumption and protect public health, for example, met with the wrath of the tobacco industry. Philip Morris took those two governments to private investor-to-state dispute arbitration under bilateral investment agreements in attempts to undermine the public health laws.

From 1992 to the present: corporate capture subverts “fundamental changes”

The urgency of tackling wasteful and excessive consumption by the rich and of meeting the needs of the world's majority, especially the poor, featured strongly in the public discourse around the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The Rio negotiations put unsustainable consumption and lifestyles on the UN agenda for the first time. The crisis of depleting natural resources exemplified by tropical forest devastation and violation of indigenous peoples' rights as well as climate change was a wake-up call. Unfortunately the power of corporations to reap profits from selling products and lifestyles linked to materialistic desires and a reductionist dream of what life should be, in order to increase sales, underlined the US infamous red line: the American way of life is not up for negotiation.

There was intensive debate over whether consumption/lifestyles or population was a major driving force of the environmental crisis during the negotiations on the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 Plan of Action. This continued into the final stage of negotiations as the US delegation shocked the conference by denying that consumption patterns were related to environment problems and proceeded to square bracket (disagree with) the most important paragraphs of an already diluted chapter of Agenda 21 dealing with unsustainable consumption.⁸ The US reluctance to address the link between consumption patterns and environmental stress has continued through subsequent negotiations; its success in deleting targets and timetables for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the parallel negotiations on the 1997 climate change treaty in Kyoto exposed the Northern refusal to accept the need for fundamental changes in its economic policies and lifestyles.⁹

The explicit stance of the first Bush Administration in 1992, that the American lifestyle is not up for negotiation, still dominates political reality in the USA, as well as across most of the global North. Unsustainable lifestyle and consumption have in fact been globalized through aggressive marketing that targets the new and emerging middle classes and elites in the global South.

The compromise agreement, that both unsustainable production and population growth were major

⁵ Cf. FirecePharma (2015).

⁶ Cf. <http://msfaccess.org/our-work/hepatitis-c>. In response to protests, in 2015 Gilead licensed several Indian generic manufacturers to produce cheaper generic versions but exclude middle-income countries where millions need the medicine, and where the largest numbers of poor people live. See Médecins Sans Frontières (2015).

⁷ WHO FCTC (2003).

⁸ Third World Network (1993), p. 11.

⁹ Ibid., p. 82.

drivers of environmental degradation was expressed in Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration: “To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should **reduce and eliminate** unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies” (emphasis added).

Fast-forward to 2015 when the SDGs were forged, and that commitment has been reduced to mere remnants in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Although watered down, Agenda 21 itself is closer to reality than is the 2030 Agenda as it recognizes the links to imbalances in patterns of production

Tinkering with “sustainable or eco tourism” hides the real face of tourism

BY ANITA PLEUMAROM (TOURISM INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING TEAM) AND CHEE YOKE LING (THIRD WORLD NETWORK)

Despite pronouncements of tourism being a positive force for economic development and poverty eradication, tourism is inept at meeting the challenge of implementing the SDGs. Like no other industry, tourism promotes – and glamorizes – a hyper-mobile and hyper-consumeristic lifestyle, rendering sustainability elusive. In fact, tourism development is fraught with negatives including inequality, social and cultural erosion, environmental degradation and climate pollution.

Recent research is particularly alarming in terms of tourism’s contribution to climate change, primarily due to the high energy use for transport such as air travel. Based on a new global tourism emissions model, global tourism is set to emit some 300 gigatonnes of CO₂ between 2015 and 2100, which is 30 percent of the global carbon budget for sustainable development. It is preposterous to take so much of this budget, also needed to meet the energy demand of billions of people around

the world. Tourism alternatives such as “green” or “eco”-tourism can also be problematic. Not only do they usually depend on long-haul flights – but despite some exceptions, they also tend to penetrate fragile ecosystems and Indigenous Peoples’ community land, and trigger biodiversity and culture loss.

Tourism as a major source of financial leakage is well documented. As it is frequently large foreign companies that either initiate or take over commercially successful tourism projects and repatriate profits to headquarters and shareholders based abroad, the domestic retention of tourism benefits and their distributive effects has a very poor record. A particular characteristic of contemporary tourism in this age of neoliberal globalization is that it is closely intertwined with the finance and real estate industry. Ground evidence shows that vast tracts of public land are being privatized and acquired by foreign investors for luxury

tourism, residential and commercial development, resulting in displacement and disempowerment of local people. Additionally, the radically de-regulated business environment spawns price hikes and speculation, posing high risks to local economies.

Therefore, steering tourism policy and practice towards more sustainability requires first and foremost tackling the unjust economic structures and power relations that drive tourism development. We would also need to put in place regulations that effectively protect local citizens and communities from harmful tourism as well as mechanisms that require travel and tourism businesses to compensate for losses and to clean up the damage they created. Clear, transparent, accessible mechanisms of accountability are also needed to empower people(s) to monitor and hold governments, financial institutions, development agencies and the private sector engaging in tourism accountable for their actions.

and consumption. Thus Paragraph 4.3 states: “While poverty results in certain kinds of environmental stress, the major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances.”

Further, in Paragraph 4.4, governments agreed: “Measures to be undertaken at the international level for the protection and enhancement of the environment must take fully into account the current imbalances in the global patterns of consumption and production.”

This point was made again in Paragraph 4.5, which states: “Although consumption patterns are very high in certain parts of the world, the basic consumer needs of a large section of humanity are not being met. This results in excessive demands and unsustainable lifestyles among the richer segments, which place immense stress on the environment. The poorer segments, meanwhile, are unable to meet food, health care, shelter and educational needs. Changing consumption patterns will require a multipronged strategy focusing on demand, meeting the basic needs of the poor, and reducing wastage and the use of finite resources in the production process.”

By contrast, under SDG 12, on production and consumption, the focus on excessive demand and unsustainable lifestyles has disappeared and the targets for that goal are very narrow and patchy. In the 2030 Agenda as a whole, there are only two references to lifestyles and these are only in the context of education (Target 4.7) and awareness-building on sustainable lifestyles (Target 12.8).

The groundwork for this slippage was however laid in Agenda 21, which also marked a shift from global agreement on the need for corporate regulation and accountability to the embrace of corporations as part of the solution to unsustainable development. That same year, in the UN system itself, work on a global code of conduct for transnational corporations (TNCs) was terminated and the small Centre on TNCs effectively dismantled. Thus corporations, for which the constant expansion of production and consumption

determines their bottom line, coupled with governments that accept the neo-liberal model of continued economic growth, continue to be obstacles to change.

Today we witness the increase of legal “rights” for corporations (especially foreign investors), including the right to directly challenge governments when they make and implement public policies that affect profits, including future, expected profits that they themselves calculate. Corporate capture of public policy-making and norm setting is evident at all levels, from the national to the global.¹⁰ Corporate accountability and the polluter pays principle have given way in large part to voluntary corporate responsibility and “multi-stakeholderism”.

From the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 to the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (Rio+10 outcome document) to the “The Future We Want” (Rio+20 outcome document) and finally to the 2030 Agenda, the words “fundamental changes” in production and consumption have survived. But the spirit has become progressively weaker and the targets are not designed to achieve fundamental changes. The current indicator framework is even more inadequate.

Lifestyle choices are not merely individual choices but are primarily molded by values nurtured by education (formal, and within family and community) and development choices (through public policy). Target 12.8 perpetuates the assumption that individual awareness and informed choice are sufficient to bring about more sustainable lifestyles, committing governments only to: “ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature” by 2030.

The 10-Year Framework of Programmes (10YFP)

Rio+20 adopted the voluntary 10-Year Framework of Programmes (10YFP) on sustainable consumption and production, invited the UN General Assembly to designate a UN Member State body to take needed

¹⁰ For a discussion on the role of corporations in the UN Development System, see Adams / Martens (2015).

steps to fully operationalize the framework, and designated the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) as the Secretariat. Negotiations at the Commission on Sustainable Development on the 10YFP were difficult and its adoption was delayed, signaling a further retreat of governments from the Agenda 21 starting point in 1992. At that time civil society groups criticized Agenda 21 as weak but it appears to be so much stronger today!

SDG 12 explicitly reiterates that developed countries should take the lead in implementing the 10YFP, but this framework is much narrower than the Rio 1992 commitment to lead in shifting to sustainable consumption and production patterns. The decades of intergovernmental discussions at the now terminated Commission on Sustainable Development and in UNEP, and now in the actions mandated by the 10YFP and the SDG targets, reveal a systematic fragmen-

Targets for SDG 12

- 12.1** Implement the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries
- 12.2** By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources
- 12.3** By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses
- 12.4** By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment
- 12.5** By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse
- 12.6** Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle
- 12.7** Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities
- 12.8** By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature
- 12.a** Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production
- 12.b** Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products
- 12.c** Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities

tation of the transformative nature of shifting to sustainable production and consumption. The objective of the 10YFP talks about generating “transformative change”, but its multi-stakeholder approach constrains the ability to put on the table the central issue of global political power imbalances along with corporate capture and dominance.

Despite these imbalances in power and influence, the 10YFP, along with much of the UN system itself, assumes everyone can be at the table (“inclusive”), be equal and like-minded (“collaborative”), and have “shared objectives”. The reality is that profit maximization and the dominant corporate bottom line rewards individual breaking of limits, fundamentally contradicting the limits of nature, communal and inter-generational responsibility. Production systems that embody these contradictions generate tensions and conflicts with regard to values, stewardship of and access to resources, research and technology choices, as well as the types of goods and services produced for society. It is not surprising that economic globalization and liberalization particularly since the 1980s have resulted in greater inequality and polarization within and between countries.

However, even as the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs identify poverty eradication and overcoming inequality as priorities, governments and UN bodies have failed to tackle the structural obstacles to sustainable production and consumption; instead of acknowledging corporate capture and regaining space for national and local public policy-making and necessary regulation, the agreed global response is the highly limited 10YFP, with its multi-stakeholder model as the primary delivery mode. Thus instead of embracing the need for government regulation of corporations, countries agreed only to urge companies to change their behavior. Thus, SDG Target 12.6 limply states: “Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle.”

A case in point is the sustainable tourism programme agreed in the 10YFP. Tourism epitomizes unsustainable consumption and lifestyles linked to rapacious economics and powerful corporate actors (see Box

in this chapter) but the programme is led by the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).

The nature and conceptualization of the UNWTO does not allow for it to adequately deal with the unsustainable and unjust patterns of tourism. Originally formed as a business organization, the UNWTO remains industry-controlled and industry-oriented and its critics do not regard it as a responsible UN agency acting for the social whole.

In synchrony with the global tourism and travel industry, it continues to aggressively campaign for further tourism growth despite the fact that much of contemporary tourism is antithetical to sustainable development, and tourism-related goods and services are often luxuries that can only be enjoyed by the world’s minority. Even if some improvements can be achieved in tourism through better regulation and management as well as increased demand for ecologically sustainable activities (“ecotourism”) it is clear that the gains made will be steadily undermined through continued growth of the tourist industry itself, as forecast and aspired to by the UNWTO. Instead of regulating and down-scaling the inflated tourism sector and effectively engaging in harm avoidance, the UNWTO sends a wrong message to the public: that “sustainable (eco)tourism” is the solution and needs to grow without barriers for the benefit of us all.¹¹ Accordingly SDG Target 12.b, “to develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products is way off the mark where sustainability is concerned.” Countries such as small island developing states that heavily rely on tourism have to contend with the volatility of tourism¹² and the need to address aviation for climate change mitigation. More sustainable economic activities are needed, a challenge that the international community must assist with, for the transition of those economies.

11 Pleumarom (2015). For more on the development and human rights context of tourism see: <http://twn.my/tour.htm>

12 For example, tourism slumps result from international financial / economic crises, natural disasters, acts of violence and health issues such as pandemics.

Conclusion

The targets on sustainable production and consumption in SDG 12 and related targets in other goals fall far short of overcoming the obstacles to this goal. For transformation to sustainability, choices must necessarily be made to remove structural injustices often created and perpetuated by corporate dominance in national policy and law making as well as globally, especially in trade, investment and intellectual property norms and agreements. Regulations are also needed to push back on corporate concentration across all sectors and to reinstate obligations and responsibilities for corporate accountability.

References

- Adams, Barbara and Martens, Jens (2015):** Fit for whose purpose? Private funding and corporate influence in the United Nations. Bonn / New York. www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Fit_for_whose_purpose_online.pdf
- FiercePharma(2015):** The top 15 pharma companies by 2014 revenues. Newton, MA. www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-15-pharma-companies-by-2014-revenue
- Médecins Sans Frontières (2015):** MSF analysis of Gilead Hepatitis C license (March 2015). www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/HepC/Docs/HepC_statement_AnalysisOfGileadLicense_ENG_2015.pdf
- Pleumarom, Anita (2015):** Tourism – a driver of inequality and displacement. In: Third World Resurgence Issue 301/302 (Sept/Oct 2015) <http://twm.my/title2/resurgence/2015/301-302/cover01.htm>
- Steinbrecher, Ricarda (2015):** Genetic Engineering and the “New Breeding techniques”: Inherent risks and the need to regulate. Oxford www.econexus.info/sites/econexus/files/NBT%20Briefing%20-%20EcoNexus%20December%202015.pdf
- Third World Network (1993):** Earth Summit Briefings. Penang.
- WHO FCTC (2003):** WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Geneva. www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/

SDG 13

Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

The climate change battle in Paris: putting equity into action

BY MEENAKSHI RAMAN AND CHEE YOKE LING, THIRD WORLD NETWORK

Sustainable Development Goal 13 acknowledges that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

As one of the three “Rio Conventions” that were forged in parallel with the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 in 1992, the UNFCCC gives legal form to the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Its objective is ambitious:

“(the) stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (...) within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”¹

Climate science today paints a more frightening picture than in 1992, when the world’s political leaders agreed on changes to production and consumption patterns, recognized the different levels of development among countries, and accepted the need for industrialized countries to take the lead in domestic climate action and the provision of means of implementation to developing countries in light of their

historical responsibility and capabilities. Accordingly, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) is the first principle in the UNFCCC (Article 3).

The Paris Agreement² adopted at the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP 21) in December 2015 was the outcome of major battles on multiple issues. Between developed and developing countries CBDR was a key issue of contention as it was in the negotiations on the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Paris Agreement operationalizes equity and CBDR

The Agreement can be regarded as a legal manifestation of the 2030 Agenda’s principles of universality, equity and CBDR and is largely consistent with the SDGs.

The Agreement was opened for signature by Parties at the UN headquarters in New York in April 2016 and will enter into force upon ratification by at least 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting for at least an estimated 55 percent of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It is expected to come into effect post-2020.

1 UNFCCC, Article 2.

2 For a detailed analysis of the Paris Agreement see <http://twn.my/title2/climate/doc/Meenabriefingpaper.pdf>.

Civil Society Review of INDCs

*The Paris Agreement does not include any reference to a global carbon budget as a basis for targets and effort sharing. However, more than 110 governments put forward voluntary pledges in 2015 in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). A report titled **Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs** was released in October 2015 that focused on the mitigation pledges of governments and how these measure up to their respective fair shares. It was endorsed by an unprecedented diversity of organizations and networks. What follows is the edited summary of this report.*

Climate science paints a frightening picture – one that shows that urgent and dramatic action is needed to have any chance at stopping irreversible global warming. This urgency is not just about the planet and the environment; it is also about people, and humanity’s capacity to secure safe and dignified lives for all. The science is unambiguous: the next 10–15 years are critical if the most dangerous effects of climate change are to be avoided.

Today, the world is 0.85°C warmer than pre-industrial levels, and many people and ecosystems are already experiencing devastating impacts. Exceeding 1.5°C will entail unacceptable impacts for billions of people and risk crossing irreversible tipping points. We can only emit a finite amount of greenhouse

gases – an amount known as the ‘global carbon budget’ – if we wish to keep overall increases beneath 1.5°C or even 2°C. The science indicates we are reaching this limit very quickly, and may even have exceeded it. Accepting the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios provide us with a global carbon budget that will be consumed in 10–20 years at current emissions levels. A commitment to keep at least within this limited budget, and to share the effort of doing so equitably and fairly, is at the heart of the international debate around climate change.

As social movements, environmental and development NGOs, trade unions, faith and other civil society groups, we jointly assessed the commitments that have been put on the table, seeking to identify which countries are offering to do their fair share, which need to do more, and present recommendations on how to close the emission reductions gap.

We concluded that addressing this gap in ambition can only be done through significantly scaled up cooperation among countries, especially between developed and developing countries. Equity and fairness matter to people’s lives and are vital to unlocking cooperation. Only by embracing equity can governments define a pathway towards scaled-up global cooperation and action to secure dignified lives for all in a climate-safe world.

We assert that equity is not something that every country can decide for itself. It can be defined and quantified in a robust, rigorous, transparent and scientific manner that is anchored in the core principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, taking into account a range of interpretations of these principles.

Equity and Fair Shares

All countries must accept responsibility for meeting at least their fair share of the global effort to tackle climate change. Some countries have much higher capacity to act than others, due to their higher income and wealth, level of development and access to technologies. Some countries have already emitted a great deal for a long time, and thrive from the infrastructure and institutions they have been able to set up because of this. The operationalization of equity and fair share must focus on historical responsibility and capacity, which directly correspond to the core principles in the UN climate convention of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities – with respective capabilities’ and the ‘right to sustainable development’.

We have assessed countries’ INDCs by judging their commitments against their ‘fair share’ of the global mitigation effort (carbon budget) needed to maintain a minimal chance of keeping warming below 1.5°C, and a 66 percent

chance of keeping it below 2°C. Our assessment of fair shares uses an ‘equity range’, which takes into account:

- Historical responsibility, i. e., contribution to climate change in terms of cumulative emissions since an agreed date; and
- Capacity to take climate action, using national income over what is needed to provide basic living standards as the principal indicator.

Historical responsibility and capacity have been weighted equally (50/50), which means that each country has a unique fair share that will change over time as they increase their incomes and relative proportion of accumulated emissions.

Our ‘equity range’ uses historical responsibility start dates of 1850 and 1950, and capacity settings that are no lower than a development threshold of US\$ 7,500 per person per year, in order to exclude the incomes of the poor from the calculation of national capacity. Our ‘equity range’ does not include a 1990 benchmark. The large volume of historical emissions from which many countries benefited during the decades of unrestricted high-carbon development cannot be ignored from both a moral and legal standpoint. Nevertheless, we have included comparisons to a 1990 benchmark in order to show that our key findings apply even to such a benchmark.

Key Findings

Our fair share assessments of the submitted INDCs lead to the following key findings:

- Together, the commitments captured in INDCs will not keep temperatures below 2°C, much less 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels. Even if all countries meet their INDC commitments, the world is likely to warm by a devastating 3°C or more, with a significant likelihood of tipping the global climate system into catastrophic runaway warming.
- The current INDCs represent substantially less than half of the reduction in emissions required by 2030. It must be noted that this itself relates to a very risky carbon budget. For a budget with a strong likelihood of keeping warming below 1.5°C or 2°C, the current INDCs would only meet a tiny fraction of what is needed. This means the fair shares presented here must be met. If anything, countries need to exceed these targets.
- The ambition of all major developed countries falls well short of their fair shares, which include not only domestic action but also international finance. Those with the sturkiest gap between their climate ambition and their fair shares include:
 - Russia: INDC represents zero contribution towards its fair share
 - Japan: INDC represents about one tenth of its fair share
 - United States: INDC represents about a fifth of its fair share
 - European Union: INDC represents just over a fifth of its fair share
- The majority of developing countries have made mitigation pledges that exceed or broadly meet their fair share, but they also have mitigation potential that exceeds their pledges and fair share – this includes Kenya, the Marshall Islands, China, Indonesia and India. Brazil’s INDC represents slightly more than two thirds of its fair share.
- The fair shares of most developed countries are already exceeded within their borders, even with extremely ambitious domestic actions. Thus in addition to very deep domestic reductions, the remainder of their fair shares must therefore be implemented by enabling an equivalent amount of emissions reduction in developing countries through financing and other support. This accounts for almost half of the reductions that need to take place globally, which indicates

the need for a vast expansion of international finance, technology and capacity-building support. This underscores the importance of a cooperative approach between developed and developing countries to enable scaled-up ambition.

- I Although climate finance is critical for developed countries to deliver their fair shares, there is a striking lack of clear commitments. Massively scaled-up international public finance is required to support developing countries' efforts, including finance to deliver the conditional offers from developing countries. In addition, significantly increased public climate finance is needed to meet the cost of adaptation, and to cover loss and damage in developing countries, particularly for the most vulnerable.

Article 2.1 enhances implementation of the Convention, strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. Parties agreed that this would include:

“(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and

(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”

A key issue throughout the negotiations was whether and how the principle of CBDR-RC will be operationalized. While developed countries challenged the principle itself, insisting that the Agreement reflect the “evolving economic and emission trends” of countries in the post-2020 timeframe, developing countries consistently argued that given the historical emissions of developed countries, they should continue to take the lead in emission reductions and in helping developing countries with the provision of finance, technology transfer and capacity-building as agreed under the UNFCCC.

At the 2014 COP meeting in Lima, where CBDR-RC was also hotly contested, Parties committed to reaching an ambitious agreement in Paris that reflects the principle of CBDR-RC, **in light of different national circumstances**. This was the ‘landing-zone’ arrived at with regard to the CBDR principle, following the China-United States joint statement on emissions that accordingly found its way into the Paris Agreement.

This gain for developing countries is captured in Article 2.2 that states, “This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common

but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in the light of different national circumstances.”³ It also means that developed countries can invoke their own national circumstances.

Throughout the four years of work leading to the Paris Agreement, the purpose itself remained contentious. Developing countries were adamant that it must not “rewrite, replace or reinterpret the Convention.” The G77 and China, including its sub-groups especially the Like-minded Developing Countries and the African Group, consistently stressed that the purpose of the Agreement is to enhance implementation of the Convention on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building, and transparency of action and support.

Developed countries, on the other hand, appeared to focus more on the ‘objective’ of the Agreement, which was perceived by developing countries as a mitigation-centric approach linked only to the temperature goal, with an attempt to weaken the link to the provisions and obligations of developed countries under the Convention, especially on the means of implementation (finance, technology transfer and capacity building). Thus the reference to “enhancing the implementation of the Convention” is seen as another gain for developing countries.

Although limiting temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels was clear, reference to efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C is also seen as a victory for developing countries, especially Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa and the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA).

Developing countries also wanted the focus to be on adaptation and finance and to ensure that the global response is in “the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”

Nationally Determined Contributions: “Bottom-up” climate actions

The Agreement obligates all Parties “to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” through intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). These efforts “will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement” (Article 3). This is fundamentally different from a science-based “top-down” approach where an aggregate of GHG emissions reduction is multilaterally determined, to be shared among developed countries.

Developed countries had sought to make the Paris Agreement mitigation-centric and to expand legally binding mitigation commitments to developing countries, especially emerging economies. Beginning at the 2009 COP in Copenhagen, the USA led the shift from a top-down approach to bottom-up nationally determined actions. The Paris Agreement locks that in through Article 3 on INDCs. However, developing countries succeeded in making the scope of INDCs comprehensive; thus Article 3 explicitly includes mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building, and a transparency framework for action and support.

Mitigation

For the first time, developing countries have an international obligation to take mitigation action, albeit in a nationally determined way, and with means of implementation provided by developed countries. By contrast, the mitigation commitment of developed countries is diluted compared to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. This came from a last minute replacement of ‘shall’ with ‘should’ regarding mitigation by developed countries. At the ‘back room’ insistence of the USA, the COP21 Presidency allowed this under the guise of a technical correction during the final plenary.

³ The first UNFCCC Principle (Article 3) states: “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”

The recognition in Article 4 on mitigation, that peaking of greenhouse gases (GHGs) will take longer for developing countries, implicitly acknowledges the principle of CBDR.

However, the aim is to achieve a balance in the second half of this century between emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs; this is to be on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. The notion of balance between emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs is not defined.

It is likely that various Parties will suggest 'net zero emissions', given that a balance refers to the total net (of human caused) emissions to the atmosphere being zero. If this is how 'balance' is to be understood, it would mean that by the second half of the century, any ongoing emissions must be balanced by an equivalent level of sequestration.

As the capacity of forests and other ecosystems to sequester carbon is finite, this effectively means bringing emissions as close to zero as possible. Sectors that cannot be reduced to zero emissions such as agriculture, will need to compensate through sequestration.⁴

Of concern is whether this notion of balance in emissions and removals by sinks opens the door for a form of geo-engineering known as carbon dioxide removal, if large-scale monoculture plantations or bioenergy crops with carbon-capture and storage are used to remove significant volumes of carbon from the atmosphere.⁵ This will indeed be a matter of much debate in the coming years.

Adaptation

Another battle in the climate negotiations was over equal treatment between mitigation and adaptation. Developing countries had been pushing for a long-term goal or vision on adaptation to ensure that there

is parity between adaptation and mitigation and to avoid having only a mitigation-centric goal linked to the temperature goal.

The result is Article 7.1 whereby Parties agreed to "establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2."

Loss and Damage

One major victory for developing countries is the anchoring of 'loss and damage' in a free-standing Article 8, distinct from 'adaptation'. (The term refers broadly to the entire range of damage and permanent loss associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that can no longer be avoided through mitigation or adaptation.)

This hard-fought achievement came at a price when a deal was made behind closed doors in the final hours prior to the release of the draft agreement, namely the clause in paragraph 51 of the COP decision stating that Parties agree "that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation."

According to several experts, the exclusionary clause in paragraph 51 does not preclude financial resources from being allocated through the Financial Mechanism of the Convention and the Agreement for developing countries to seek funds to address the adverse impacts related to loss and damage.

Finance and Technology

Prior to the adoption of the final Agreement, the thrust of the developed countries' position on the issue of finance was to increase the scope of countries (to include developing countries) who should be 'donors' of climate finance by proposing such terms as 'all Parties in a position to do so' should provide financial resources or that the mobilization of climate finance is a 'shared effort' of all Parties.

⁴ Cf. Dooley (2016).

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

In the final Agreement, however, developed countries are not absolved from their financial commitments under the UNFCCC, and “shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.” In addition, “Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.”

The inclusion of the figure of US\$ 100 billion per year as a floor did not make it into the Agreement because developed countries, in particular the USA, were against any quantified target on the scale of resources in the Paris Agreement. Instead paragraph 53 of the accompanying COP21 decision states that:

“(…) developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.”

This goes further than SDG Target 13.a in terms of setting a future floor of over US\$ 100 billion annually, SDG Target 13.a states that developed country parties to the UNFCCC are to “implement” their commitment to mobilize jointly US\$ 100 billion annually by 2020.

Developed countries also sought to “integrate climate considerations” into “international development assistance.” This was strongly resisted by developing countries and the Agreement includes no mention of international development assistance.

Which developing countries can be recipients of finance under the Convention was another contested issue. Developed countries tried to limit this to those “who are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change”, and are “capacity-constrained developing countries, least developed countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Africa”. Subsequently, developing countries failed to agree on the need to explicitly mention not only Africa but also other developing country regions, so

in the end Article 9(4) refers only to LDCs and SIDS – as does Target 13.b of SDG 13.⁶

In the technology negotiations, developing countries submitted various proposals to enhance technology development and transfer. Developed countries opposed these and only wanted a very weak outcome relating to ‘technology cooperation’.

The real value for developing countries in the final Article 10 is the establishment of the technology framework to provide guidance to the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism to promote and facilitate enhanced action on technology development and transfer. One of the aspects for further work is “the assessment of technologies that are ready for transfer” in the decision accompanying the Agreement. It is however silent on how such technologies will be effectively transferred to developing countries.

The long-standing battle over intellectual property rights (IPR) continued, with strong opposition by developed countries, in particular the USA, to even mentioning the word ‘IPRs’. Their opposition can be explained in part by a letter from six major US industry lobbies⁷ dated 18 February 2016 to US Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, which stated:

“(…) In Paris, technical and IP experts from different parts of the Administration worked together to secure a final UNFCCC text that does not mention IP and thus removes uncertainty that could have discouraged continued investments by U.S. companies in clean technology.

6 Article 9(4): “The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.”

7 Biotechnology Innovation Organization, National Association of Manufacturers, National Foreign Trade Council, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, United States Council for International Business.

“Significant challenges to IP still remain in the Paris Agreement’s implementation and subsequent negotiations – especially those related to the technology development and transfer chapter. Nonetheless, we are certain that the successful UNFCCC outcome on IP in Paris could not have been achieved without close interagency cooperation and collaboration among the U.S. government’s technical and IP experts in dialogue with business. This allowed the U.S. delegation to develop and defend consistent negotiating positions (...).”⁸

Conclusion

Developing countries started the Paris talks with some clear objectives and principles. While some aspects of these were diluted, their red lines were protected, though they did not get some key demands

⁸ Cf. <http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/Multi-Industry-Letter-on-UNHLP-2.18.16.pdf>.

such as clearer targets on finance or a reference to IPRs as a barrier to technology transfer. Some important developing country gains are:

- The Paris Agreement is not mitigation-centric as desired by developed countries, although in some aspects mitigation does get pride of place;
- Developing countries to a significant extent successfully defended the Convention and stopped the plans of developed countries to drastically rewrite the Convention and negate its fundamental principles;
- Differentiation between developed and developing countries was retained in the main, although weakened in some areas;
- The principle of equity and CBDR is stated in a clause in Article 2 on the purpose of the Agreement, and was operationalized in some key provisions;

Targets for SDG 13*

- 13.1** Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries
- 13.2** Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning
- 13.3** Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning
- 13.a** Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a

goal of mobilizing jointly \$ 100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible

- 13.b** Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities

* Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

- Sustainable development and poverty eradication provide the context of actions by developing countries in some key areas;
- Developed countries taking the lead in mitigation and finance is in the Agreement;
- Although the temperature goal is to limit temperature rise to well below 2°C from pre-industrial levels, the reference to pursuing efforts to limit temperature rise to below 1.5°C is significant.⁹

It is true that the Paris Agreement also means that big pressures will be put on developing countries, and especially the emerging economies, to do much more on their climate actions, including mitigation. But these enhanced actions need to be taken, given the crisis of climate change that very seriously affect developing countries themselves.

However, the Agreement fails to provide actions that fulfil the 2°C pathway, let alone 1.5°C. The emissions gap is very large between what countries in aggregate should do and what they pledged to do in their INDCs up to 2030 (see box) leading many commentators to condemn the Paris COP21 as a failure.

However another perspective is that COP21 is only a start, and the Agreement represents a multilateral agreement to enhance individual and collective actions to face the climate catastrophe. A real failure would have been a collapse of the Paris negotiations, Copenhagen-style, or an outcome that only favours the developed countries with the rewriting of the Convention.

The Agreement, from this perspective, has laid the foundation on which future actions can be motivated and incentivized, a baseline from which more ambitious actions must flow. The Agreement includes mechanisms, such as a global stocktaking in 2023,¹⁰ that can be used to encourage countries to raise their

ambition level. International cooperation, however inadequate and flawed, remains intact from which more cooperation can flow in future.

The bottom-up approach enabling each country to choose its “nationally determined contribution” with presently very weak or even no compliance, was the only possible outcome, given that many governments (including the USA) were generally not ready or willing or able to undertake legally binding targets.

It can be expected that developed countries will continue to pressure developing countries, especially emerging economies, and also try to shift or avoid their own obligations. Developing countries will need to invoke the overall context of what will make a low carbon pathway a reality – means of implementation plus adaptation, loss and damage, all in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. They must also remain firm and united to ensure that multilateralism shapes climate actions in the negotiations and other processes ahead.

References

- Climate Equity Reference Project (2015):** Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs. Berkeley, CA / Stockholm. <http://civilsocietyreview.org/report>
- Dooley, Kate (2016):** What does the Paris climate agreement mean for forests and forest peoples’ rights? Bruxelles: FERN. www.fern.org/node/6009
- IPCC (2014):** Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva. www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/
- IPCC (2013):** Summary for Policymakers: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/

⁹ This 1.5 degree C target was called for by Small Island States, LDCs, Africa and ALBA countries.

¹⁰ This will be followed by one every five years unless otherwise decided by the Parties of the Paris Agreement.

SDG 15

Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystem, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

Policy choices for helping or hindering the poor

BY CHRISTINE VON WEIZSÄCKER, ECOROPA

Biodiversity is at the basis of human life and well-being. The rich diversity of life is being locally and historically contextualized into ecosystems. These ecosystems are models of resilience, from which one could learn a great deal. Many peoples, communities and cultures actually have learned a lot and have made it part of their traditional knowledge.

Unless there is a serious disruption of their functions, ecosystems provide benefits/services to humans which are essential to their well-being.

People drink water. Water is filtered by biodiversity and the water supply is kept steady through biodiversity storage systems, such as wetlands, forests, and soils rich in humus content. Severe harm is caused by land degradation, deforestation, and loss of humus-rich soil ecosystems. Humans are eating biodiversity. Many people are stilling their hunger with wind-pollinated cereals, such as rice, corn and wheat. Many people depend on fish for their protein supply. The quality of our meals in terms of nutrition, taste and social interaction needs more than just some carbohydrates and some proteins. The recent report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production demonstrates some of the complex interlinkages.¹ Pollinators, essential

for the provision of fruits, vegetables and nuts, which in turn, are essential for food security and healthy nutrition, are declining.

Agricultural practices, such as large monocultures of grains sprayed with herbicides, or large-scale applications of insecticides are known to harm pollinators. Poor people who can neither afford world market prices for vegetables, fruits and nuts nor afford to buy vitamin and micronutrient supplements for themselves and the healthy development of their children call such practices unsustainable. The rich, however, may not even notice that there are destructive impacts. Similar threats arise in terms of the impact of clothing, housing and energy production for those who directly depend on biodiversity to provide for their survival.

There is a dramatic asymmetry between the rich and the poor in terms of dependence on direct ecosystem services. This has been described in the report of The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) initiative for policy makers as the difference between the GDP of the poor sector of the population versus the average GDP in terms of their reliance on ecosystem services (see [Figure 2.14.1](#)).² This dependence is often not market-mediated and is known to pose problems for economic quantification. The reality on the ground may be even more asymmetrical.

¹ Cf. Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2016).

² Cf. TEEB (2010).

For poor people stricken by disasters and conflicts the interaction between biodiversity and people becomes even more relevant. Studies have shown that biodiversity hotspots are also hotspots of conflicts. Up to a point, biodiversity will provide even if all else fails, but after that point, it no longer can. A wide-ranging variety of emergency services rely on biodiversity: food, fresh water, wood and fibre, shelter, fuel, personal safety, the ability to hide, the ability to help others. Numerous recovery services also depend on biodiversity, such as water purification, climate and temperature regulation, soil protection and soil formation, recovery of social cohesion and community building. The same is true for livelihoods, even under ‘normal conditions’. Emergency conditions make affected people ‘poor’.


Moreover, disasters and conflicts are themselves drivers of biodiversity loss. They drive over-exploitation, pollution, habitat change and habitat destruction. The mutual relationship between biodiversity and people must not reach the tipping point of synergy of destruction, nowhere and for nobody.

Natural disasters and resource conflicts will increase in the future unless countries adopt – and invest inequitable and sustainable development policies.

It is evident that SDG 15 is not a stand-alone goal, or for conservationists only. Rather it is a cross-cutting goal. It has to be seen in the light of SDG 1 on poverty, SDG 3 on health, and SDG 6 on water and sanitation. It has close links to SDGs 10, 14 and 16, on inequality,

Figure 2.14.1

Neither the State nor the formal Market but Ecosystems provide for the livelihoods of the Poor



Source: TEEB for National Policy, Chapter 3 (N3)

marine resource management and just and inclusive institutions.

The perception, strategies and policy preferences of poor people differ from those who make their living in a global investment-driven market. Poor people need the establishment of a firm legal framework and the implementation of their rights. Voluntary guidelines implying a self-committment of those in power are not enough. You would not trust the voluntary guidelines of robbers to really protect your own home. The so-called “environmental and human rights safeguards” very often do not go beyond voluntary codes of conduct or voluntary guidelines. Peoples’ lives and livelihoods need established rights. Land tenure rights need to be recorded and defended. Fake participation and agreements under pressure need to disappear or, at least be contestable by affordable access to justice. Free prior consent of all peoples’ affected needs to be a prerogative for interventions and projects. This should take into account and disallow all the indirect pressures on the persons affected which are spelt out in the Nuremberg Code.³

Poor people cannot buy their survival on the world market. They cannot buy bottled water if their rivers are polluted. They cannot move house to nice surroundings and views on intact nature if the ecosystems on which their culture and community depended are destroyed. They cannot discount the future, meaning earning more now and invest the earnings in buying their private way out of a disaster later. Poor people need the prevention of harm. In case of scientific uncertainty and if there are indications of serious or irreversible harm, they need decisions to be made on the basis of the precautionary principle: ‘do no harm’. Decisions based on the precautionary approach have been taken by the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on Ocean Fertilization and Geoenvironment and on many other climate-related issues where the 196 Parties to the CBD

committed to applying ecosystem-based approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation.

This also applies to the interface between SDG 15 and SDG 13, between terrestrial biodiversity and climate change. They are not as easily compatible and mutually supportive as was naively assumed at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. Again, the relationship is asymmetrical. The issue of climate change has received a large amount of policy and public interest. The CBD consistently acknowledges and works on the findings and decisions on the impact of climate change as well as adaptation and mitigation. So far, it does not happen the other way round.

Through proposals for carbon pricing, money and CO₂ equivalents/Global Warming Potential (GWP) of greenhouse gases are seen as globalizable accounting entities, inviting the concept of offsetting.

Offsetting itself involves problems, as do efforts to financialize ecosystems. Biodiversity and ecosystems are unique, local and historically interlinked. This is true for the species and their interlinkages and feedback loops, as well as for the peoples, communities and their local and diverse cultures whose lives depend on these ecosystems, be they rural or urban slum dwellers. There are many scientific, socio-economic and cultural reasons why “replanting” ecosystems and uprooting communities does not work. It does not work, but it has been done and is still being done.

In this regard, there are conflicting perceptions of what the TEEB Report, as well as the Review on the Economics of Climate Change, authored by Nicholas Stern,⁴ are really meant for. For some, their findings provide good arguments why the postponement of measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change is an economically stupid option – which is a very valuable contribution to the international debate. The same is true for biodiversity. Halting biodiversity loss now is the better economic option. For others, however, the two reports are seen as a chance to finally

³ The Nuremberg Code is a set of research ethics principles for human experimentation set as a result of the subsequent Nuremberg trials at the end of the Second World War. One of the principles is informed consent and absence of coercion. Cf. <https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf>.

⁴ Cf. Stern (2006). Stern, heads the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy in London (www.ccecep.ac.uk/).

arrive at a total financialization of nature. The latter option would mean that those who decide are those who have the money to invest. The preferences and lives of those without capital to invest are neglected and easily sacrificed.

The biofuel debate can give us a warning as to future conflicts ahead. Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is a mechanism promoted by many

experts in the climate change debate, who argue it is the only way to achieve the ambitious goal of limiting temperature rise to less than 2° Celsius, even aiming for 1.5° C. These experts did not even deign to look at ecosystem-based approaches to mitigation and adaptation.

What would BECCS mean? Ever larger areas in developing countries on which poor communities live

Targets for SDG 15

- 15.1** By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements
- 15.2** By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally
- 15.3** By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world
- 15.4** By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development
- 15.5** Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species
- 15.6** Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed
- 15.7** Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products
- 15.8** By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species
- 15.9** By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts
- 15.a** Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems
- 15.b** Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation
- 15.c** Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities

on will be called “degraded and underutilized.” Ever more developing heavily indebted countries will be persuaded – with more or less pressure and blackmail behind it – to let BECCS take up large portions of their territories. Land rights, human rights, livelihoods, food and nutrition, community coherence and ecosystems will be sacrificed and irretrievably lost.

Can any of these things be restored? Is destroy and restore a realistic option? Public relations experts will promote the BECCS strategy in order to get the permit to destroy. Who will pay for restoration? Restoration of a type decided by whom? Ecosystem restoration with or without people and decent lives and well-being? Restoration is needed for already severely harmed landscapes. But not without local participation in the decision-making. And there can be no offsetting of destruction permits against promises of restoration.

And there is an additional problem with BECCS, in that it is meant to bypass the mobilization of the political will needed to phase out fossil fuels quickly. The rights of rich consumers, primarily in the North, to an unlimited number of miles in their unlimitedly gas-greedy cars could be superseding the rights of the poor to their life and well-being.

Poor people and biodiversity both are being victimized by a type of scientific approach that favours the outside expert: Extractive Knowledge. They both need Cognostic Knowledge where none of the players are deemed to know it all and consequently should decide it all. There are, however, established hard-core asymmetries, which will not dissolve accidentally, and require official government action. They need systemic legal and institutional reform. Decisions on land use and land use changes are highly relevant for biodiversity and poor people. There is no offsetting of rights; prevention and precaution and the very basis of life should be the rule not only in biodiversity and climate change but also in agricultural and other sectoral policies.

References

- Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2016):** Thematic Assessment of Pollinators, Pollination and Food Production. Bonn: IPBES. www.ipbes.net/publication/summary-policy-makers-thematic-assessment-pollinators-pollination-and-food-production
- Stern, Nicholas (2006):** Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. London: HM Treasury.
- TEEB (2010):** The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations of TEEB. Nairobi: UNEP. www.teebweb.org/publication/mainstreaming-the-economics-of-nature-a-synthesis-of-the-approach-conclusions-and-recommendations-of-teeb/

SDG 16

Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

“There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development”

BY ROBERT ZUBER, GLOBAL ACTION TO PREVENT WAR

As strategies are being developed to enhance implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 goals, a number of objectives seem to have risen to the surface: including a global policy environment that makes it possible for governments to achieve their commitments; ensuring robust, data, appropriate to each country; reliable funding sources; clear and measurable indicators; a secure, just and inclusive social fabric, and SDG 16, the so-called “peace goal.” It recognizes that “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.”

The targets for SDG16, on peaceful, just and inclusive societies, were strongly endorsed by many policy advocates, but remained controversial in part because of geopolitical policy compromises that will be noted below but also because of the absence of conversations with peace and security experts during the process of developing the targets.¹ However, the larger message of Goal 16 is widely affirmed: that the success of the 2030 Agenda will depend on our ability to sustain stable, secure and inclusive societies governed by states that are essentially trustworthy, responsive to constituents, free of corruption and committed to eliminating violence, in part by reigning in coercive security institutions.

While SDG 16, as with the other goals, will likely offer challenges to any proposed indicators of success, there are at least two hopeful notes going forward. The first is the commitment to assuring structures of governance robust enough to enforce the rule of law and ensure equal access to justice (Target 16.3), eliminate corruption and bribery and abide by the same laws that it enforces within its citizenry (Target 16.5), and restrict predatory corporate and criminal interests (Target 16.4). These targets clearly recognize that citizen trust in all aspects of government, trust that is duly earned, is the soundest basis for peaceful, just and inclusive societies.

Also welcome is language specifying stronger participation by developing countries in institutions of global governance (Target 16.8). For many of these countries, the tasks of virtually all SDGs – including Goal 16 – are only tenable within multilateral structures, ensuring progress together that is much more elusive alone.

This includes addressing the problems of illicit financial flows (IFFs), which each year drain millions of dollars from developing countries (see chapter 2.16). But as we see often at the UN, having access to global governance is insufficient without the commitment to balance global structures, creating more functional and inclusive equivalences of state responsibility and authority (Target 16.7). We are convinced that

¹ As noted by Ribeiro Pereira (2014).

Implementation of SDG 16 vital for the Middle East and North Africa

BY ZIAD ABDEL SAMAD, ARAB NGO NETWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its accompanying Goal 16, constitutes significant progress as compared with the previous MDG agenda, because it makes the links stronger between peace and security, nationally and globally, democratic, effective and transparent governance, social inclusion and access to justice.

It is obvious that war-torn and deep-rooted long-lasting conflict countries – where good governance is lacking and the rule of law and essential elements of democracy are undermined – will continue to fail even in meeting the most basic needs of their peoples. Almost all of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa are in such a situation. The bleak situation of the region is well reflected by the Global Peace Index 2015. Countries in the region are among those with the worst score, even deteriorating compared to the previous year (average rank stands at 109 over 162 countries).¹

1 Cf. Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). Scores worsened in particular in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria.

There are both external and internal reasons for these conflicts and violence; yet all of these reasons are related to the great impact of the flaws in the global system and the failure of the international community to implement international law and respective resolutions. The lack of peace and security in the region is also linked to foreign invasions and occupation, and the violation of the right to self-determination. Furthermore, the unprecedented flow of refugees and displaced people from the region, which is the biggest since World War II, is intensively shaking stability in the region and creating or increasing tensions among and within the countries.

In parallel, there is a dramatic shift in the composition of official development assistance (ODA) towards the inclusion of expenditures for humanitarian interventions, security related expenditures and refugee costs in host countries, often at the expense of previous development programmes. This shift is based on the interpretation by the OECD countries of the link between security, justice and democracy, namely that security is necessary to democracy and development. Obviously, this logic ignores the root causes of instability and conflicts and focuses on its symptoms. This reflects a short term vision which might be serving

geopolitical interests but will not have long lasting positive impact on stability, security and peace in the region.

At the national level, the principle of allocation of maximum available resources to development is challenged by high military spending, which amounts to US\$ 196 billion in 2014, an increase of 5.2 percent over 2013, and 57 percent since 2005.²

In this context, the implementation of SDG 16 is vital for the region. However, progress is significantly challenged by failure of the region to deal with systemic and structural problems, to a large extent generated by its dependence on oil revenues, including authoritarian governments; widespread corruption, in both the public and private sector; and the default to a business as usual approach. Consequently, efforts to create stability and address governance

2 Cf. SIPRI (2015). SIPRI did not publish an updated estimate for the Middle East for 2015 as data for 2015 has been unavailable for several countries.

issues should be accompanied by efforts towards a paradigm shift focusing on the rights-based approach, enhancing productive economies and implementing fair redistribution of wealth policies.

To overcome these challenges, countries of the region should:

1. **Unpack the new paradigm of sustainable development:** The 2030 Agenda, including SDG 16, can potentially give more clarity on the role of the state and different actors including the private sector. To implement its goals and targets, countries have to be more inclusive and sustainable in patterns of production, consumption and the provision of public services.
2. **Focus on addressing inequalities in achieving peaceful societies:** Inequality and lack of inclusion remain the core challenge in the region hampering societal peace and stability. This challenge can only be addressed by eradicating disparities at multiple levels: geographic, political, gender, social, economic, cultural and environmental. This also requires the revision of social and economic policy choices.
3. **Redesign relations with international partners and institutions:** These relations should be based on the mutual respect of interests, mutual accountability and the protection of a more equitable policy space based on the right to self-determination and the right to development.
4. **Prioritize human rights and democracy as values and regard security as a tool to protect them:** The current tendency, not only in the region but worldwide, is to consider security as a value by itself, which is creating massive harm to development efforts and violating basic human rights.
5. **Foster political participation, inclusion, citizen empowerment and engagement:** People should enjoy an enabling environment for a more active engagement in public policy-making through increased levels of transparency and social dialogue.
6. **Reconstitute the state and ensure the separation of powers:** The accumulation of all powers in either one or a few hands is common in the region. Together with widespread corruption, clientelism and nepotism this jeopardizes accountability, widens inequalities and creates policies of exclusion and discrimination and gross human rights violations.

References

- Institute for Economics and Peace (2015): Global Peace Index 2015. Sydney http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf
- SIPRI (2015): Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014. Stockholm <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf>

2.15 “There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development”

as this balancing takes further shape, trust levels in the promises of global governance are likely to rise as well.

At the UN, it is important to note that there are significant centres of policy coherence regarding the core concerns of Goal 16. For instance, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), currently led by Kenya’s Ambassador Macharia Kamau, is taking steps in accord with the Secretary-General’s Advisory Group of Experts² to broaden its scope and authority both beyond Member States in its formal configurations and to matters beyond post-conflict reconstruction, including the often neglected task of conflict prevention. The evolving attention of the PBC to complex matters impacting both the onset and longevity of conflict includes addressing persistent poverty and other inequalities within and among states, while highlighting the need to build strong state institutions and reliable, transparent governance to help prevent the onset (or relapse) of conflict.

For its part, the UN Security Council seeks to apply its Charter mandate to “maintain” peace and security in part through a widening group of “thematic obligations” including to climate health, women’s full participation in peace processes, and trafficking in weapons, narcotics and persons. The Council is regularly accused by some UN Member States of spending more time attempting to restore peace and security – often through controversially coercive means – than to “maintaining” it in the first instance. Other states urge the Council to leave thematic obligations to the various committees of the UN General Assembly tasked directly with matters ranging from rule of law and the protection of fundamental freedoms to the strengthening of national institutions.

However, institutional turf and trust issues aside, the fact that the Security Council recognizes many of the profound promises embedded in the 2030 Agenda and their potential implications for peace and security

has great potential. In this regard, Security Council Resolution 2220 (2015) on small arms notes the Council’s grave concern

“(…) that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life, contribute to instability and insecurity and continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”³

Weapons, of course, don’t have to be “illicit” to have wide ranging impacts, but that the Council is seized of at least some of these important development-security links can hopefully lead to more comprehensive (and earlier) security contributions relevant to the fulfillment of the SDGs.

Unfortunately, Security Council (and other UN) resolutions tend to embody limitations of language and policy dictated by permanent members including some of the largest weapons producing states. While rightly highlighting the “destabilizing accumulation” of weapons, there is scarce mention of the “destabilizing production” of such weapons. Destabilizing “accumulation” takes the form of weapons procured but not secured; or weapons acquired specifically to humiliate or suppress populations; or weapons purchased to replace older models which then – deliberately or inadvertently – are diverted into the open market. But weapons production in and of itself creates its own instabilities and diversions, including the diversion of vast and critically-needed resources from human development to often-wasteful military purposes.

Beyond security and to the UN’s credit, little time has been wasted in setting up procedures to help ensure full, flexible implementation of SDG goals and targets. From the Commissions on Social Development and Population and Development to high-level events

2 Cf. the report of the Advisory Group and a letter from its chair Ambassador Gert Rosenthal at: www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%20the%202015%20Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf.

3 Cf. [www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2220\(2015\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2220(2015)).

sponsored by the presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), there is broad recognition within the UN system that the planet is running out of time for the type of realignment suggested by both the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.⁴ One can worry that these landmark events may have come too late in the game to save us from ourselves or, less dramatically, that they are not thoughtful enough in terms of what has been left out, what has been willfully ignored, what can possibly go wrong. What can be doubted less is the sincerity of UN leadership and

⁴ A reflection note on plans for the implementation of the Paris Agreement can be found at: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/reflections_note.pdf

most UN Member States, to seize the opportunity presented by these goals and agreements to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”

Nevertheless, sustaining peaceful and inclusive societies, establishing state institutions worthy of constituent approval without imposing security arrangements that provoke intimidation or fear remain considerable challenges. Part of this challenge is related to people’s lingering distrust of governments and their security apparatus in countries worldwide. Many indigenous and rural persons, many politically concerned individuals, many marginalized persons in local communities and neighbourhoods: these and

Targets for SDG 16

- 16.1** Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
- 16.2** End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
- 16.3** Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
- 16.4** By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime
- 16.5** Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
- 16.6** Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
- 16.7** Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
- 16.8** Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
- 16.9** By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
- 16.10** Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
- 16.a** Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
- 16.b** Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development

others acknowledge a fear – not without reason – of the coercive and at times wholly disproportionate responses of the security sector.

As the UN knows well, in many parts of the world, it is a struggle to hold police accountable for their mis-behaviour. It is a struggle to hold militaries accountable for bombing civilian and community targets in the name of fighting terror; indeed many persons in the security sector seem to take refuge in a system that rarely acknowledges the need for nuanced response to perceived threats, let alone abuses committed or security failures of any sort.

Security Arrangements Worthy of the SDGs

To promote a viable security-development linkage in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals is to acknowledge that state security sectors have the capacity to both impede and enable sustainable development. While civil society advocates must continue to address the security sector when its conduct crosses lines that intimidate populations and deny due process and other fundamental rights, they can also remind that sector of its ability to enhance implementation of the 2030 Agenda in many ways, including curtailing various forms of trafficking and armed violence that overwhelm many communities in Latin America and in other global regions.⁵ UN human rights treaty bodies also have a role to play in scrutinizing security sector conduct. But still within some states, an unaccountable security sector combined with official assertions of sovereignty and suppressions of those who would otherwise be community watchdogs create a climate which can only be interpreted as hostile to the fulfillment our 2030 development promises. We can be fair, but we must also be vigilant.

While SDG 16 includes specific targets to support a framework for peaceful societies – especially on matters of governance, corruption and the rule of law – the contention of many of our security colleagues,

⁵ For more on the security-development linkage in Latin America, cf. Lucatello / Zuber (eds.) (2014).

including Reaching Critical Will,⁶ is that the volume of small arms and other weapons systems – production, transfer and proliferation – also poses grave risks to the stable, abundant societies envisioned by the SDGs. Some will evaluate the UN’s multilateral treaties and disarmament architecture and decide that, as dysfunctional as they sometimes seem, something is better than nothing. The question we should be asking, though, is whether or not the remedy is sufficient to the cure that we hold out in the form of a promise to global constituencies?

If the vast global arms trade is still as serious a problem as many of us maintain (and to which Goal 16 alludes), we will need more robust instruments of arms restraint than at present. Since its negotiation and adoption, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force on 24 December 2014, has been hampered by Member States, particularly those like U.S. and Russia who as major arms exporters are reluctant to be bound by its provisions; it also has weak oversight provisions and has diverted time and energy from implementing the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA), adopted in 2001, which engages the practical, multilateral work of stockpile management, weapons marking and tracing, arms trafficking and improved security at borders and ports.⁷ And the ATT, through no intrinsic failure of its own, has no actionable outcome regarding arms that have long ago left the factory, the second-hand weapons that now do so much damage every day to communities and their development aspirations in Libya, Mali, Yemen, Nigeria and elsewhere.

When one steps back from this level of institutional scrutiny to gaze a bit higher, it is clear that security and development represent more than bookend obligations by states, but point to inter-related responses to existential threats affecting communities and

⁶ The disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Security, cf. e.g. <http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/statements/GDAMS2011.pdf>.

⁷ Information on the 6th Biennial Meeting of States on the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (BMS 6) in June 2016 can be found at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/bms6/>.

societies. A failure to live up to the promise of the 2030 Agenda, by accepting data that is selectively analyzed and promoted, funding that is unreliable and unevenly applied, policy that reaches towards the most vulnerable but never quite makes physical contact, weapons that drain public resources and are more numerous in many communities than textbooks or antibiotics – is as likely to exacerbate militarism as cure its many defects. In addition, a security policy that inhibits the safety and education of children, the political participation of women, the promotion of a free press and the fair administration of justice – all in violation of specific SDG targets – will not help to promote development so much as keep people locked in fearful, subordinated social and political contexts.⁸ Trust in the state (as in persons) is an under-analyzed, under-appreciated dimension in sustainable community development, as heavy handed, unaccountable security continues to play a huge role in undermining development confidence.

Pursuing the 2030 sustainable development goals, the UN has geared up for its High Level Political Forum assessments, indicators (of varying quality) are being finalized, and agencies are figuring out how best to secure needed funding.⁹ Security arrangements are evolving also. Moving forward, it is important to fully understand the diverse potentials of these arrangements and to minimize the more toxic aspects of their practices. If Member States fail to make a “best faith” effort to meet their 2030 promises, including on security arrangements fit for sustainable development, this will do more than bring discredit to the UN; it will signal that the world has likely crossed a threshold of threats to planetary health and peace from which our species might never recover. Having heartily celebrated our recent policy achievements, we have woken up with a bit of a hangover and now recognize the full complexity of our new development obligations, attempting to fix a series of urgent and related problems – including on security arrangements – that have deep and stubborn roots.

References

- Guerra, Hector / Zuber, Robert (2012):** Minimizing the Impact of Illicit Small Arms and Diverted Weapons Transfers in the Commission of Atrocity Crimes, Human Rights Violations, and Other Violence. In: *Applying a Disarmament Lens to Gender, Human Rights, Development, Security, Education and Communication: Six Essays*, eds. Katherine Prizeman and Robert Zuber. New York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, pp. 13–22. https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/HomePage/ODAPublications/CivilSocietyAndDisarmament/2012/NGO_pub_2012.pdf
- Lucatello, Simone / Zuber, Robert (eds.) (2014):** Sustainable Development Goals Post-2015: Ensuring a Security Development Linkage in the Forthcoming Global Agenda. Mexico City: Instituto Mora.
- Ribeiro Pereira, Laura (2014):** What’s Peace Got To Do With It? Advocating Peace in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. New York: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/10928.pdf>

⁸ This is a core component of the argument in Guerra / Zuber (2012).

⁹ An advocacy toolkit geared towards full and effective implementation of Goal 16 and its targets has been produced by TAP Network, cf. <http://tapnetwork2030.org/goal-16-advocacy-toolkit/>.

Goal 17

Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development

Beyond the current means of implementation

BY STEFANO PRATO, SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The means of implementation (MoI) are the decisive test – one could even say the acid test – of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as they reveal the true extent of the commitment by all signatories, and particularly the so-called developed countries, to the aspirations set forward by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Tracking progress on MoI requires a combined assessment of the SDG-specific means of the implementation, the elements explicitly targeted within SDG 17 and the status of implementation of the Financing for Development (FfD) Conferences, including, though not exclusively, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA).¹

It is however necessary to advance three important qualifications with respect to the adequacy of the currently formulated MoI, the political context within which implementation takes place, and the overall focus of any civil society-led monitoring process.

First, civil society organizations and networks engaging with the FfD process have strongly denounced the inadequacy of the AAAA to meet the challenges it was set against and have reclaimed the FfD acronym to mean Failing to Finance Development. Indeed, the combined MoI/AAAA framework falls short of the am-

bitution of the 2030 Agenda. Instead, the discussion is increasingly dominated by the narrative of scaling-up resources (moving “From Billions to Trillions”), which is aimed largely at catalysing and leveraging private investments. This narrative is problematic on several grounds. For one thing, it places excessive emphasis on financial resources instead of on the removal of the structural barriers that relegate many countries – particularly many African countries – to conditions of commodity-dependence and unacceptably low levels of economic diversification, because of their inequitable positioning in the global organization of production. Moreover, it ignores the unacceptable level of financialization of the global economy and the need for profound systemic reform; a good example is the fact that commodity prices are primarily driven by financial markets (derivatives in particular) rather than by the reality of production. Additionally, and probably most importantly, this narrative subjects the implementation of a global public agenda to the mechanisms and conditions of private investments and their speculative markets.

The second qualification regarding MoI concerns the political context in which implementation and monitoring take place, specifically the emerging bias in favour of the direct participation of the private (mostly corporate) sector, increasingly blurred lines between public and private interest, and lack of consideration of often blatant conflicts of interests. The continued efforts by many Member States, across the global North-South divide, to ‘seduce’ the private sector into

¹ The Addis Ababa Action Agenda is the outcome of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, which took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2015. Cf. United Nations (2015).

engaging in sustainable development reveal challenging political economies and expose the covert desire to maintain current power structures, rather than try to seriously change the current socially and environmentally unsustainable business model.

It is therefore essential to locate any progressive civil society effort to monitor the implementation of the SDGs and the MoI/AAAA in this evolving, and often regressive, political context. This highlights a third important qualification, which is that progressive civil society should avoid being trapped in the implementation of elements that contradict human rights and other fundamental values. On the contrary, it should only be tracking those commitments that advance its transformative agenda, one that is far more ambitious than what exposed within the SDGs. However, the 2030 Agenda is already generating significant co-optation mechanisms that aim to domesticate civil society's engagement by fully aligning its agenda to that of the SDGs and undermining any structures that promote dissent. This calls for a more sophisticated strategy of resistance and proactiveness, one that engages with the process without accepting its limitations and pushes for a level of ambition that is far beyond the currently framed objectives and targets.

Conceptual framework

Such a strategy highlights the need to establish a clear conceptual framework to explore progress, or lack of it, with respect to the means of implementation. This initial report proposes the following categories to track the MoI/AAAA implementation:

- Provision of financial (and technical) resources;
- Removal of the structural barriers to socio-economic transformation of developing countries;
- Democratization of economic governance;
- Reform of economic, monetary and financial systems to increase their responsiveness and coherence with sustainable development;
- Rethinking of the business model and the role of the private and corporate sectors.

These categories provide a better sense of the different areas within which progress could unlock the implementation of the SDG agenda and open new areas that requires active exploration beyond the limitations of the current MoI/AAAA agendas.

Provision of financial resources. While the 'trillions' narrative is problematic, financial resources remain critical, including international public finance, domestic resource mobilization and private finance, all of which are inadequately addressed within the current MoI/AAAA agenda.

With respect to **international public finance**, the MoI/AAAA negotiations exposed the continued attempt by developed countries to elude and downscale their historical responsibilities and previous commitment by emphasizing primarily domestic resource mobilization, South-South and triangular cooperation, migrant remittances and private flows. Not only did developing countries fail to secure new commitments regarding official development assistance (ODA), no timetable to advance progress was agreed, references to development effectiveness and untying aid commitments are unsatisfactory and the additionality of climate finance vaguely expressed. Furthermore, the initial implementation period has shown that ODA contributions are under increasing attack by conservative governments in many developed countries. The very definition of aid is evolving with the introduction of the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) being developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to capture flows that are currently not included into the ODA definition. While this may sound good at superficial analysis, it involves significant risks in terms of undermining aid commitments by including flows that are claimed to be developmental but that in fact are not, and by providing perverse incentives to promote private investments through redirecting ODA to leverage private finance. Indeed, the concepts of blending public-private finances and redirecting development cooperation funds from poverty interventions to leverage private sector engagement and investment open the way to a renewed emphasis on new and more sophisticated forms of tied aid. Finally, the migration crises not only has again exposed the dramatic human consequences of

persisting structural inequalities and development disparities, but has also resulted in the diversion of ODA by key donors to address the cost of the refugee crisis in their own countries.

With regard to **mobilizing domestic resources**, the fundamental challenge is to significantly reduce the increasing levels of outflows from Southern countries due to illicit financial flows (IFFs), debt service

payments and the maintenance of foreign reserves in developed countries (see the box by **Dereje Alemayehu** in this chapter). However, while increased capacity to mobilize domestic resources is critical, it is not a panacea. Many developing countries, particularly Least Development Countries (LDCs), still require international public finance in the short/medium term in order to confront many of their development challenges.

Domestic Resource Mobilization and Illicit Financial Flows

BY DEREJE ALEMAYEHU, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR TAX JUSTICE

In terms of financing, one of the major differences between the MDGs and the SDGs is that, while the achievement of the MDGs was implicitly and explicitly made dependent on external financing, in particular on Official Development Assistance (ODA), the SDGs are mainly expected to rely on domestic resource mobilization for their implementation.

While recognizing ODA as an important *complementary* source of development finance, in particular in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), African governments welcomed this shift of emphasis and committed themselves to enhance domestic resource mobilization to finance their own sustainable development. Over-dependence on resources supplied by external development partners is being increasingly considered as compromising African country's commitment to pursue the development priorities they have set themselves.

However, domestic resource mobilization cannot succeed without tackling illicit financial flows (IFFs) and other forms of resource leakages through tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance. Even the OECD admits that for every US dollar which comes to developing countries as ODA, three US dollars leave these countries as illicit financial flows. The arithmetic is simple: $+1 - 3 = -2$. It won't be possible to raise domestic resources adequately as long as outflows exceed inflows.

In their submission to the SDG consultation, called Common Africa Position,¹ African governments reiterated the need for “global commitment to address issues

of illicit financial flows” and for this to happen they demanded “an expeditious transition to a development-friendly international financial architecture.”²

African countries consider tackling illicit financial flows as a key measure to enhance domestic tax revenues. It was because of this that the African Union Commission and the UN Economic Commission for Africa were mandated to establish in 2011 a High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, headed by Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa.

After three years of case studies and continent-wide consultations the High Level Panel issued a report with findings and rec-

1 Cf. African Union (2014): Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Addis Ababa (www.africa-platform.org/resources/common-african-position-cap-post-2015-development-agenda).

2 Ibid. p. 19.

ommendations.³ Four of the key findings are:

- a) IFFs from Africa are large and increasing (US\$ 50-60 billion a year and increasing by over 20 percent annually along with the emergence of new and innovative means of generating them);
- b) the commercial sector is the major driver of IFFs from Africa (over 60%);
- c) eliminating IFFs is a political issue; and
- d) the global architecture for tackling IFFs is incomplete and inadequate.

Emphasizing this political nature of IFFs and its solution, the report states:

“The range of issues related to IFFs makes this a technically complex subject. However, we are convinced that success in addressing IFFs is ultimately a political issue. Issues involving abusive transfer pricing, trade misinvoicing, tax evasion, aggressive tax avoidance, double taxation, tax incentives, unfair contracts, financial secrecy, money laundering, smuggling, trafficking and abuse of entrusted power and their interrelationships confer a very technical character to the study

of IFFs. However, the nature of actors, the cross-border character of the phenomenon, and the effect of IFFs on state and society attest to the political importance of the topic. Similarly, the solutions to IFFs that are the subject of ongoing work in various forums at the global level attest to this political significance.”⁴

The Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) held in Addis Ababa in July 2015 was expected to deliver on development finance by challenging rich countries to fulfil their ODA obligations, by proposing global policy changes, regulatory measures and institutional arrangements to curb resource leakages which drain on development finance. It failed to deliver on all fronts. Many developing countries hoped that the conference would deal with IFFs as a political problem to be tackled in an intergovernmental process in which all UN Member States participate on an equal footing. However, the paragraphs referring to IFFs in the FfD outcome document are written more in a “we take note of” style. They don’t address IFFs as a central problem to be urgently resolved to enhance domestic tax mobilization. In the end, rich countries managed to “kill” the proposal put forward by the G77 plus China for the establishment of an intergovernmental tax body based at the UN. In fact they virtually ‘boycotted’ the negotiations, until and unless the paragraph was deleted.

The chances for addressing IFFs in follow-up negotiations in the FfD process, and to give a prominent place to IFFs in the means of implementation section of the 2030 Agenda and the SDG process appear to be very limited. Rich countries insist on considering domestic resource mobilization and IFFs as ‘technical’ issues that can be resolved through enhanced ‘capacity building’ of developing country revenue authorities, by multilateral and bilateral development agencies. This is merely a pretext to prevent the participation of African countries in norm setting and reforming international tax rules on an equal footing.

As the African High Level Panel Report on IFFs emphasizes, “the critical ingredient in the struggle to end illicit financial flows is the political will of governments, not only technical capacity.” But “political will of governments” does not come by itself; it needs international support and citizen mobilization to put pressure on decision- and policy-makers. The major reason for global civil society to support G77 countries in their call for the establishment of an intergovernmental UN tax body to tackle IFFs and tax dodging is because this creates an open process in which citizens can exert influence to generate this political will for measures and decisions which curb IFFs and enhance domestic resource mobilization to finance sustainable development.

3 Cf. Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa 2015 (www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf).

4 Ibid. p. 65.

Lastly, the overreliance on **private finance and public-private partnerships** despite little, if any, evidence of their effectiveness in public service delivery and the provision of public goods, risks compromising the state's ability to protect, respect and fulfil human rights. Not only does this strategy involve higher costs than direct public procurement, privatizes gains while socializing risks, it changes the nature of public services and profoundly alters governance relations.

Removal of structural barriers to socio-economic transformation of developing countries. Financial resources, while important, are only a limited part of the means of implementation. The most critical dimension is related to the removal of the structural barriers that continue to trap many developing economies, especially many African countries, into heavy commodity dependence, as their role within the international organization of production is focused on providing primary agricultural produce and minerals. Many commodity-trapped economies expose small and unsophisticated local economies, with often significant disconnect between primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, and very significant import/export flows, as they export primary commodities and import virtually everything else. The openness of these economies also generates limited possibilities for industrialization and local value addition. The primary drivers of these conditions are extractive growth models that benefit rent-economies by local elites connected with international investors and the unfair trade and investment agreements (see the next [chapter 2.17](#)). It is therefore necessary to challenge the far-too-benign characterization of global value chains and expose their frequent focus on grabbing rather than adding value.

The MoI/AAAA lost an important opportunity to reaffirm the development terms that should direct *trade and investment agreements*. In particular, they failed to expose the increasing normative hierarchy between human rights and investors' and other commercially framed rights that these agreements, and their Investor-State Dispute Settlements mechanisms, are fostering (see [chapter 2.17](#)).

The emerging emphasis on the *global infrastructure agenda* is another concern in this context. Rather than focusing on the much-needed infrastructural investments to strengthen local economies and promote (commodity-driven) industrialization, emphasis tends to be on large, often mega-projects driven by the 'connecting mine-to-port' logic that risks further ossifying the current extractive development models. Furthermore, the increased reference to infrastructure as an asset class could intensify the financialization of already weak economies and the revival of high debt stocks, with potentially grave levels of macroeconomic instability.

Another key dimension of the structural barriers to socio-economic transformation concerns *technology*. Despite agreement on the new Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM), it is important to assess the actual impact of these initiatives in addressing the technology gap (see the box by Neth Daño in this chapter).

It is also important to emphasize that technology development is not a monopoly of the formal sector, nor is it transferred and diffused only by the private sector and industrialized countries, as the TFM architecture implies. Progress cannot be measured by the uncritical acceptance of the promises of new technologies and the blind faith that these would bridge current development divides, and should rather recognize the inherent risks in establishing new, or ossifying existing, levels of inequalities.

Democratization of economic governance. The progressive effort to shift the epicentre of global economic governance from the current Bretton Woods Institution-centred system in favour of a greater role of the United Nations was seriously undermined by developed countries during the MoI/AAAA negotiations. All attempts to promote this movement that did not succeed is the proposal for a Global Tax Body to strengthen international tax cooperation, including but not limited to eliminating IFFs and tax havens. Along the same lines, the Global Infrastructure Forum (GIF) exposes another revealing anecdote. Although provided for through the AAAA, any attempt to propose even a mild reporting mechanism to the FfD Forum was stalled and so de-facto opposed by

Multi-stakeholder STI Mechanisms at the UN: Fad or Trap?

BY NETH DAÑO, ETC GROUP

A string of new mechanisms dealing with science, technology and innovation (STI) and the science-policy interface have sprouted at the UN in recent years. Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) governments established a Technology Mechanism in 2010. The UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) spun off the Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystems Services (IPBES) in 2012 (www.ipbes.net). The UN Secretary-General created a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in 2013 (<http://en.unesco.org/un-sab/content/scientific-advisory-board>). Then, in 2015 the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development gave birth to the Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM) (<https://sustainable-development.un.org/TFM>).

These mechanisms all share one thing in common: inclusion of stakeholders beyond Member-States and government-endorsed experts.

In contrast to well-established expert bodies like the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) housed at UNCTAD and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the new STI mechanisms have a far less rigid attitude towards informal and non-conventional sources of knowledge and expertise. IPBES principles explicitly value the contribution

of indigenous and traditional knowledge systems. The SAB and the TFM have indigenous and civil society expertise in their composition alongside eminent names in the scientific community.

An inclusive approach and the recognition of diverse sources of knowledge is key to ensuring that STI contributes to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The recognition of indigenous knowledge and local innovations are already enshrined in UN treaties and it is only logical that indigenous peoples are represented in mechanisms that provide scientific and technological support to the implementation of multilateral agreements. Civil society representation in STI bodies helps ensure that the views and interests of communities shape the direction of UN priorities and programmes in STI.

The inclusion of rights holders and civil society are hard-fought gains from decades of advocating to participate in decision-making on STI in global development. Since the 1990s, civil society initiatives have proactively set the pace of intergovernmental discourses in governance of new technologies at the UN. On the ground, civil society and social movements have worked with communities in the development, transfer and dissemination of environmentally sound, socially acceptable and inclusive technol-

ogies and innovations long before these became fashionable.

The concept of *stakeholders*, however, needs to be challenged. It is based on the flawed premise that business interests have an equal *stake* as the holders of rights such as those held by indigenous peoples and local communities in relation to traditional knowledge systems and biological resources. This justifies that giving a seat to civil society in a multi-stakeholder mechanism entitles business and industry to a seat at the same table. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development sits alongside an indigenous peoples' representative in the 10-Member Group that supports the TFM. The transnational oil company Shell as the representative of business NGOs in the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN-AB) of the UNFCCC is entitled to an equal voice with environmental NGOs. Which stakeholders should be represented is controversial. Parties to the UNFCCC agreed to have non-governmental constituencies represented in the CTCN-AB, but only environmental, research and business NGOs – a political compromise that left out the rights holders in climate technologies – women, youth and children, farmers and indigenous peoples.

Danger looms large in using stakeholder inclusion in global STI mechanisms to institutionalize a

corporate sector role in the development, transfer and deployment of technologies to achieve the 2030 Agenda with no clear accountability. As civil society representatives lock horns with this sector in STI discourses around the table, UN agencies engage corporate-sector representatives in programme

initiatives in between meetings. Members of the CTCN, for instance, tried to push for an engagement policy exclusively for the private sector but was blocked by the Advisory Board that transformed the policy so as to apply to civil society as a whole. While Advisory Board deliberations on the policy

were underway, the CTCN went on with corporate-sector engagement funded by a bilateral donor. These non-transparent ‘back-room’ dealings indicate the creation of a stakeholder hierarchy in decision-making that casts shadows on the sincerity of the goal to “leave no one behind” in STI for the SDGs.

developed countries in the course of the inaugural FfD Forum (New York, April 2016).

Indeed, a bizarre ‘Out of UN implementation’ narrative characterized the initial phase of the FfD Follow-up process: the UN can propose new initiatives, but their implementation should not necessarily take place within the UN itself. Accordingly, the OECD can advance its ‘inclusive framework’ with respect to tax cooperation claiming it responds to the UN call for scaling-up action in this field, and the GIF can be operationalized with no accountability with the process that has actually established it.

However, the greatest attack against (still timid) attempts to democratize global economic governance concerns the unproblematized promotion of multi-stakeholder partnerships at all levels. These shift governance mechanisms away from legitimate rights-based and people-centred accountability, by consolidating the primacy of stakeholders against/over rights-holders with no consideration of the profoundly different nature of public and private interests.

Reform of economic, monetary and financial systems to increase their responsiveness and coherence with sustainable development. Another key dimension of MoI concerns the pressing need to reform the economic, monetary and financial systems in order to increase their responsiveness and coherence with sustainable and equitable development. The challenge is greater than simply that of alignment. The reality is that many of the drivers of economic globalization

and the marginalization that it generates are deeply rooted in the current monetary and financial systems. Furthermore, these systems have created the impression, and the reality, of a distinct space where state sovereignty – and therefore peoples’ sovereignty – does not apply. An example is Argentina’s final surrender to the predatory business models of the vulture funds in April 2016, which opened a new cycle of indebtedness (for Argentina) and a new phase of uncertainty on how to handle the next generation of debt crises (for many countries). Once again, attempts to find orderly mechanisms for sovereign debt restructuring processes in the context of the United Nations met the obstinate opposition of developed countries, and with them the legitimate affirmation of the principles for responsible lending and borrowing, which have been subject to lengthy negotiations in the context of the United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Beyond debt, the broader agenda of systemic reforms include the development of regulations to prevent financial crises and to limit their devastating effects, the reform of the monetary system (in terms of capital controls, financial safety nets, Special Drawing Rights, etc.), the governance reform of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the increased alignment of their activities with development goals, the intractable issue of derivatives and their consequences in terms of commodity price volatility, and the management of climate risk as systemic risk with potentially devastating impact, among others. These issues are only mildly and inadequately addressed by the AAAA. Many of the SDG ambitions will therefore

meet the harsh counter-realities generated by the powerful drivers of economic marginalization, unless many of these issues are seriously tackled.

Rethink the business model and the role of the private sector. Rethinking the business model to better align to the imperatives of human rights and sustainable development is a fundamental but completely overlooked dimension of the MoI. It requires, first and foremost, unpacking the often monolithic concept of the private sector into its various components in order to expose the current dynamics of corporate concentration and allow the tensions between global corporate players and local and smaller scale actors to unfold and become manifest. For example, such disaggregation will immediately highlight the conflicting objectives between the global hegemonic, homogenizing and often predatory global food system and the large array of local economic actors, including smallholders and small producers that compose local food systems. The concentration of economic power is a critical indicator to monitor, alongside with the progress (or lack of) with respect to the establishment of binding instruments to regulate the activities of transnational corporations.

To do this, it is essential to advance the development of needed regulatory frameworks to ensure business operations are fully consistent with human rights, including workers' rights, incorporate externalities, ensure appropriate taxation of natural resources, re-establish proper relations between the real and financial economies, and promote responsible advertising and marketing, among others. Here significant tension remains between binding regulatory frameworks and voluntary guidelines, with the continued double standard of legally framing investors and other commercially framed rights without equally binding frameworks related to business conduct and responsibilities.

A separate discourse is related to the need to further regulate the increasing private delivery of public services to respect human rights, ensure that the fundamental nature of public services is not compromised, and contrast social stratifications that promote the intergenerational transmissions of inequalities. The public policy space needs to be protected from en-

croaching corporate capture at multiple levels, often through the continued promotion of multi-stakeholder partnerships that redirect governance away from rights-holders towards the pretence of a politically neutral understanding of stakeholders. This requires robust safeguards against conflicts of interest to ensure adequate protection of the integrity of public policy making processes and the trustworthiness of the scientific/knowledge process that generates evidence to support public policies.

Conclusions

The current MoI/AAAA will not provide the necessary instruments and resources to advance the aspirations and the extent of transformation that progressive civil society would like to foster. This fundamentally means that civil society cannot limit itself to the monitoring of the currently framed MoI targets and AAAA commitments, as these are largely inadequate, even if achieved, to support the extent of economic, social and political changes that we collectively aspire to. Hence the need to establish a far more ambitious progressive agenda that raises the bar with respect to the existing level of commitment. This report aims to provide an initial but potentially useful framework for future engagement.

References

United Nations (2015): Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. New York. www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf

International Trade and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

BY RANJA SENGUPTA, THIRD WORLD NETWORK

The full value of the 2030 Agenda is its promise to deliver development outcomes beyond what national governments can do on their own. Here lies the importance of a global partnership, that is based on effective, transparent and fair global cooperation that more than matches national efforts. In the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), this was captured in Goal 8 (MDG 8). In the 2030 Agenda it is embodied in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17 on Means of Implementation (MOI) as well as the goal-specific means of implementation targets in each of the other goals. There are 19 MOI targets in Goal 17 as well as a total of 43 MOI targets spread throughout the other 16 goals.

The inclusion of a stand-alone goal on means of implementation together with goal-specific targets threaded throughout represents a huge advance in terms of global development agreements, giving significant importance to the issues of implementation and calling for a far more coherent approach to achieving the goals. Sadly, this most crucial component of the Agenda, which is essential if it is to be truly “transformative” and meet key sustainable development needs, remains the most contested and divided, still often on North-South lines. While developing countries have been asking developed ones to deliver on their commitments on the various components of MOI such as official development assistance (ODA), debt restructuring, fair rules of trade, technology sharing and transfer, policy coherence and systemic issues of global governance, developed countries have not done so. The failure of recent attempts (e.g., the Asia Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development and the first Financing for Development Forum in April 2016) to get more cooperation, clarity and accountability on MOI delivery mechanisms, makes it clear that this resistance is strong and proactive. As such, it creates serious obstacles to the ability of developing countries to meet the SDGs.

With regard to trade, for example, developing countries will not be able to meet development targets if they continue to face unfair and adverse rules of global, regional, plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements. These not only stop their governments from getting necessary revenues to fund development priorities, including those set out in the 2030 Agenda; they can actually obstruct and reverse the progress made through other means. The question is, does business-as-usual work or do trade rules need to be fundamentally re-shaped to serve sustainability goals? Difficult negotiations on the three targets on international trade in SDG 17 (Targets 17.10, 17.11 and 17.12), as well as those in several other goals, have meant that though some of these targets are good and well-intended, critical issues have not been addressed. Moreover, the collective scope of these targets, designed to be inter-related and interlinked remains limited and often bypasses the real issues that global trade and in particular, developing and least developed countries, face today.

Trade targets in the 2030 Agenda

The three targets on trade in SDG 17, along with two targets on technology that have a close connection to trade issues (Target 17.6 and Target 17.7)¹ and various goal-specific targets linked to trade demonstrate these problems.

Target 17.10, to promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, for example, locates such a system only under the WTO. Although this is agreed 1992

¹ Target 17.6, on the setting up of the Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM) and (Target 17.7) on the promotion of the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries are useful, cf box in chapter 3.16.

Rio Summit language, WTO proceedings make it difficult for developing and least developing countries (LDCs) to be “open” at all times, as they may need to protect their markets depending on their stage of development. This target also refers to “the conclusion of negotiations under its [the WTO’s] Doha Development Round.” This is currently contentious at the WTO, with developing countries fighting to keep it open until its development mandate is delivered while developed countries want to end it right away, without addressing the development dimension. Although both developed and developing countries want the conclusion of the Round, it will be meaningless for developing countries unless the development mandate is met.

Target 17.11, to significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the LDCs’ share of global exports by 2020, and Target 17.12 on timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all LDCs, consistent with WTO decisions, are both good in principle. But as an UNCTAD report points out, exports of developing and least developed countries are blocked by non-tariff measures such as high standards, strict rules of origin, and so on which are much more difficult to pin down.² Duty Free Quota Free access has been the target of long, drawn-out battles between developed countries and LDCs. The Bali WTO Ministerial of 2013 delivered merely some best endeavour³ provisions on this issue while the Nairobi Ministerial of December 2015 (held *after* the adoption of the 2030 Agenda) failed to include any language on this target.

The goal-specific trade means of implementation face challenges as well.

Under SDG 2, on hunger, food security, and sustainable agriculture, Target 2.b specifies the correction and prevention of trade restrictions and distortions in global agricultural markets. However, it highlights the elimination of export measures (including sub-

sidies) as the primary instrument whereas in reality the importance of export promotion measures has declined, making it largely irrelevant in addressing global market distortions. In fact the Nairobi Ministerial delivered a binding outcome on this, however only after allowing the United States (US) extremely lenient terms.⁴ On the other hand, the elephant in the room, namely the high domestic agricultural subsidies of the OECD countries, mainly the US and the European Union (EU), remain untouched. These subsidies continue to distort agricultural markets and undercut producers in developing countries and LDCs.

Under SDG 3, on health and well-being, Target 3.b reaffirms the use of TRIPS flexibilities to provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines for diseases that affect developing countries. But due to the high degree of pressure exerted on countries which have tried to use these flexibilities, developing countries are forced to seek re-affirmation, even though the 2001 Doha TRIPS Declaration was itself a reaffirmation of rights in the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, by referring only to “essential medicines,” a limitation that is neither in the TRIPS Agreement nor the Doha Declaration, the target in fact represents a regression.

Under SDG 10, on reducing inequality within and among countries, Target 10.a specifies the implementation of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing and least developed countries. This has been the foundation of the Doha Development Round, even if framed in a rather flawed manner. As the Round faces threats of an early conclusion without fulfilling its development mandate, the SDT component risks being severely undermined. In Nairobi, negotiations on development failed to make much headway. If this target is to be met, the current approach to WTO negotiations must change significantly.

Under SDG 14, on marine resources, Target 14.6 seeks to eliminate certain forms of fisheries subsidies. Because, several developed countries grant large sub-

² Cf. UNCTAD (2016).

³ “I will try my best” language, which is not binding on Member States.

⁴ Cf. www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm.

sidies on fisheries that undercut developing country producers, this target could help in correcting that situation. However, in order to give due attention to the need of small-scale fishing sectors in developing countries for support, the target includes SDT for developing and least developed countries. In the WTO Nairobi Ministerial, however, several developed countries asked developing countries to remove fisheries subsidies, even those that support small-scale fishing and fisherfolk. The SDT treatment provision included in Target 14.6 was ignored.

Adverse trade orientation

While some targets on trade are well intended, most remain limited and incomplete and may sometimes do more harm than good. However, there are some provisions that could be clearly adverse. For example, under SDG 10, Target 10.b supports foreign direct investment (FDI) as an unqualified positive measure, and fails to point out the various problems related to FDI, especially in the current context, including restrictions on governments' policy space, pressure to remove or dilute performance requirements on FDI,⁵ challenges to natural resource conservation and management, environmental degradation, and protection of human rights, especially rights of local communities and vulnerable sectors of the population.

The overall emphasis on trade liberalization as a blanket panacea is also problematic. Thus the inclusion in Paragraph 68 on MOI in the 2030 Agenda, of a commitment to pursue "meaningful trade liberalization"⁶ ignores the fact that the ability of trade liberalization to do blanket-good has been severely challenged even by trade advocates.

To sum up, the 2030 Agenda addressed trade issues in a highly limited way. It focuses only on the multi-lateral space of the WTO whereas the plethora of bilateral, regional and plurilateral FTAs are witness-

ing even more aggressive liberalization and creating impacts that makes the WTO (at least in its present form) almost benign by comparison.

Moreover, not only is the coverage limited, it is often damaging rather than constructive for sustainable development. The primary reason is that the 2030 Agenda's trade provisions, as well as the reality of world trade, continue to favour the interests of corporations and the narrow interests of developed countries, also largely corporate-driven. This also poses an inherent conflict with the objectives of sustainable development laid out in other goals.

The current reality of global trade and the framework of the 2030 Agenda

The current trade agreements pose an inherent conflict with the whole framework of the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs.

The ongoing divide at the WTO on ending the Doha Round without having met its development objectives persists despite the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. This clearly indicates that even after agreeing to Target 17.10 (on the Doha Development Round) and Target 10.a (on special and differential treatment) several developed countries especially the US, Japan and the EU are asking for a premature termination of the Round.

Another anomaly, as pointed out earlier, is the increasing dominance of FTAs and bilateral investment agreements (BITS), as well as the emerging spectre of mega FTAs such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (see box). These include deeper liberalization of the trade in goods and services (e.g., higher tariff cuts on agricultural and industrial products and more open markets for services), higher standards of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, as well as coverage of new areas such as investment, government procurement, competition policy, e-commerce, environmental goods and services, global value chains, and so on, all unsuccessfully pushed for by developed countries at the WTO in the 1990s. However, these countries are succeeding in getting these into the FTAs, following

5 Performance requirements generally impose conditions on inward FDI that helps a domestic economy; such as local content, local labour requirements, mandatory technology transfer, etc.

6 Cf. United Nations (2015b), para. 68.

which can be seen the steady advance of these “new issues” at the WTO. Most of these areas represent considerable threat to governments’ space for policy regulation. This despite the fact that, Target 17.14 refers to “enhancing policy coherence for sustainable development” while Target 17.15 mandates “respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development” (emphasis added).

The aggressive IPR provisions in these agreements, as for example the TPPA, can severely compromise governments’ policy space to ensure access to medicines, seeds and other important products for people at large. Even if the very limited Target 3.b on access to essential medicines is met, the FTA provisions on IPRs (and investment) are rapidly bypassing these flexibilities.

The BITS and investment chapters of FTAs are particularly damaging. Investment protection chapters include expansive definition of ‘investment’ and give very strong rights to the foreign investor, much above that of national investors and public interests. In particular, the dispute settlement mechanism in these agreements allow foreign investors to sue governments in secret private international arbitration cases through the Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS) clause, for any “expropriation” or imposition on their investment and expected profits. The arbitration system is hazy and bypasses national legal systems.⁷ These investment agreements can challenge decisions not only of the executive or bureaucracy, but that of state/provincial governments, legislature and judiciary as well.

In spite of major efforts by global civil society, FTAs and BITS are not covered in the 2030 Agenda. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) from July 2015 at least has Paragraph 88 that says such agreements cannot constrain domestic policies and regulation in the public interest.⁸ However, public policy regulation for protection of public interest, environment, public health, human rights and natural resources

are all being challenged in ISDS cases. There are 696 known cases globally with more than fifty per cent on natural resources, and the developing countries are losing most of theirs.

The 2030 Agenda and the AAAA expect governments to raise revenues domestically through taxes for development financing. But changes in tax policy are also challenged in several ISDS cases. Judicial and local government decisions are being challenged as well. As mentioned earlier, the strong role of the private sector in the 2030 Agenda and lack of language on regulation of private sector activities can potentially help to perpetuate such use of abusive investment agreements by large corporations.

The burden of ISDS has already led to Indonesia’s termination of 17 BITS in a review to assess the appropriateness of many BITS signed by former Governments in light of the current needs of the country. India has announced that it will renegotiate 47 BITS that have expired based on its new model BIT, and South Africa has already started its own review and terminated several BITS.⁹

Agriculture and food security is another area where global trade rules will be trampling on the SDGs. Target 2.3 under talks of doubling agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment. However, at the WTO, the recent attack by the US, the EU and other developed countries of developing country subsidies to small farmers for supporting public food programmes, will challenge the meeting of goal 2 overall and this target in particular. Such subsidies by developing countries are a measure to support production for food programmes as well as that of livelihoods of farmers, without which long term food security of developing countries cannot be safeguarded. At the WTO, a per-

7 Cf., for example, Eberhardt/Olivet (2012).

8 Cf. United Nations (2015a), para. 88.

9 Cf. www.rh-arbitration.com/south-africa-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-germany-netherlands-and-switzerland/.

Targets for SDG 17

Finance

- 17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection
- 17.2 Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries
- 17.3 Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources
- 17.4 Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress
- 17.5 Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries

Technology

- 17.6 Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism
- 17.7 Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed
- 17.8 Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology

Capacity-Building

- 17.9 Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation

Trade

- 17.10** Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda
- 17.11** Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries' share of global exports by 2020
- 17.12** Realize timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed countries, consistent with World Trade Organization decisions, including by ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from least developed countries are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access

Systemic issues*Policy and Institutional coherence*

- 17.13** Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence
- 17.14** Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development
- 17.15** Respect each country's policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development

Multi-stakeholder partnerships

- 17.16** Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries
- 17.17** Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships

Data, monitoring and accountability

- 17.18** By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts
- 17.19** By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries

manent solution that asks for allowing such subsidies without limit is facing major challenges, while developed country subsidies are allowed to continue unfettered. The push in the FTAs to get agricultural import duties removed in developing countries, even for subsidised developed country products, will also challenge SDG 2 and several targets thereof.

On the other hand, Target 2.c on regulating food commodity markets and controlling food price volatility is a much welcomed measure but the WTO and FTAs have no mechanism to address this. In fact their operation actually encourages speculative trading in food commodity markets, for example by opening up developing countries to global markets and challenging public stockholding operations.

The WTO and FTAs are also challenging industrialisation and job creation prospects in developing and least developed countries by forcing them to reduce or eliminate import duties on industrial sectors even in the presence of infant industries. Preferential treatment for domestic industry, even small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), is being barred. Further several FTAs, for example the EU FTAs, force developing countries to eliminate export duties on raw materials. Kenya's leather industry was damaged as they were forced to remove export taxes on raw leather. Several others are fighting to retain minerals to be developed and used for local industrialisation. China lost a case at the WTO on its export taxes on minerals. The investment provisions including the pressure to remove performance requirements are challenging as well. These run counter to Target 9.b which asks for "ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities" in developing countries.

The Global Value Chains (GVCs) are being advanced as the solution for SMEs in developing countries to grow and contribute to job creation. Target 9.3 says "increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets". While the emphasis on SMEs is good, the GVCs are based on a principle of exploitation of both natural and human resources in developing countries while locking them into very low ends of the value chains that blocks them (often through the control of technology) from moving up the chain.

Another example is the aggressive liberalisation of services trade through the FTAs which includes asking for market access and investment into sensitive and critical service areas such as water, health, education, energy and even food. By generating and accelerating rising user fees, increasing inequality across economic and geographical (rural-urban for example) status, and even loss in employment opportunities in associated segments,¹⁰ such liberalisation is resulting in severe loss of access to services for the people. The access to sustainable health, education, water and energy are embodied in SDGs 3, 4, 6 and 7 respectively but many of these goals and the specific targets will not be attainable unless trade rules and power asymmetries in rule-making are changed.

To conclude, there are many other examples that can be given to show that the whole paradigm of the current commercially and corporation-driven trade agreements does not fit in with the overall approach of the SDGs. It is clear that a lot has to change in global trade rules if it has to cater to the SDGs. In many ways, the SDGs themselves make it easy for trade agreements to rule by allowing "the private sector" to dominate the development discourse and set its own standards for sustainable development, in effect also allowing weak or non-existent regulation of activities of the corporations which drive the trade and investment agreements.

¹⁰ For example retail liberalization in several countries have resulted in severe job losses and closure of small retail, thus compromising their incomes and access to basic services.

Interestingly, in spite of the limited approach on trade issues, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs have actually begun to have a bearing on global rule setting on trade, in probably an unplanned but not unexpected way. It is important to note that the SDGs have no legal status and are more useful in norm-setting whereas trade and investment agreements are legally binding. But we already see that the SDGs are being used, if selectively, by the developed countries to push for legally binding stipulations in trade agreements, for example, in the fisheries subsidies case mentioned above. Though this particular attempt failed, it is clear that the SDGs provide a potential instrument to advance a selective agenda through its selective use.

This makes it clear that negotiators of trade agreements, especially from developing countries, need to know not only of the provisions that are related to trade but the entire 2030 Agenda itself, if they are to make use of it themselves or block adverse use in legally binding trade agreements. As such the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs represent a limited and often, a regressive package on trade. But the bigger Agenda (especially other goals and targets) still offers opportunities for developing countries to fight for changes in the current global trade systems if they can use it effectively. But for this to happen, it must first be recognised by all that meaningful sustainable development spanning economic, social and environmental pillars, though not necessarily limited to the 2030 Agenda itself, represents top priority for developing countries. In particular, trade and investment agreements are subservient to that priority. That is the biggest reality that has to be changed.

References

- Eberhardt, Pia/Olivet, Cecilia (2012):** Profiting from injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom. Brussels: Corporate Europe Observatory/Transnational Institute.
<http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profitting-from-injustice.pdf>
- UNCTAD (2016):** Trading into Sustainable Development: Trade, Market Access and the Sustainable Development Goals. Geneva.
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2015d3_en.pdf
- United Nations (2015a):** Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. New York.
www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf
- United Nations (2015b):** Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York (UN Doc. A/RES/70/1).
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

TTIP – a threat for the 2030 Agenda

BY HUBERT RENÉ SCHILLINGER, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG GENEVA

Since 2013 the Transatlantic Trade and Partnership Agreement (TTIP) has been negotiated between the European Union and the United States aiming to create a free trade area for over 800 million people combining the two most affluent regions on the globe and two of the most powerful global players into one single market. According to US President Obama and German Chancellor Merkel, an agreement will still be finalized before the end of 2016. However, as people are becoming more aware of the terms of these negotiations, resistance against TTIP has been mounting. Even a complete breakdown of negotiations has become a distinct possibility.

A final agreement on TTIP in its current form could seriously undermine important goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda in a number of ways.

First, TTIP is sold by US and EU leaders to their own population as a unique – and also the last – opportunity for the old ‘West’ to write the global rules on trade and investment in the 21st century, “before others could do it.” In future, TTIP – in combination with its companions the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), is thought to become the blueprint for any other trade

agreements that follows. TTIP and other US- and EU-led agreements would actually replace the World Trade Organization as the place where global trade rules are made, thus undermining multilateralism. The sheer economic weight of the combined transatlantic market alone is thought to make sure that the norms and standards applied here would almost automatically become the new global ones. Such an exclusionary approach to changes in global rules is hardly in line with the spirit and the wording of SDG 16, in particular with Target 16.7, to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels, and Target 16.8, to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance. And it directly flies in the face of Target 17.10 calling for the promotion of “a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization.”

Second, direct negative economic spillovers to poor countries can be expected from TTIP. Several studies show that tariff cuts between the transatlantic trading partners could seriously disadvantage exporters from poor developing countries, as for example, those in sub-Saharan Africa, that rely on tariff preferences for their access to EU and US markets. The fact that some of these preferences

will be eroded by transatlantic tariff cuts will impact negatively on a number of poor economies and thereby potentially impede progress on other goals, such as SDG 1 on the elimination of poverty, SDG 2 on sustainable agriculture, SDG 8 on economic growth and employment, and SDG 10 on inequality, particularly among countries. As compensation for these negative spillovers, the US and the EU have been called upon to make the harmonization and improvement of their respective preference schemes towards Africa (the US African Growth and Opportunity Act – AGOA, Everything But Arms on the side of the EU) an integral part of the TTIP negotiating agenda. The harmonization of these schemes should, for instance, target much more generous and at the same time simplified and harmonized rules of origin for exports from these countries into both markets.

Third, TTIP is actually only to a very small extent about the reduction or abolition of already very low import tariffs. The true focus is the removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade – essentially regulations. TTIP proponents argue that regulations limit trade, and “harmonizing” standards would remove these “obstacles” to cheaper imports. However such regulations are not arbitrary impediments to trade, but are generally issued to protect and promote public health, consum-

er safety, citizens' and workers' rights, sustainable communities and a healthy environment. They often reflect deeply held public values that tend to differ from country to country. The processes of "harmonization" and "mutual recognition" of standards proposed in TTIP are likely to end up accepting the smallest common denominator based on the weaker of EU or US standards. Such a race to the bottom would, however, perfectly fit the corporate deregulation agenda in many of the areas under negotiation (e.g., in the area of financial regulation).

In addition, a joint "regulatory council" has been proposed to, in future, vet all new projects of law or regulatory projects on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether they are harmful to bilateral trade. This council could veto any proposed regulation, if it considers it potentially discriminatory to exporters from the other side, even before any such project could go to any parliament for deliberation and decision-making. If this "regulatory cooperation" was to become part of the proposed new "gold standard" of global trade rules it would replace or at the very least seriously undermine decision-making of legitimate and representative political bodies through unaccountable and opaque technocratic bodies under the influence of corporate lobbyists, therefore becoming a direct threat to democracy. It

could also undermine needed action in public policy areas of vital importance to the fulfillment of the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda, such as, in the case of necessary environmental protection legislation to ratchet up sustainability standards in the face of planetary boundaries and to combat climate change, as mandated under SDG 13.

Fourth, the greatest threat of TTIP and its siblings for the achievements of the SDGs arguably resides in the envisaged provisions for investor rights and the controversial investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS). Even if relabeled as an investment court system (ICS), as proposed in the revised CETA-text, this measure creates an explicit tool for foreign investors to effectively challenge changes in the policy environment that are potentially harmful to their bottom line. Through this parallel system of privatized justice via international arbitration tribunals, corporations can attack government regulations, such as that designed to protect public health, to reduce carbon emissions, or to promote sustainable development more generally, by suing governments for lost future profits without the involvement of any genuine court of law. Already the threat by investors to sue governments for millions – and sometimes even billions – of taxpayers' euros or dollars can have a "chilling effect", by forcing

governments to abstain from needed action for sustainable development because of the huge financial risks involved. While a small number of countries have cancelled previously negotiated bilateral investment agreements that include these investor-state dispute settlement arrangements, the TTIP, TPP and CETA would hugely expand the coverage of such arrangements, empowering the use of this mechanism to tens of thousands of additional corporations.

3

Measures and indicators

Measuring Accountability: The politics of indicators

BY BARBARA ADAMS, ROBERTO BISSIO AND KAREN JUDD

The visible commitment of the UN system and its Member States to the universal and inclusive 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development risks being undermined by a less visible debate about the indicators by which to assess progress on each of its goals.

Although produced following an extensive series of consultations – with statisticians, academic and civil society experts – the SDG indicator framework submitted to the Statistical Commission of the UN in March 2016 continues a process of narrowing the Agenda and limiting its universality. While in a few cases they contribute to the interconnectedness of elements needed to meet the targets, for the most part the indicators fail to address the complexity of the targets, at times distort their meaning and in a few cases serve to legitimize totally inadequate targets.

Despite the universal framing of the 2030 Agenda, the responsibilities of the rich, including extraterritorial responsibilities, remain largely outside the indicator framework. How is it possible to measure vulnerability to global power dynamics vs. power to shape them? Some countries are extremely vulnerable to the consequences of rules on debt or trade for example with little or no power to shape these rules. The same is true of global tax rules. How can progress by middle-income countries be measured without addressing this dynamic? Is there scope to correct this at national and regional levels?

This chapter looks at the two-stage process by which the indicators not already agreed upon in the first indicator framework were determined. Chapter 3.2 presents alternative measures that cover the breadth of the targets and indicator framework as a whole.

The politics of indicators

On 11 March 2016 the UN Statistical Commission¹ approved “as a practical starting point” an initial set of global indicators submitted by the Interagency and Expert Group on SDGs (IAEG-SDGs), which had been charged with developing a global indicator framework.² More than 80 UN Member States expressed dissatisfaction with this framework, raising concerns about their failure to adequately address the targets.

The Group of 77 (G 77) and China, for example, stated that the framework should encompass all of the 17 SDGs and 169 targets in a balanced and integrated manner, including Goal 17 on means of implementation (MoI) and stressed that the “indicators should be faithful and relevant to the 2030 Agenda and should not re-interpret targets.”³ In fact, the indicators for Goal 17 have proved to be the most difficult to identify throughout the IAEG-SDGs process (see below).

Several countries stressed the need for more disaggregated data. Given that neglected groups and areas tend to disappear in national averages, the fact that the framework now includes less data disaggregation rather than more is a failure to conform to the ambition of the 2030 Agenda, particularly regarding its overarching commitment to leave no one behind. How can we reach “the furthest behind first” if we don’t know who they are?

Other concerns went to specific goals. Least developed countries (LDCs) noted that the indicator on proportion of population using the internet fails to adequately

¹ A subsidiary body of ECOSOC, comprising the heads of national statistical offices of 24 countries that supervises the work of the UN Statistical Division, cf. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/>.

² Cf. United Nations (2015a).

³ Cf. G77 (2016).

capture the target on technology transfer or to measure the operationalization of the LDC Technology Bank set up for that purpose. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) noted the inadequacy of the indicator to measure inequality, which as many civil society organizations have pointed out is limited to income per capita among the bottom 40 percent of the population, saying nothing about the top.

India raised concerns about the use of perception surveys or opinion polls as indicators for some of the targets, noting that they lack internationally accepted standards or guidelines and cautioning that they could be “overly subjective, imprecise and also prone to misuse.”⁴

The UN Statistical Commission requested the IAEG-SDGs to consider these and other reservations and continue to refine the framework. At the same time it emphasized the importance of “guaranteeing international comparability.”⁵ However, the UN Statistics Division (UNSD) has stated repeatedly that the global indicators are intended for global follow-up and review and are not necessarily applicable to all national and regional contexts. This reflects the recognition that there is widespread distrust on part of many developing countries that, notwithstanding such assurances, the emphasis on comparability will pressure countries to use the global framework as the starting point, thereby running the risk of multiplying its weaknesses (without securing its strengths).

The IAEG-SDGs, following a meeting in Mexico in March 2016 to assess availability of data for each of the indicators, passed the ball back to governments, saying in its report that “specific proposals for refinement of indicators mentioned by Member States” and “possibly reviewing those indicators that are determined to not completely cover the full scope of the target” is a job that “will not commence until after the indicator framework is adopted (and possibly a mandate for refinements/revisions is given) by ECOSOC and the General Assembly.”⁶ This leaves

agreement on a revised indicator framework open for at least another year.

What challenges need to be addressed?

While the MDGs had a total of 21 targets and 60 indicators, but in practice focused primarily on a single target, the SDGs may confront a different problem. MDG 1 on poverty was considered achieved when the World Bank-monitored target of halving the number of people living on US\$ 1.25/day was reached, even when the poverty profile of most developing countries remained much more nuanced. Similarly the goal of reducing gender equality was considered advanced when the target of universal primary education was reached.

In the case of the SDGs, however, despite pressure to try to limit the goals and targets, the IAEG-SDGs was asked to identify at least one (frequently more) indicator for each of the 169 targets, which to date has resulted in a list of 230 indicators and might end up with some 300 indicators. The challenge is now how to avoid evaluating progress on each of these separately without considering the way in which they need to be coordinated.

To meet this challenge and finalize the indicators, Member States that approved the SDGs will have to explain the intent of paragraph 17 of the 2030 Agenda which states that “(...) there are deep interconnections and many cross-cutting elements across the new Goals and targets (...)” and this reflects the “(...) integrated approach that we have decided on (...)”⁷

The indicators to measure progress on gender equality and on decent work for all, for example, are cross-cutting throughout the goals, and include those to measure the right to paid employment and to rights at work; to equal pay for work of equal value; to recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work; to reduce inequalities in income and social protection coverage; to measure the right to economic resources and ownership and control of land and property. Target 10.3 focuses not only on equality of opportunity but also of outcome, offering scope for civil society monitoring.

4 Cf. India, Government of (2016).

5 UN Statistical Commission (2016a), p. 9.

6 UN Statistics Division (2016), para. 19.

7 United Nations (2015b), para. 17.

The selection of the indicator on people's experiences of discrimination and harassment to measure this target may be a starting point through which to capture the promise of "no one will be left behind." In so doing, these indicators stretch the envelope, especially from the perspective of rights.

Several other targets are even more comprehensive, requiring a multiplicity of cross-cutting policies and potential results that cannot be captured within one or two indicators. However, the decision to limit the number of indicators, for which data was (or could be) available, means that in many cases only one element of the target has an indicator, often one that distorts the overall meaning, directly or by omission.

Some targets lack indicators entirely. This is the case with Target 1.4, to ensure equal rights to "economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance." An indicator has been proposed to measure the proportion of population living in households with access to basic services, but the IAEG-SDGs pointed out that "there is no established methodology for this indicator" and UNEP (the UN Environment Programme) offered to "contribute to the definition of basic services as this is within the scope of UNEP's existing work on SDG ontologies."⁸ But even if an acceptable assessment tool for basic services is developed, this is only one of the issues covered by this target, and access to property, technology and finances will also need to be monitored.

This approach risks viewing each of the 17 goals as nothing more than the sum of its separate targets and indicators and can be measured accordingly. By counting the trees, therefore, this approach risks hiding the forest.

This risk is obvious under Goal 10, to "reduce inequality within and among countries." This should be straightforward, since despite the failure of governments to identify a specific target, there is broad

political agreement that current inequalities have reached the point where they are impeding development and need to be reduced.

Yet, while many of the targets address the problem of inequalities the specific target to do so is limited to improving the income growth of the bottom 40 percent, with no mention of the top 1 percent. This omission is also apparent in the indicators, which fail to measure this gap, either with the well-established Gini index (which measures the extent to which household income/or consumption deviates from perfect equality), or the "Palma ratio" (the ratio between the income of the top 10 percent and the bottom 40 percent) that is also widely accepted and easier to understand. Data for both measures are available for most countries and are used in other reports, which suggests that despite the fact that the selection of the indicators is meant to be a technical process only, it is indeed highly political. This conclusion is strongly reinforced by the fact that the framework completely ignores inequalities *among* countries.

As noted, the indicators on implementation, both for Goal 17 and for the MOI targets in all the other SDGs remain among the most difficult. Many of them are still being debated and many of those already agreed miss the point or limit/distort the intention of the target. For Goal 1 on poverty, for example, to "ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions," the indicators measure only the percentage of government spending that goes to poverty reduction programmes and the provision of essential services (education, health and social protection), saying nothing about development cooperation.

The same is true with Target 17.1, to "strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection." The indicator, "total tax revenue/GDP", ignores international support, not only through development cooperation but more importantly though

8 Cf. United Nations (2016), p. 3.

3.1 SDG Indicator Framework: Counting the trees, missing the forest

global agreements and measures to curb tax evasion and illicit financial flows.

Target 17.3, to “mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources” is to be measured only by “foreign direct investments as % of total FDI + ODA” and “additional volume of remittances (USD)/GDP.” These indicators might artificially inflate the accounted contribution of developed countries. On the one hand the OECD itself recognizes that “microeconomic or macroeconomic impacts of remittances are controversial and the extent to which these flows contribute to development is still not clear.”⁹ On the other hand not every FDI contributes

to development and if capital inflow weights positively in the balance of payments, it is the net balance what counts and thus outflows (profits, royalties, illicit financial flows, etc.) should not be ignored.

Moreover, an indicator on the percentage of tax paid by multinational corporations within host countries, suggested by civil society, was not adopted in the final framework.

The main point of Target 17.6 is to “enhance cooperation and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing,” not only through existing mechanisms but also through “a global technology facilitation mechanism.” The proposed indicator, rather than assessing whether or not these procedures and mechanisms have been set up, measures “access to the WIPO Patent Database and

⁹ OECD DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (2013), para. 24.

Beyond GDP in Italy

In February 2015 a group of Parliament members presented a bill entitled “Provisions for the use of well-being indicators in public policy-making.” The objective, according to the introduction, is “introducing indicators of well-being, environmental sustainability, gender equality and social quality with means provided for by national law in the elaboration, adoption and assessment of public policies, so that they can be effective in improving welfare conditions for the country as a whole.”

This proposal takes one step further the work on alternative indicators to GDP. Italy’s “Equitable and Sustainable Well-being”, or *Benessere Equo e Sostenibile* (BES)

in Italian, was adopted in 2013. The analytical framework was used to extend the analysis to the provincial and municipal levels, and the BES is now the reference measuring Italian well-being at all levels, for policy-makers, scholars as well as for civil society. The process of selection and refinement has led to a set of tested indicators on the basis of which synthetic indices have also been proposed to facilitate effective communication of results.

Synthetic indexes are computed for health, education and training, cultural participation, employment, quality of employment, economic hardship, income and inequality, social relations, security, homicides and subjec-

tive well-being. Thus, it is possible to assess the impact of the recent economic crisis on all of these dimensions of wellbeing in Italy, indicating that all have shown some deterioration. The level of income and employment decreased as expected, yet a more intense impact is shown for other linked phenomena such as the rise of small-scale criminality and the fall of cultural activities, demonstrating the way in which the crisis has had a negative impact not only on the economic life but also on the social fabric of Italy.

*Excerpted from the
Social Watch Italy Report 2016,
authored by Soana Tortora,
Jason Nardi and
Tommaso Rondinella*

use of the international IP system.” This is adding insult to injury, because the current global intellectual property system is precisely one of the obstacles that this goal seeks to overcome.

Moreover, given Member States’ commitment “to developing broader measures of progress to complement gross domestic product” and the inclusion of a specific target (17.19) to meet this, it is alarming that there is no adequate measure included in the current list of SDG indicators. So far, the only proposed indicator is “countries conducting population and housing census and achieving 100% birth and 80% death registration.”

Options that could be explored are well-being indicators like those adopted in Italy (see Box) and environmental “footprint” assessments to show where countries are positioned in terms of the ecological sustainability of their development. These could illustrate the continued relevance of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), and point out that while countries pursue universal SDGs their pathways and priorities to reach them will be different.

With regard to policy measures, under Target 17.9, to implement effective and targeted capacity building to support national plans for sustainable development, the measure to “implement a policy mix” to achieve the goals that includes the elements of reducing inequality has been omitted to focus only on the dollar value of financial and technical assistance.

Key demands like enhancing global macroeconomic stability (which is important everywhere and not just for developing countries), or to “enhance the global partnership (among countries) for sustainable development” still lack agreed indicators.

The commitment to “respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development” is left without an agreed indicator. Developing countries suggested to use a simple count of the “numbers of constraints” (conditionalities) that are embodied in ODA or loan agreements as well as investment and trade agreements.

Under Target 17.15 to enhance policy coherence, the proposed indicator “Numbers of constraints that are embodied in official development assistance or loan agreements, international investment agreements, regional trade agreements” etc., was revised to omit reference to constraints and reads now: “extent of use of country owned results frameworks and planning tools by providers of development cooperation.”

Moreover, in a number of cases, proposed indicators were revised to eliminate key concepts of sustainable development and its measures: Under Target 17.9 on international support for capacity building, the proposed indicator was simplified to omit reference to “implementing a holistic policy mix that aims at sustainable development in 3 dimensions (including reducing inequality within a country and governance).”

Under Target 17.14 to enhance policy coherence, the single indicator was simplified to omit references to “countries ratifying fundamental ILO conventions and recommendations” and instead only measures the number of countries with “mechanisms in place to enhance policy coherence of sustainable development.”

Follow-up and review

The 2030 Agenda states that the primary responsibility for follow-up and review lies with Governments, and that at the global level the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) will have the central role in overseeing the process, and will also “promote system-wide coherence and coordination of sustainable development policies. It should ensure that the Agenda remains relevant and ambitious and should focus on the assessment of progress, achievements and challenges faced by developed and developing countries as well as new and emerging issues.”¹⁰

It is also “mandated to conduct national reviews and thematic reviews of the implementation of the Agenda, with inputs from other intergovernmental bodies

¹⁰ United Nations (2015b), para. 82.

3.1 SDG Indicator Framework: Counting the trees, missing the forest

and forums, relevant UN entities, regional processes, major groups and other stakeholders.”¹¹

The 2030 Agenda rejected the concept of “accountability” in favour of “follow-up and review.” Could the failure of Member States to agree on a universal reporting and accountability process be somewhat mitigated by the continuing work of the IAEG-SDGs? It will be essential to assess all of the indicators in terms of who benefits and who is accountable. The Statistical Commission has requested the IAEG-SDGs to take into account the specific proposals by Member States on refining the indicators, many of which address the need to capture disparities at the top of the income spectrum and not just the bottom. Will this be an opportunity to adopt an indicator to measure or monitor reducing extreme wealth? Will it open the discussion on monitoring extraterritorial obligations?

Enormous disparities of opportunity, wealth and power...

The 2030 Agenda could further development, peace, and sustainability to the extent that it can address the root causes of multi-dimensional violence and reach the most marginalized. The addition of an indicator that measures disparities within countries along income, residential location, gender or ethnic lines could be a step forward. This figure should be included alongside the average measure to support efforts not only to increase or decrease the national average but also to decrease the gaps. The data is available, and was utilized in several of the last MDG reports, to measure disparities in income and/or location for key issues, such as working poverty, hunger, education, health, and access to clean drinking water.

Will the IAEG-SDGs’ ongoing review and refinement process revisit the indicators under Goal 17 proposed by several civil society organizations in a joint statement during the consultation process including those focused on “goals for the rich”?¹²

Several of these seek to assess constraints to policy coherence, including trade and investment treaties and loan agreements as well corporate tax avoidance and drains on the public purse through outsourcing development to the corporate sector. While Target 3.b specifically refers to the TRIPS provisions that allow developing countries to produce generic medicines, bilateral, and regional trade agreements typically include binding arbitration provisions that make that impossible. An indicator that should be added to assess the impact of trade on sustainable development would be the number of disputes brought against countries through trade and investment dispute settlement processes.

Target 17.17 on partnerships is another case where indicators need improving. The promotion of “effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships” will be measured by the money “committed on public-private partnerships,” not assessing whether those funds were actually disbursed nor their real contribution and impact.

There are ways to do this, for instance by introducing an indicator to measure the existence of binding human rights/environmental protection frameworks to regulate partnerships, including periodic impact assessments. In addition to proposing an indicator on contributions to PPPs by source, there should be also indicators to assess the value of public-private partnerships in terms of their contribution to sustainable development. These include:

- the number of public-(for profit) private partnerships that deliver greater value for achieving the SDGs than public or private finance alone;
- the number of public-(for profit) private partnerships that include full transparency of contracts, terms, and assessment results, and are subject to the highest international environmental and social safeguards.

Reverse the slippery slope

The fact that the proposed indicators framework has been sent back for refinement is an opportunity for the statisticians to take these and other recommenda-

¹¹ Cf. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf>.

¹² Cf. Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives (2015).

tions from Member States and civil society on board. While much is made of the distinction between the technical work of the IAEG-SDGs and the political decisions by Member States, it is clear that the border is more fluid.

Acknowledging this, the UN Statistical Commission also set up the High-level Group for Partnership, Coordination and Capacity-Building for post-2015 monitoring, partnership and coordination (HLG). The HLG's report of January 2016 notes that it can help shape the interaction between the technical and political aspects of the work on indicators, and that it will define mechanisms to make recommendations to the IAEG-SDGs on strategic issues at the country level, including the use and interpretation of indicators and means of implementation.¹³

The 2030 Agenda states that “data and information from existing reporting mechanisms should be used where possible.”¹⁴ Does this open an opportunity for other reports, including shadow reports? This has become an accepted part of the reporting process for treaty bodies such as UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and allows for the broader representation of views from civil society organizations. While the number of reporting countries will not be automatic or comprehensive, such a development could lead to a mechanism for NGO reporting as part of the official process.

Looking at the overall process of elaborating the goals, targets, and indicators, the progression reveals a downward trend: with some exceptions, the set of goals are more ambitious than the targets, and the targets are more ambitious than the indicators.

The HLPF must face its responsibility to reverse this slippery slope.

References

- Adams, Barbara/Judd, Karen (2016):** 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: indicator framework, monitoring and reporting. New York (Global Policy Watch Briefing #10). www.globalpolicywatch.org/blog/2016/03/18/2030-agenda-sdgs-indicator/
- Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives (2015):** Goals for the Rich: Indispensable for a Universal Post-2015 Agenda. Discussion Paper. Berlin/Geneva: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/11253.pdf>
- G77 (2016):** Remarks on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Mr. Nontawat Chandrtri, Chargé d’Affaires and Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the United Nations, at the 47th session of the United Nations Statistical Commission (New York, 8 March 2016). www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=160308b
- India, Government of (2016):** Statement delivered by Dr. T.C.A. Anant, Chief Statistician of India and Secretary, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, (New York, March 8, 2016). <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/statements-3a-data-and-indicators-for-the-2030-sustainable-development-agenda-india-E.pdf>
- OECD DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (2013):** External resource flows beyond ODA: Remittances in the post-2015 DAC statistical framework. Paris (DCD/DAC/STAT(2013)19). [www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT\(2013\)19&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT(2013)19&docLanguage=En)
- UN Statistical Commission (2016a):** Report on the forty-seventh session (8-11 March 2016). New York (UN Doc. E/2016/24-E/CN.3/2016/34) <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/Report-on-the-47th-session-of-the-statistical-commission-E.pdf>
- UN Statistical Commission (2016b):** Report on the Third Meeting of the High-level Group for Partnership, Coordination and Capacity-Building for post-2015 monitoring (HLG for post-2015 monitoring). New York. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/BG-2016-3-high-level-group-for-partnership-E.pdf>
- UN Statistics Division (2016):** Third Meeting of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the Sustainable Development Goal Indicators. Report. New York (UN Doc. ESA/STAT/AC.318/L.3). <http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/meetings/iaeg-sdgs-meeting-03/3rd-IAEG-SDGs-Meeting-Report.pdf>
- United Nations (2016):** Provisional Proposed Tiers for Global SDG Indicators, draft as of March 24, 2016. New York. <http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/meetings/iaeg-sdgs-meeting-03/Provisional-Proposed-Tiers-for-SDG-Indicators-24-03-16.pdf>
- United Nations (2015a):** Report of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators. New York (UN Doc. E/CN.3/2016/2). <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/47th-session/documents/2016-2-IAEG-SDGs-E.pdf>
- United Nations (2015b):** Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York (UN Doc. A/RES/70/1). www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&referer=/english/&Lang=E

13 Cf. UN Statistical Commission (2016b), p. 3.

14 Cf. United Nations (2015b), para. 48.

Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

BY ROBERTO BISSIO, SOCIAL WATCH

Measuring progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is more complicated than it was for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although a total of 60 indicators were identified for the one or more targets for each of the MDGs, in practice, the measure of success was largely limited to a single target. Thus the promise to reduce extreme poverty by half, which was the primary concern, was celebrated as accomplished when the World Bank target of halving the number of people living on US\$ 1.25/day was reached, even when the poverty profile of most developing countries remained much more nuanced. Similarly the goal of reducing gender equality was considered advanced when the target of universal primary education was reached.

The SDGs confront a different problem. Despite pressure from donor countries to try to limit the goals and targets, the Interagency and Expert Group on SDGs (IAEG-SDGs) was asked to identify at least one (frequently more) indicator for each of the 169 targets, which to date has resulted in a list of 231 indicators and might end up with some 300 indicators. The challenge is now how to avoid evaluating progress on each of these separately without considering the way in which each impacts on others.

In this regard it is useful to recall the observation by Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (the “Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Commission”), which stated:

“The assessment of sustainability is complementary to the question of current well-being or economic performance, and must be examined separately. This may sound trivial and yet it deserves emphasis, because some existing approaches fail to adopt this principle, leading to potentially confusing messages. For instance, confusion may arise when one tries to combine current well-being and sustainability into a single indicator. To take an analogy, when driving a car, a meter that added up in one single number the current speed of the vehicle and the remaining level

of gasoline would not be of any help to the driver. Both pieces of information are critical and need to be displayed in distinct, clearly visible areas of the dashboard.”¹

The recommendation to *not* attempt to capture in a single number the assessment of the sustainable development agenda is not easy to follow. Looking at the 17 goals with their 169 targets and two or three proposed indicators for each one, the temptation emerges to average the indicators for each goal, then average the resulting numbers and *voilà*, there you have it, all countries of the world instantly photographed and ranked according to their performance.

This is, in essence, precisely the path followed by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), led by economist Jeffrey Sachs, in computing its “Preliminary Global SDG Index” that ranks 147 countries.² The first five are Nordic countries, followed by three German-speaking countries. Nine of the last ten are least developed countries (LDCs) and all but three of the bottom twenty are in Africa. This index has a high degree of correlation with the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI).

The SDSN index includes indicators related to each of the 17 goals, but its ranking shows striking similarity to the more focused Environmental Performance Index (EPI), launched in May 2016 by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, in collaboration with the World Economic Forum (Davos) and others.³

1 Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009), p. 17.

2 Cf. Sachs et al. (2016). The authors have submitted the draft to public consultation through to 31 March 2016, but do not allow citation. A “revised and expanded version for public use” has been announced.

3 Cf. Hsu et al. (2016).

The EPI claims to have a “parallel approach” to the internationally agreed SDGs in its “use of quantitative metrics to evaluate policy performance” and maintains that “(a)ligning EPI’s indicators with the SDGs provides a baseline for evaluating national performance and shows how far countries are from reaching global targets.”⁴ Of the EPI’s 180 countries, the best performers are Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark, while Singapore is the only developing country among the best 30. Germany is number 30, outranked by France at number 10 and the USA at number 26. At the other end, “the Index’s bottom third, comprised mostly of African countries, is a list of troubled states whose problems extend beyond their inability to sustain environmental and human health.”⁵ This assessment leads the authors to conclude that “environmental performance is an issue of governance – only well-functioning governments are able to manage the environment for the benefit of all.”⁶

This conclusion is surprising, since the EPI does not explicitly include any governance indicators, unlike the SDGs, which include several such indicators in Goal 16. What EPI evaluates is organized around nine major issues (health, air quality, water and sanitation, water resources, agriculture, forests, fisheries, biodiversity and habitat, climate and energy). In each of these areas country scores (from 0 to 100) are determined by how close or far countries are to targets, which the authors select from international agreements, scientific thresholds and their own analysis of “best performers.”

Thus, in the case of climate, for example, since “there are no globally agreed-upon targets for CO₂ reduction”⁷ the EPI measures improvements in carbon intensity. As a result, over-polluters (Britain, Denmark, USA) appear as “over-achievers” while those that emit very little year after year are downgraded. Historic trends count to measure progress but not in

terms of accumulated responsibilities. Similarly, the section on biodiversity and habitat measures not the actual loss of biodiversity, but instead the expansion of protected areas.

In the case of water, the EPI target is to achieve 100 percent of wastewater treatment, which will obviously put developed countries on top. This kind of approach, which measures the capacity to address a problem and not the scale of the problem in each country or the historical responsibility for creating it, explains the correlation between the EPI and the SDSN index with per capita income. Wouldn’t it be logical, as well as fair, to give some credits to those that produce less waste to start with? Would Bangladesh be at the bottom of the table (173rd in the EPI) if climate damage created by others was accounted for?

Ranking all countries irrespective of their capacities and responsibilities and measuring efforts to clean up the mess while not awarding credits to those that do not produce waste is not a helpful way to summarize global sustainability. Both the EPI and the SDSN Index convey the message that the OECD countries are good environmental performers while African countries are damaging the planet. If the best rankings correlate with wealth, more economic growth appears as the solution to the problems of humanity.

A dashboard that more closely captures the basic notions of sustainable development that underpin the 2030 Agenda would offer a very different picture. Many key elements for such a dashboard already exist. They do not provide a way to proclaim winners and losers, as the 2030 Agenda is not a competition. It defines itself, instead as a “collective journey” and a commitment “to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world on to a sustainable and resilient path.”⁸

Eight numbers for the 2030 Agenda

While undoubtedly more work needs to be done to gather and process indicators for the new Agenda, existing databases, indexes and indicators already

4 Ibid. p. 11.

5 Cf. www.socialconnectedness.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Yale-EPI-FACT-SHEET_2016.pdf.

6 Cf. Hsu et al. (2016), p. 11.

7 <http://epi.yale.edu/chapter/climate-and-energy>

8 United Nations (2015), preamble.

provide the basic components of a Global Dashboard against which to measure progress or regression. Our proposed preliminary dashboard of what is already available includes:

- I Basic Capabilities Index
- I Gender Equity Index
- I Social Protection Floor Index
- I Climate Equity Index
- I Palma ratio
- I Global Militarization Index and homicides rate
- I Financial Secrecy Index
- I Social Intensity of carbon

These measures show diverse and independent dimensions of sustainable development. Militarization, gender inequalities and carbon emissions do not necessarily move in the same direction. While it therefore makes no sense to average them in a single number, each of the eight tells a story and, when looked at multiply and in terms of their complex interactions they can start to form a dashboard picture to help steer the 2030 Agenda.

1. The Basic Capabilities Index: A measure of deprivation

Social Watch developed the Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) as a tool to monitor social deprivation, combining such indicators as mortality among children under age five, the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, and three education indicators (adult literacy rate, primary net enrollment rate, survival rate to fifth grade). The results roughly correlate with the UNDP Human Development Index that ranks countries by a combination of life expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators.

The major difference between HDI and BCI is that the latter does not include income data, in order to

highlight the fact that without adequate social policies, economic growth by itself does not guarantee progress in social well-being. Per capita income can grow indefinitely, while school matriculation cannot be more than 100 percent or infant mortality cannot be lower than zero. Thus, if one plots BCI along one axis and per capita income along the other, the point is reached where BCI no longer grows with income – a point that can be shown empirically to be around US\$ 10,000 per capita. Some countries with a per capita income four times higher do not show lower infant mortality rates.

Of course, a BCI close to 100 does not imply total social well-being, but rather that the countries reaching it have met minimum essential requirements.

The BCI originated in the Quality of Life Index developed by Social Watch Philippines to assess social deprivation at the municipal level by using education and health figures that civil society could access (and verify) locally. At the global level its advantage is its simplicity, transparency and use of UN-endorsed figures, which strengthens civil society advocacy based on its findings.

A Multidimensional Poverty Index⁹ was first calculated in 2010 by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) and is now published by the UNDP Human Development Report. This index elaborates on the idea of measuring poverty not by income but by dimensions such as health, education, living standards and quality of work. The MPI is available for 100 countries and does not include OECD members, except Mexico. This exclusive focus on developing countries reduces its usefulness for global comparisons in terms of sustainable development.


The OECD has developed its own “better life index,”¹⁰ which combines statistics for its members on eleven topics (e.g., education, health, housing, but also citizen involvement and quality of the environment) and allows users to rate each topic according to their

9 Cf. www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/global-mpi-2016/.

10 Cf. www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/.

Figure 3.2.1

Basic capabilities increase with more money... up to a point



Note: BCI goes up when per capita income increases, but only up to a point. From there, greater per capita income does not improve the BCI.

Sources: Social Watch for BCI [www.socialwatch.org/node/13749], World Bank for GDP per capita (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>).

subjective importance to the user and thus come out with different rankings.

These efforts are consistent with the observation of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission that “no single measure can summarize something as complex as the well-being of the members of society” and therefore “the issue of aggregation across dimensions (i.e., how one adds up, e.g., a measure of health with a measure of consumption), while important, is subordinate to the establishment of a broad statistical system that

captures as many of the relevant dimensions as possible. Such a system should not just measure average levels of well-being within a given community, and how they change over time, but also document the diversity of peoples’ experiences and the linkages across various dimensions of people’s life.”¹¹

¹¹ Cf. Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009), p. 12.

2. GEI: Measuring the gender gap

The gender divide is one of many other divides (e.g., ethnicity, wealth, race, religion, caste) that underline the “diversity of experiences” within any community. Social Watch developed a Gender Equity Index (GEI)¹² to measure the gap between men and women in education, the economy and political empowerment. The GEI differs from other gender indexes in that it focuses on the gaps and not on the absolute well-being of women. While women’s health and education may correlate with the per capita income of their countries, the gap between the health and education of women and

that of men does not. The graph below clearly shows that some countries have low income levels but better gender equity others with much higher income levels.

Further, while many countries score close to the maximum in education, no country in the world has achieved gender equality in the economic and political empowerment areas.

3. SPFI: Social protection floor does not need to be expensive

Using a methodology also based on identifying and quantifying gaps, the Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology of the United Nations University (UNU-MERIT)

12 Cf. www.socialwatch.org/taxonomy/term/527.

Figure 3.2.2
Income and gender equity do not correlate completely



Source: Social Watch (www.socialwatch.org/node/14365)

has now produced a Social Protection Floor Index (SPFI).¹³

The SPFI assesses the degree of implementation of national social protection floors by identifying gaps in the health and income dimensions and indicating the magnitude of financial resources needed to close these gaps in relation to a country's economic capacity.


The income gap depends on what poverty line is used as a reference, and therefore the SPFI is calculated for the two so-called "absolute" lines of US\$ 1.90 a day and US\$ 3.10 a day defined by the World Bank and for

the relative minimum income level (incomes below 50% of the mean).

On this basis, the SPFI shows that "most countries do not have to invest unreasonably large amounts to close their social protection gaps." In countries where the shortfall is relatively large in comparison to countries with similar economic capacity and development, this is not due to economic or fiscal non-affordability but "to political will and prioritization in national spending decisions." At the bottom of the ratings there are a few countries where the required resources would be larger than 10 percent of GDP. In such cases the support of the international community is indispensable in order to enable them to implement sound social protection floors. For more detail, see Table 3.2.6 at the end of this chapter.

13 Cf. Bierbaum et al. (2016).

Figure 3.2.3
The equitable share of the climate bill



Note: For numbers and explanation, cf. Table 4 at the end of this chapter.

Source: <https://calculator.climateequityreference.org/>

4. Climate Equity Index: Responsibility and capability

The main difficulty in reaching a climate agreement that actually reduces emissions is not the quantification of the total “budget” needed to enable countries to mitigate their impacts (before the atmospheric carbon reaches a catastrophic level), but how to distribute fairly the costs of adapting to that budget, mitigate its effects and pay for loss and damages. Scientific research has determined the thresholds within reasonable margins of error that are less challenged than what the press would want us to believe. What diplomats disagree about is how to distribute the costs.

Just as parties at a banquet would do at the time of paying the check, basic equity would require the costs to be shared equally. But an equal division of atmospheric space among 7 billion breathing people on Earth is not taking into account that some had champagne during the banquet while others drank only tap water. Further, distributing the cost according to what each consumed has to be nuanced with consideration of the capacity to pay. The average per capita income of the twenty richest members of the OECD is fifty times bigger than that of the fifty least developed countries, and their per capita emissions of carbon are twenty times higher. Since the poor are those suffering the most from the consequences of climate changes that they did not create and since capacity to pay correlates with historical responsibilities (because of accumulated emissions due to early industrialization) fairness is not difficult to conceptualize.

On the eve of the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015, a wide coalitions of NGOs endorsed a Climate Equity Index,¹⁴ based on research conducted by the Climate Equity Reference Project (CERP).¹⁵ The CERP approach is a dynamic one. For each nation in each year, indicators of responsibility and capacity, together with a variety of macro-economic data that together define national development need (estimated by way of a development threshold) are used to calculate a Responsibility and Capacity Index, or RCI.

The exact definitions of responsibility, capacity and development need, and the relative weighting given to responsibility and capacity, are chosen by the user. Table IV below was drawn up assuming a mitigation pathway to keep warming under the 2°C Standard (“Greater than 66% chance of staying within 2°C in 2100”), which is a moderate assumption, considering that the Paris agreement deems 1.5°C to be the preferred limit. It calculates historic responsibilities since 1950 (which is moderate, considering that emissions increased dramatically in industrialized countries from 1850) and a development threshold of US\$ 7,500 per capita GDP. Further, this table weights equally the factors of responsibility and capacity to act. By changing any of these factors the final numbers will change, but the impact on the final results is not substantial when it comes to formulating what percentage of the costs each country should pick if fairness and civilization (which concepts also correlate) are to survive.

5. Palma ratio: Inequalities are bad

During decades development thinking assumed that the correlation between economic growth and income inequality would follow the “Kuznets curve” formulated in 1954 by Nobel prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets, one of the creators of national accounts and the GDP indicator.

Kuznets believed that the distribution of income becomes more unequal during the early stages of income growth but that the distribution eventually moves back toward greater equality as economic growth continues.

Years later, an “environmental K curve” was proposed, with a similar logic, postulating that economic growth – equated with “development” – would be environmentally destructive until a certain turning point, when the wealth would be used to protect the environment.

Both logics were used to pursue growth at any cost and not worry about social or environmental consequences that would somehow solve themselves in a future of prosperity. But both have been shown to be wrong.

¹⁴ Cf. Climate Equity Reference Project (2015).

¹⁵ Cf. <https://climateequityreference.org/>

Figure 3.2.4
The Kuznets curve





Figure 3.2.5
Palma Ratio does not follow the Kuznets curve



The Palma ratio – the income of the bottom 40 percent of the population in relation to the top 10 percent – is an intuitive and simple indicator. As the K curve predicts, the top positions are shared by Japan and Myanmar, one of the richest and one of the poorest countries in the world. But positions at the bottom of the table, where inequalities are extreme, are also shared by countries usually classified in very different development categories like Mexico, an OECD member, Brazil and South Africa, emerging economies, and Haiti, one of the least developed countries. China and Denmark both have a Palma ratio of 1, while the United States and Thailand have the same ratio of 2 and Chile, often considered as the most advanced economy in South America, and Paraguay, one of the poorest countries of the continent both have ratios of about 3.¹⁶

The K curve is nowhere to be found in Figure 3.2.5, which plots the Palma ratio against GDP per capita.

Income inequalities, or at least those qualified as “extreme” are now identified as an obstacle to economic recovery even by the IMF, and in SDG 10 of the 2030 Agenda governments committed to “reduce inequality within and among countries.” Yet, it is regrettable that even when well-established income inequality indicators (such as the Palma ratio and the Gini coefficient) exist, have a solid academic tradition and are regularly published by the World Bank and the United Nations University, they are not yet included among the list of official indicators for the SDGs.

6. Global Militarisation Index

The Bonn International Center for Conversion compiles an annual Global Militarisation Index (GMI) that estimates the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole.¹⁷ The 2015 GMI covers 152 states and bases its rankings on:

- a) the comparison of each country’s military expenditures with its GDP and its health expenditure (as share of GDP);

- b) the contrast between the total number of (para) military forces and the number of physicians in the overall population; and
- c) the ratio of the number of heavy weapons systems available and the number of people in the overall population.

This index does not compare the absolute weight of military forces (or their global “footprints”) and therefore the United States and China are absent from the top ten, despite being global leaders in military spending. BICC explains that “this is because when their military expenditures are measured as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), and their military headcount and heavy weapon system numbers are measured per 1,000 inhabitants, the situation looks rather different.”¹⁸

Among the ten countries with the highest level of militarization—namely Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Jordan, South Korea, Russia, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kuwait and Greece—three are in the Middle East, two in Asia and five in Europe.

Examining the relationships between militarization and the Human Development Index, the authors “find that a high GMI ranking is often accompanied by a high HDI value (Israel, Singapore)” but there also examples where a high GMI is combined with a low HDI, such as Chad, or Mauritania. “Here, disproportionately high spending on the armed forces may be taking critical resources away from development.”

The Institute for Economics and Peace publishes a yearly Global Peace Index (GPI)¹⁹ that ranks 163 countries based on 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators on three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic or international conflict and the degree of militarization. Most quantitative indicators are from reliable recognized international sources but the qualitative indicators rely on the Economist Intelligence Unit

¹⁶ Cf. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/IHDI>.

¹⁷ Cf. www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/GMI_2015_EN_2015.pdf.

¹⁸ Cf. www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/global-militarisation-index-2015-627/.

¹⁹ Cf. www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index.

Table 3.2.1

The Top 10 in the Global Militarization Index

| Country | Military Expenditure Index Score | Military Personal Index Score | Heavy Weapons Index Score | GMI Score | Rank |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|------|
| Israel | 5.86 | 5.98 | 3.5 | 890.23 | 1 |
| Singapore | 5.67 | 6.17 | 3.21 | 868.4 | 2 |
| Armenia | 5.84 | 5.88 | 2.9 | 835.79 | 3 |
| Jordan | 5.6 | 5.45 | 3.19 | 807.98 | 4 |
| Korea, Republic of | 5.41 | 5.86 | 2.88 | 801.26 | 5 |
| Russia | 5.79 | 5.06 | 3.22 | 794.53 | 6 |
| Cyprus | 5.25 | 5.58 | 3.23 | 794.17 | 7 |
| Azerbaijan | 5.85 | 5.29 | 2.82 | 786.44 | 8 |
| Kuwait | 5.76 | 4.91 | 3.1 | 772.38 | 9 |
| Greece | 5.24 | 5.32 | 3.2 | 771.66 | 10 |

Source: http://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table?year=2014&sort=rank_asc**Table 3.2.2**

Intentional homicides per 100,000 persons and Palma ratio (select countries)

| Country | Yearly average (2009–2013) | Palma ratio |
|---------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| Japan | 0 | 0,6 |
| Austria | 1 | 0,9 |
| Tajikistan | 2 | 1,0 |
| India | 3 | 1,2 |
| Turkey | 4 | 1,8 |
| United States | 5 | 2,0 |
| Lithuania | 7 | 1,2 |
| Mongolia | 8 | 1,3 |
| Venezuela, RB | 49 | 1,5 |
| Jamaica | 47 | 2,5 |
| Bolivia | 10 | 4,1 |
| Honduras | 84 | 4,7 |
| Haiti | 8 | 5,3 |
| South Africa | 31 | 11,9 |

Source: For homicide rate: World Bank cf. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>.Palma ratio calculated by the author (ratio between income of the top 10% to the bottom 40%) based on data from the World Income inequality database (UNU-WIDER), available at www.wider.unu.edu/data.

(a sister company to *The Economist*), whose reports include the Quality of Life Index (renamed the Where to be Born Index) among others, whose methodology to assess such things as political instability and obtain a number is not transparent.

The UN indicator framework currently incorporates as one of the indicators for Goal 16 the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. These figures²⁰ exclude deaths as a result of battles or confrontation between organized armed groups, which are computed separately. The resulting table does not show a correlation with militarization or with the Human Development Index, as there are poor and rich countries among both the highest and lowest ends of the table, but there is a high correlation with inequalities.

7. Financial Secrecy Index

The Financial Secrecy Index²¹ computed by the Tax Justice Network (TJN) ranks jurisdictions according to their internal transparency and the scale of their

offshore financial activities. It is a tool for monitoring and understanding global financial secrecy, tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions, and illicit financial flows or capital flight.

An estimated US\$ 21 to US\$ 32 trillion of private financial wealth is located, untaxed or lightly taxed, in “secrecy jurisdictions” around the world. Secrecy jurisdictions – a term used as an alternative to the more widely used term tax havens – attract illicit and illegitimate or abusive financial flows.

Illicit cross-border financial flows have been estimated at US\$ 1-1.6 trillion per year: dwarfing the US\$ 135 billion or so in global foreign aid. Since the 1970s African countries alone have lost over US\$ 1 trillion in illicit financial outflows, while combined external debts are less than US\$ 200 billion. So the African region is a major net creditor to the world – but its assets are in the hands of a wealthy elite, protected by offshore secrecy; while its debts are shouldered by broad sectors of the population in African countries.

European countries like Greece, Italy and Portugal have also been severely affected by decades of tax evasion and state looting via offshore secrecy.

20 Cf. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5>.

21 Cf. <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/>.

Table 3.2.3

Financial Secrecy Index 2015 – Top 10

| Rank | Secrecy Jurisdiction | FSI – Value ³ | Secrecy Score ⁴ | Global Scale Weight ⁵ |
|------|---|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1 | Switzerland | 1,466.1 | 73 | 5625 |
| 2 | Hong Kong | 1,259.4 | 72 | 3.842 |
| 3 | USA | 1,254.7 | 60 | 19.603 |
| 4 | Singapore | 1,147.1 | 69 | 4.280 |
| 5 | Cayman Islands ¹ | 1,013.1 | 65 | 4.857 |
| 6 | Luxembourg | 816.9 | 55 | 11.630 |
| 7 | Lebanon | 760.2 | 79 | 0.377 |
| 8 | Germany | 701.8 | 56 | 6.026 |
| 9 | Bahrain | 471.3 | 74 | 0.164 |
| 10 | United Arab Emirates (Dubai) ² | 440.7 | 77 | 0.085 |

Note: For all jurisdictions covered by the FSI and more detailed explanation, see table 3.2.10 at the end of this chapter.

Source: <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2015-results>

According to TJN, “the offshore world corrupts and distorts markets and investments, shaping them in ways that have nothing to do with efficiency. The secrecy world creates a criminogenic hothouse for multiple evils including fraud, tax cheating, escape from financial regulations, embezzlement, insider dealing, bribery, money laundering, and plenty more. It provides multiple ways for insiders to extract wealth at the expense of societies, creating political impunity and undermining the healthy ‘no taxation without representation’ bargain that has underpinned the growth of accountable modern nation states.”²²

The FSI combines a qualitative measure and a quantitative one. The first looks at a jurisdiction’s laws and regulations, international treaties, and so on, to assess how secretive it is. It gets assigned a secrecy score: the higher the score, the more secretive the jurisdiction. The second measurement attaches a weighting to take account of the jurisdiction’s size and overall importance the global market for offshore financial services.

In identifying the most important providers of international financial secrecy, the Financial Secrecy Index reveals that “the world’s most important providers of financial secrecy are some of the world’s biggest and wealthiest countries. Rich OECD member countries and their satellites are the main recipients of or conduits for these illicit flows”.

8. “Social intensity of carbon”

“Carbon intensity” – defined as total emissions of CO₂ in relation to GDP – is a key environmental indicator for the EPI and other assessments of environmental performance. China, which recently surpassed the USA as the world’s largest emitter, claims in its climate action annual report released in November 2014, that its carbon intensity decreased 4.3 percent between 2012 and 2013 and dropped 28.6 percent from the 2005 level.

If economic output was stable, increased carbon intensity would mean reduced emissions. If an international agreement establishes carbon quotas, more intensity would allow for economic growth within the same emission total. But the world still has not allocated its “carbon budget,” that is, the emissions possible – or the reductions needed – to ensure that global warming does not surpasses two degrees Celsius (or, better, 1.5 C).

What causes climate change are absolute emissions, irrespective of their origin and it is therefore not very relevant to know that Benin is more carbon intensive than Russia, according to the Shift Project data portal.²³ The ethical highground of low intensity (high efficiency) is not obvious, as it would also require more information about who benefits from the resulting income growth, how it is distributed and what is its composition.

On the other hand, the “social intensity” of carbon emissions could provide a valuable indicator to assess sustainable development.

Figure 3.2.6 plots infant mortality on the vertical axis and per capita CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels on the horizontal axis. El Salvador and Pakistan both emit roughly one tonne of carbon per capita a year, but the under five mortality rate of the latter is 85 per thousand and that of the former is 15 per thousand. Cuba’s infant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States with only one fifth of its per capita emissions.


If high infant mortality and high carbon emissions per capita are regarded as equally undesirable, we can compute the distance to zero in the graph with a simple formula²⁴ that will provide the ranking in Table 3.2.11 below.

23 Cf. <http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/TOP-20-Carbon-Intensity#tspQvChart>.

24 Distance to zero will be the root square of the sum of the squares of the x and y axis after converting their values into “distance” for example by attributing a value of 100 to the more distant point in each axis.

22 Ibid.

Figure 3.2.6
“Social intensity of carbon”



Source: For infant mortality, see United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Database (<http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>); for for CO₂ emissions: World Bank, World Development Indicators (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>).

At the top of the table, Sri Lanka comes first with the same infant mortality rate as the United States, but less than a tonne of carbon emissions per capita a year. Costa Rica, with the same mortality rate emits a bit more and comes third while Luxembourg and Angola share similar positions at the bottom of the table,

the latter for its unusual high infant mortality rate and the former, with one of the lowest infant mortality rates in the world has an unusually high level of carbon emissions per capita. (Small oil producing countries like Qatar and Kuwait are excluded from the table because of data comparability issues.)

This table does not correlate with HDI or per capita income and its inclusion in the dashboard can therefore help throw new light on the debate around what “universality” in the 2030 Agenda means and why no country can claim to be sustainably developed.

What needs to be done

The proposed eight figures in the dashboard cover environmental, social and economic topics, in line with the three dimensions of sustainable development. But more work needs to be done on such issues as environmental footprints and extraterritorial impacts of national policies, from damaging subsidies (in agriculture, fisheries or fossil fuels) to the “races to the bottom” in taxation, deregulation of big corporations or competitive devaluations, all of which create net global damage in pursuit of small short term national advantages.

Future editions of the Spotlight Report will throw more light on these issues.

References

- Bierbaum, Mira/Oppel, Annalena/Tromp, Sander/Cichon, Michael (2016):** A Social Protection Floor Index: Monitoring National Social Protection Policy Implementation. Discussion Paper of the Maas-tricht Graduate School of Governance/UNU-MERIT. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/12490.pdf>
- Climate Equity Reference Project (2015):** Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs. Berkeley, CA/Stockholm.
<http://civilsocietyreview.org/report>
- Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009):** Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Paris.
www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/default.asp?page=dossiers_web/stiglitz/documents-commission.htm
- Hsu, Angel et al. (2016):** 2016 Environmental Performance Index. New Haven, CT: Yale University. www.epi.yale.edu
- Sachs, Jeffrey D./Schmidt-Traub, Guido/Durand-Delacre, David (2016):** Preliminary Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Index and Dashboard. SDSN Working Paper, 15 February 2016. New York.
<http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/sdg-index/>
- United Nations (2015):** Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York (UN Doc. A/RES/70/1).
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

Table 3.2.4

Basic Capabilities Index, GDP per capita and Human Development Index

| | Basic Capabilities Index 2011 | GDP per capita (current US\$) 2014 | Human Development Index (HDI) 2014 |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Albania | 96 | 4,564 | 0.733 |
| Algeria | 92 | 5,484 | 0.736 |
| Angola | 67 | 5,901 | 0.532 |
| Argentina | 98 | 12,510 | 0.836 |
| Armenia | 96 | 3,874 | 0.733 |
| Australia | 99 | 61,980 | 0.935 |
| Austria | 99 | 51,122 | 0.885 |
| Azerbaijan | 93 | 7,886 | 0.751 |
| Bahamas, The | 97 | 22,217 | 0.790 |
| Bahrain | 97 | 24,855 | 0.824 |
| Bangladesh | 70 | 1,087 | 0.570 |
| Belarus | 98 | 8,040 | 0.798 |
| Belgium | 98 | 47,328 | 0.890 |
| Belize | 96 | 4,831 | 0.715 |
| Benin | 76 | 903 | 0.480 |
| Bhutan | 81 | 2,561 | 0.605 |
| Bolivia | 86 | 3,124 | 0.662 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 96 | 4,852 | 0.733 |
| Botswana | 90 | 7,123 | 0.698 |
| Brazil | 95 | 11,727 | 0.755 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 98 | 40,980 | 0.856 |
| Bulgaria | 98 | 7,851 | 0.782 |
| Burkina Faso | 62 | 713 | 0.402 |
| Burundi | 66 | 286 | 0.400 |
| Cambodia | 73 | 1,095 | 0.646 |
| Cameroon | 73 | 1,407 | 0.555 |
| Canada | 99 | 50,231 | 0.512 |
| Cape Verde | 89 | 3,641 | 0.913 |
| Central African Rep. | 62 | 359 | 0.350 |
| Chad | 48 | 1,025 | 0.392 |
| Chile | 98 | 14,528 | 0.832 |
| China | 97 | 7,590 | 0.727 |
| Colombia | 94 | 7,904 | 0.720 |
| Comoros | 78 | 810 | 0.503 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 64 | 442 | 0.591 |
| Congo, Rep. | 75 | 3,147 | 0.433 |
| Costa Rica | 97 | 10,415 | 0.766 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 68 | 1,546 | 0.462 |
| Croatia | 98 | 13,475 | 0.818 |
| Cuba | 99 | 6,790 | 0.769 |
| Cyprus | 99 | 27,194 | 0.850 |
| Czech Republic | 98 | 19,502 | 0.870 |

| | Basic Capabilities Index 2011 | GDP per capita (current US\$) 2014 | Human Development Index (HDI) 2014 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Denmark | 99 | 60,718 | 0.923 |
| Djibouti | 75 | 1,814 | 0.470 |
| Dominica | 96 | 7,244 | 0.724 |
| Dominican Republic | 90 | 6,164 | 0.715 |
| Ecuador | 90 | 6,346 | 0.732 |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | 90 | 3,366 | 0.690 |
| El Salvador | 91 | 4,120 | 0.666 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 66 | 18,918 | 0.587 |
| Estonia | 99 | 20,148 | 0.861 |
| Ethiopia | 58 | 574 | 0.442 |
| Finland | 99 | 49,843 | 0.883 |
| France | 99 | 42,726 | 0.888 |
| Gabon | 86 | 10,772 | 0.684 |
| Gambia, The | 70 | 441 | 0.441 |
| Georgia | 97 | 4,435 | 0.754 |
| Germany | 99 | 47,774 | 0.916 |
| Ghana | 77 | 1,442 | 0.579 |
| Greece | 99 | 21,673 | 0.865 |
| Guatemala | 80 | 3,673 | 0.627 |
| Guinea | 64 | 540 | 0.411 |
| GuineaBissau | 56 | 568 | 0.420 |
| Guyana | 92 | 4,054 | 0.636 |
| Haiti | 67 | 824 | 0.483 |
| Honduras | 86 | 2,435 | 0.606 |
| Hungary | 98 | 14,027 | 0.828 |
| Iceland | 99 | 52,037 | 0.899 |
| India | 76 | 1,582 | 0.609 |
| Indonesia | 88 | 3,492 | 0.684 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | 94 | 5,443 | 0.766 |
| Iraq | 87 | 6,420 | 0.654 |
| Ireland | 99 | 54,339 | 0.916 |
| Israel | 99 | 37,206 | 0.894 |
| Italy | 99 | 35,223 | 0.873 |
| Jamaica | 92 | 5,106 | 0.719 |
| Japan | 99+ | 36,194 | 0.891 |
| Jordan | 96 | 5,423 | 0.748 |
| Kazakhstan | 96 | 12,602 | 0.788 |
| Kenya | 77 | 1,358 | 0.548 |
| Kiribati | 84 | 1,510 | 0.590 |
| Korea, Rep. | 99 | 27,970 | 0.898 |
| Kuwait | 97 | 43,594 | 0.816 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 94 | 1,269 | 0.655 |

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

| | Basic Capabilities Index 2011 | GDP per capita (current US\$) 2014 | Human Development Index (HDI) 2014 |
|------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Lao PDR | 71 | 1,793 | 0.575 |
| Latvia | 99 | 15,692 | 0.819 |
| Lebanon | 96 | 10,058 | 0.769 |
| Lesotho | 77 | 1,034 | 0.497 |
| Liberia | 68 | 458 | 0.430 |
| Libya | 97 | 6,573 | 0.724 |
| Lithuania | 98 | 16,490 | 0.839 |
| Luxembourg | 98 | 116,613 | 0.892 |
| Madagascar | 75 | 449 | 0.510 |
| Malawi | 72 | 255 | 0.445 |
| Malaysia | 98 | 11,307 | 0.779 |
| Maldives | 97 | 7,635 | 0.706 |
| Mali | 61 | 705 | 0.419 |
| Malta | 97 | 22,776 | 0.839 |
| Mauritania | 69 | 1,275 | 0.506 |
| Mauritius | 96 | 10,017 | 0.777 |
| Mexico | 96 | 10,326 | 0.756 |
| Moldova | 96 | 2,239 | 0.693 |
| Mongolia | 96 | 4,129 | 0.727 |
| Montenegro | 98 | 7,378 | 0.802 |
| Morocco | 82 | 3,190 | 0.628 |
| Mozambique | 68 | 586 | 0.416 |
| Myanmar | 75 | 1,204 | 0.536 |
| Namibia | 89 | 5,408 | 0.628 |
| Nepal | 68 | 702 | 0.548 |
| Netherlands | 99 | 52,139 | 0.922 |
| New Zealand | 99 | 44,342 | 0.913 |
| Nicaragua | 84 | 1,963 | 0.631 |
| Niger | 57 | 427 | 0.348 |
| Nigeria | 64 | 3,203 | 0.514 |
| Norway | 99 | 97,300 | 0.944 |
| Oman | 95 | 19,310 | 0.793 |
| Pakistan | 68 | 1,317 | 0.538 |
| Panama | 94 | 11,949 | 0.780 |
| Papua New Guinea | 77 | 2,268 | 0.505 |
| Paraguay | 94 | 4,713 | 0.679 |
| Peru | 92 | 6,541 | 0.734 |
| Philippines | 86 | 2,873 | 0.668 |
| Poland | 98 | 14,337 | 0.843 |
| Portugal | 99 | 22,124 | 0.830 |
| Qatar | 97 | 96,732 | 0.850 |

| | Basic Capabilities Index 2011 | GDP per capita (current US\$) 2014 | Human Development Index (HDI) 2014 |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Romania | 97 | 10,000 | 0.793 |
| Russian Federation | 98 | 12,736 | 0.798 |
| Rwanda | 71 | 696 | 0.483 |
| Saudi Arabia | 95 | 24,406 | 0.837 |
| Senegal | 70 | 1,067 | 0.466 |
| Serbia | 98 | 6,153 | 0.771 |
| Sierra Leone | 58 | 766 | 0.413 |
| Singapore | 99 | 56,284 | 0.912 |
| Slovak Republic | 98 | 18,501 | 0.844 |
| Slovenia | 99 | 24,002 | 0.880 |
| South Africa | 89 | 6,484 | 0.666 |
| Spain | 99 | 29,722 | 0.876 |
| Sri Lanka | 96 | 3,795 | 0.757 |
| Sudan | 69 | 1,876 | 0.479 |
| Suriname | 91 | 9,680 | 0.714 |
| Swaziland | 83 | 3,477 | 0.531 |
| Sweden | 99 | 58,899 | 0.907 |
| Switzerland | 99 | 85,617 | 0.930 |
| Tajikistan | 92 | 1,114 | 0.624 |
| Tanzania | 76 | 955 | 0.521 |
| Thailand | 96 | 5,977 | 0.726 |
| Togo | 77 | 635 | 0.484 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 95 | 21,324 | 0.772 |
| Tunisia | 94 | 4,421 | 0.721 |
| Turkey | 94 | 10,515 | 0.761 |
| Turkmenistan | 94 | 9,032 | 0.688 |
| Uganda | 69 | 715 | 0.483 |
| Ukraine | 97 | 3,082 | 0.747 |
| United Arab Emirates | 97 | 43,963 | 0.835 |
| United Kingdom | 99 | 46,297 | 0.907 |
| United States | 99 | 54,629 | 0.915 |
| Uruguay | 98 | 16,807 | 0.793 |
| Uzbekistan | 95 | 2,037 | 0.675 |
| Venezuela, RB | 95 | 12,772 | 0.762 |
| Vietnam | 93 | 2,052 | 0.666 |
| Yemen, Rep. | 72 | 1,408 | 0.498 |
| Zambia | 70 | 1,722 | 0.586 |
| Zimbabwe | 82 | 931 | 0.509 |

Sources: Social Watch for BCI (<http://www.socialwatch.org/node/13749>); World Bank for GDP per capita (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>) per capita; UNDP for HDI (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/2015-report>).

Table 3.2.5

The Gender Equity Index – Richer doesn't make women more equal, economic and political empowerment does

| Country (alphabetical) | GEI 2012 | Country (alphabetical) | GEI 2012 |
|------------------------|----------|------------------------|----------|
| Afghanistan | 0.15 | Czech Republic | 0.73 |
| Albania | 0.55 | Denmark | 0.84 |
| Algeria | 0.49 | Djibouti | 0.46 |
| Angola | 0.64 | Dominican Republic | 0.72 |
| Argentina | 0.74 | Ecuador | 0.71 |
| Armenia | 0.70 | Egypt | 0.45 |
| Australia | 0.80 | El Salvador | 0.62 |
| Austria | 0.74 | Equatorial Guinea | 0.42 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.64 | Eritrea | 0.44 |
| Bahrain | 0.54 | Estonia | 0.77 |
| Bangladesh | 0.55 | Ethiopia | 0.44 |
| Belarus | 0.64 | Finland | 0.88 |
| Belgium | 0.79 | France | 0.77 |
| Belize | 0.69 | Gabon | 0.61 |
| Benin | 0.41 | Gambia | 0.59 |
| Bhutan | 0.41 | Georgia | 0.67 |
| Bolivia | 0.66 | Germany | 0.80 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0.58 | Ghana | 0.62 |
| Botswana | 0.73 | Greece | 0.72 |
| Brazil | 0.72 | Guatemala | 0.49 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 0.72 | Guinea-Bissau | 0.43 |
| Bulgaria | 0.76 | Guyana | 0.64 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.48 | Haiti | 0.48 |
| Burundi | 0.69 | Honduras | 0.63 |
| Cambodia | 0.55 | Hungary | 0.73 |
| Cameroon | 0.41 | Iceland | 0.87 |
| Canada | 0.80 | India | 0.37 |
| Cape Verde | 0.72 | Indonesia | 0.62 |
| Chad | 0.25 | Iran | 0.51 |
| Chile | 0.72 | Ireland | 0.74 |
| China | 0.64 | Israel | 0.75 |
| Colombia | 0.64 | Italy | 0.70 |
| Comoros | 0.48 | Jamaica | 0.63 |
| Congo, DR | 0.36 | Japan | 0.57 |
| Congo, Rep. | 0.29 | Jordan | 0.49 |
| Costa Rica | 0.74 | Kazakhstan | 0.75 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 0.32 | Kenya | 0.58 |
| Croatia | 0.74 | Korea, Rep. | 0.59 |
| Cuba | 0.68 | Kuwait | 0.62 |
| Cyprus | 0.68 | Kyrgyzstan | 0.73 |

| Country (alphabetical) | GEI 2012 |
|------------------------|----------|
| Lao, PDR | 0.56 |
| Latvia | 0.77 |
| Lebanon | 0.55 |
| Lesotho | 0.72 |
| Liberia | 0.56 |
| Lithuania | 0.77 |
| Luxembourg | 0.68 |
| Madagascar | 0.70 |
| Malawi | 0.59 |
| Malaysia | 0.56 |
| Maldives | 0.63 |
| Mali | 0.32 |
| Malta | 0.63 |
| Mauritania | 0.53 |
| Mauritius | 0.67 |
| Mexico | 0.64 |
| Moldova | 0.77 |
| Mongolia | 0.81 |
| Morocco | 0.40 |
| Mozambique | 0.58 |
| Namibia | 0.77 |
| Netherlands | 0.79 |
| New Zealand | 0.82 |
| Nicaragua | 0.74 |
| Niger | 0.26 |
| Norway | 0.89 |
| Oman | 0.45 |
| Pakistan | 0.29 |
| Panama | 0.76 |
| Papua New Guinea | 0.60 |
| Paraguay | 0.73 |
| Peru | 0.69 |
| Philippines | 0.76 |
| Poland | 0.76 |
| Portugal | 0.77 |
| Qatar | 0.60 |
| Romania | 0.72 |
| Russian Federation | 0.75 |
| Rwanda | 0.77 |
| Nepal | 0.47 |

| Country (alphabetical) | GEI 2012 |
|--------------------------|----------|
| Saudi Arabia | 0.37 |
| Senegal | 0.50 |
| Serbia | 0.75 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.44 |
| Singapore | 0.69 |
| Slovakia | 0.73 |
| Slovenia | 0.75 |
| South Africa | 0.79 |
| Spain | 0.81 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.62 |
| Sudan | 0.40 |
| Swaziland | 0.65 |
| Sweden | 0.87 |
| Switzerland | 0.79 |
| Tajikistan | 0.51 |
| Tanzania | 0.60 |
| Thailand | 0.71 |
| Togo | 0.40 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.78 |
| Turkey | 0.45 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.62 |
| Uganda | 0.63 |
| Ukraine | 0.69 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.63 |
| United Kingdom | 0.76 |
| United States of America | 0.72 |
| Uruguay | 0.74 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.57 |
| Venezuela | 0.64 |
| Viet Nam | 0.70 |
| Yemen | 0.24 |
| Zambia | 0.49 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.55 |

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

| Ranking | GEI 2012 |
|---------------------|----------|
| Norway | 0.89 |
| Finland | 0.88 |
| Iceland | 0.87 |
| Sweden | 0.87 |
| Denmark | 0.84 |
| New Zealand | 0.82 |
| Spain | 0.81 |
| Mongolia | 0.81 |
| Canada | 0.80 |
| Germany | 0.80 |
| Australia | 0.80 |
| South Africa | 0.79 |
| Belgium | 0.79 |
| Netherlands | 0.79 |
| Switzerland | 0.79 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 0.78 |
| Portugal | 0.77 |
| Latvia | 0.77 |
| Estonia | 0.77 |
| France | 0.77 |
| Moldova | 0.77 |
| Rwanda | 0.77 |
| Lithuania | 0.77 |
| Namibia | 0.77 |
| United Kingdom | 0.76 |
| Philippines | 0.76 |
| Panama | 0.76 |
| Poland | 0.76 |
| Bulgaria | 0.76 |
| Slovenia | 0.75 |
| Russian Federation | 0.75 |
| Israel | 0.75 |
| Kazakhstan | 0.75 |
| Serbia | 0.75 |
| Uruguay | 0.74 |
| Ireland | 0.74 |
| Croatia | 0.74 |
| Costa Rica | 0.74 |
| Austria | 0.74 |
| Nicaragua | 0.74 |

| Ranking | GEI 2012 |
|--------------------------|----------|
| Argentina | 0.74 |
| Hungary | 0.73 |
| Czech Republic | 0.73 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 0.73 |
| Botswana | 0.73 |
| Slovakia | 0.73 |
| Paraguay | 0.73 |
| Lesotho | 0.72 |
| Romania | 0.72 |
| United States of America | 0.72 |
| Brazil | 0.72 |
| Greece | 0.72 |
| Chile | 0.72 |
| Cape Verde | 0.72 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 0.72 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.72 |
| Thailand | 0.71 |
| Ecuador | 0.71 |
| Viet Nam | 0.70 |
| Madagascar | 0.70 |
| Armenia | 0.70 |
| Italy | 0.70 |
| Peru | 0.69 |
| Ukraine | 0.69 |
| Belize | 0.69 |
| Burundi | 0.69 |
| Singapore | 0.69 |
| Luxembourg | 0.68 |
| Cuba | 0.68 |
| Cyprus | 0.68 |
| Georgia | 0.67 |
| Mauritius | 0.67 |
| Bolivia | 0.66 |
| Swaziland | 0.65 |
| Guyana | 0.64 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.64 |
| Venezuela | 0.64 |
| Belarus | 0.64 |
| Angola | 0.64 |
| Mexico | 0.64 |

| Ranking | GEI 2012 |
|------------------------|----------|
| China | 0.64 |
| Colombia | 0.64 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.63 |
| Honduras | 0.63 |
| Uganda | 0.63 |
| Malta | 0.63 |
| Jamaica | 0.63 |
| Maldives | 0.63 |
| El Salvador | 0.62 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.62 |
| Indonesia | 0.62 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.62 |
| Kuwait | 0.62 |
| Ghana | 0.62 |
| Gabon | 0.61 |
| Qatar | 0.60 |
| Tanzania | 0.60 |
| Papua New Guinea | 0.60 |
| Malawi | 0.59 |
| Korea, Rep. | 0.59 |
| Gambia | 0.59 |
| Mozambique | 0.58 |
| Kenya | 0.58 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0.58 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.57 |
| Japan | 0.57 |
| Malaysia | 0.56 |
| Liberia | 0.56 |
| Lao, PDR | 0.56 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.55 |
| Lebanon | 0.55 |
| Cambodia | 0.55 |
| Bangladesh | 0.55 |
| Albania | 0.55 |
| Bahrain | 0.54 |
| Mauritania | 0.53 |
| Tajikistan | 0.51 |
| Iran | 0.51 |
| Senegal | 0.50 |
| Guatemala | 0.49 |

| Ranking | GEI 2012 |
|-------------------|----------|
| Jordan | 0.49 |
| Algeria | 0.49 |
| Zambia | 0.49 |
| Comoros | 0.48 |
| Haiti | 0.48 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.48 |
| Nepal | 0.47 |
| Djibouti | 0.46 |
| Turkey | 0.45 |
| Oman | 0.45 |
| Egypt | 0.45 |
| Ethiopia | 0.44 |
| Eritrea | 0.44 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.44 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.43 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.42 |
| Cameroon | 0.41 |
| Benin | 0.41 |
| Bhutan | 0.41 |
| Togo | 0.40 |
| Sudan | 0.40 |
| Morocco | 0.40 |
| Saudi Arabia | 0.37 |
| India | 0.37 |
| Congo, DR | 0.36 |
| Mali | 0.32 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 0.32 |
| Pakistan | 0.29 |
| Congo, Rep. | 0.29 |
| Niger | 0.26 |
| Chad | 0.25 |
| Yemen | 0.24 |
| Afghanistan | 0.15 |

Source: Social Watch (<http://www.socialwatch.org/node/14365>).

Table 3.2.6

The Social Protection Floor Index

Country ranking based minimum income criterion of \$ 1.90 a day in 2011 PPP, 2012

Gap is the theoretical amount of money that a country would have to allocate in order to meet four basic social security guarantees (in per cent of GDP).

| Ranking | Country | Gap (as % of GDP) | Ranking | Country | Gap (as % of GDP) |
|---------|------------------------|----------------------|---------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0.0 | 37 | Chile | 0.8 |
| | Costa Rica | | | Latvia | |
| | Croatia | | | Nicaragua | |
| | Czech Republic | | | St. Lucia | |
| | Estonia | | 41 | Bolivia | 1.0 |
| | Hungary | | | Jamaica | |
| | Jordan | | | Peru | |
| | Lithuania | | | Russian Federation | |
| | Macedonia, FYR | | 45 | Mexico | 1.2 |
| | Maldives | | 46 | Belize | 1.3 |
| | Moldova | | | Botswana | |
| | Montenegro | | 48 | Cabo Verde | 1.4 |
| | Poland | | | China | |
| | Romania | | 50 | Albania | 1.5 |
| | Serbia | | | Ecuador | |
| | Slovak Republic | | | Trinidad and Tobago | |
| | Slovenia | | 53 | Dominican Republic | 1.6 |
| | Uruguay | | | Iran, Islamic Rep. | |
| 19 | Brazil | 0.1 | 55 | Bhutan | 1.7 |
| | Panama | | | Fiji | |
| | Seychelles | | | Suriname | |
| 22 | Bulgaria | 0.2 | 58 | Vietnam | 1.8 |
| | Colombia | | 59 | Kazakhstan | 1.9 |
| | El Salvador | | | Ghana | |
| | Tunisia | | 61 | Vanuatu | 2.0 |
| | Turkey | | | Mauritius | |
| | Ukraine | | | Honduras | |
| 28 | Kyrgyz Republic | 0.3 | 64 | Malaysia | 2.1 |
| | Paraguay | | | Morocco | |
| | South Africa | | 66 | Congo, Rep. | 2.3 |
| 31 | Belarus | 0.4 | | Djibouti | |
| | Mongolia | | | Kiribati | |
| 33 | Guyana | 0.5 | | Uzbekistan | |
| 34 | Namibia | 0.7 | 70 | Gabon | 2.4 |
| | Thailand | | 71 | Armenia | 2.5 |
| | Tonga | | | Guatemala | |

| Ranking | Country | Gap (as % of GDP) |
|---------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 73 | Swaziland | 2.6 |
| 74 | Tajikistan | 2.7 |
| 75 | Venezuela | 3.0 |
| 76 | Angola | 3.1 |
| | Azerbaijan | |
| | Cambodia | |
| | Mauritania | |
| | Sri Lanka | |
| | Turkmenistan | |
| 83 | Georgia | 3.2 |
| | Indonesia | |
| 85 | Philippines | 3.3 |
| 86 | Pakistan | 3.4 |
| 87 | India | 3.7 |
| | Sudan | |
| | Sao Tome and Principe | |
| 90 | Comoros | 3.8 |
| 91 | Solomon Islands | 4.4 |
| 92 | Cameroon | 4.6 |
| 93 | Kenya | 4.7 |
| 94 | Cote d'Ivoire | 4.8 |
| 95 | Lao PDR | 4.9 |
| 96 | Timor-Leste | 5.0 |
| 97 | Bangladesh | 5.4 |
| | Micronesia, Fed. Sts | |
| 99 | Papua New Guinea | 5.8 |
| | Uganda | |
| 101 | Nigeria | 5.9 |
| 102 | Senegal | 6.2 |
| 103 | Tanzania | 6.3 |
| 104 | Zambia | 7.6 |
| 105 | Ethiopia | 8.0 |
| 106 | Chad | 8.1 |
| | Burkina Faso | |
| 108 | Guinea | 8.5 |
| 109 | Benin | 8.9 |

| Ranking | Country | Gap (as % of GDP) |
|---------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 110 | Sierra Leone | 9.2 |
| 111 | Gambia, The | 9.3 |
| 112 | Lesotho | 9.4 |
| 113 | Mali | 9.8 |
| 114 | Rwanda | 10.3 |
| 115 | Niger | 12.1 |
| 116 | Togo | 13.5 |
| 117 | Liberia | 15.8 |
| 118 | Haiti | 16.1 |
| 119 | Guinea-Bissau | 17.0 |
| 120 | Mozambique | 20.2 |
| 121 | Madagascar | 23.2 |
| 122 | Central African Rep. | 24.0 |
| 123 | Malawi | 31.0 |
| 124 | Burundi | 32.9 |
| 125 | Congo, Dem. Rep. | 44.9 |

Note: The SPFI can be calculated for 125 countries that are included in PovcalNet and for which information on public health expenditure and births attended by skilled personnel is available. In addition to high-income countries, the following countries are not included due to the non-availability of data: Afghanistan, Algeria, American Samoa, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt (Arab Rep.), Eritrea, Grenada, Iraq, Kosovo, Korea (Dem. Rep.), Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Palau, San Marino, Somalia, South Sudan, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Syrian Arab Republic, Tuvalu, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen (Rep.), Zimbabwe.

Source: Bierbaum, Mira, Annalena Oppel, Sander Tromp and Michael Cichon (2016): "A Social Protection Floor Index: Monitoring National Social Protection Policy Implementation," Discussion Paper of the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance / UNU-MERIT, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Global Policy and Development. Berlin. Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/12490.pdf>.

Table 3.2.7

The equitable share of the climate bill

| Country | For every million dollars of climate costs, the country should pay (in US dollars) | Country | For every million dollars of climate costs, the country should pay (in US dollars) |
|----------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| United States | 297,222.91 | Indonesia | 3,406.05 |
| China | 73,084.80 | India | 3,358.75 |
| Japan | 71,596.28 | Israel | 3,333.63 |
| Germany | 57,390.76 | Kazakhstan | 3,213.68 |
| Russia | 45,538.73 | Thailand | 3,193.01 |
| United Kingdom | 38,068.43 | Singapore | 3,174.42 |
| Brazil | 36,790.31 | Finland | 3,113.74 |
| France | 34,276.08 | Ireland | 3,108.60 |
| Canada | 32,060.55 | Qatar | 2,833.61 |
| Italy | 25,005.88 | Chile | 2,680.00 |
| Australia | 22,928.68 | Peru | 2,599.03 |
| Korea, Rep. | 16,463.76 | New Zealand | 2,597.24 |
| Spain | 16,186.67 | Portugal | 2,451.29 |
| Mexico | 15,618.32 | Romania | 1,997.91 |
| Netherlands | 11,761.50 | Iraq | 1,994.81 |
| Saudi Arabia | 11,307.89 | Hungary | 1,974.82 |
| Poland | 8,675.54 | Ecuador | 1,650.27 |
| Turkey | 8,415.82 | Slovakia | 1,470.46 |
| South Africa | 7,713.57 | Libya | 1,387.71 |
| Belgium | 7,512.46 | Oman | 1,335.17 |
| Venezuela | 6,805.65 | Algeria | 1,300.93 |
| Switzerland | 6,504.41 | Bolivia | 1,267.96 |
| Argentina | 6,469.80 | Philippines | 957.48 |
| Iran | 6,025.18 | Luxembourg | 909.93 |
| Czech Republic | 5,988.86 | Egypt | 851.11 |
| Sweden | 5,805.94 | Croatia | 835.06 |
| Taiwan | 5,698.39 | Belarus | 744.11 |
| United Arab Emirates | 5,647.89 | Paraguay | 723.22 |
| Norway | 5,142.62 | Nigeria | 699.50 |
| Malaysia | 5,020.42 | Bulgaria | 694.74 |
| Austria | 5,016.80 | Panama | 673.29 |
| Denmark | 4,432.09 | Lithuania | 667.43 |
| Colombia | 4,155.18 | Slovenia | 665.79 |
| Ukraine | 4,057.26 | Cuba | 659.02 |
| Kuwait | 3,861.58 | Trinidad and Tobago | 633.91 |
| Greece | 3,485.09 | Zambia | 619.55 |

| Country | For every million dollars of climate costs, the country should pay (in US dollars) |
|--------------------|--|
| Azerbaijan | 601.61 |
| Bahrain | 600.31 |
| Costa Rica | 592.07 |
| Angola | 584.18 |
| Dominican Republic | 523.64 |
| Zimbabwe | 509.21 |
| Brunei | 499.19 |
| Lebanon | 489.38 |
| Nicaragua | 477.19 |
| Estonia | 454.03 |
| Guatemala | 440.51 |
| Uruguay | 428.63 |
| Turkmenistan | 419.42 |
| Serbia | 382.19 |
| Botswana | 361.24 |
| Tunisia | 332.75 |
| Syria | 306.96 |
| Gabon | 293.28 |
| Iceland | 289.22 |
| Morocco | 284.62 |
| Sri Lanka | 280.70 |
| Namibia | 278.74 |
| Honduras | 275.58 |
| Latvia | 249.20 |
| Cyprus | 237.42 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 233.89 |
| Papua New Guinea | 212.22 |
| Cameroon | 211.96 |
| Bosnia and Herz. | 196.03 |
| Kenya | 189.66 |
| Korea, Dem. Rep. | 182.32 |
| El Salvador | 171.99 |
| Macedonia | 170.20 |
| Sudan | 162.74 |
| Uzbekistan | 158.15 |
| Jamaica | 153.05 |

| Country | For every million dollars of climate costs, the country should pay (in US dollars) |
|--------------------------|--|
| Central African Republic | 133.63 |
| Bahamas | 129.68 |
| Vietnam | 123.99 |
| Malta | 102.51 |
| Mauritius | 96.26 |
| Jordan | 91.43 |
| Myanmar | 85.41 |
| Georgia | 81.23 |
| Afghanistan | 72.42 |
| Congo, Republic of the | 63.77 |
| Pakistan | 62.35 |
| Albania | 61.97 |
| Barbados | 60.99 |
| Burkina Faso | 60.67 |
| Belize | 60.27 |
| Monaco | 59.49 |
| Liechtenstein | 57.41 |
| Mongolia | 51.83 |
| Guyana | 49.52 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 44.96 |
| Montenegro | 42.04 |
| Suriname | 41.25 |
| Armenia | 40.06 |
| Senegal | 39.28 |
| Guinea | 33.22 |
| Tanzania | 31.16 |
| Mauritania | 27.74 |
| Nepal | 23.37 |
| Cambodia | 22.87 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep | 22.85 |
| Swaziland | 21.96 |
| San Marino | 20.98 |
| Madagascar | 20.92 |
| Moldova | 19.07 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 16.53 |
| Ghana | 15.60 |

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

| Country | For every million dollars of climate costs, the country should pay (in US dollars) |
|-----------------------|--|
| Liberia | 15.55 |
| Fiji | 15.49 |
| Haiti | 15.11 |
| Seychelles | 15.04 |
| Yemen | 14.65 |
| Uganda | 14.21 |
| Grenada | 13.34 |
| Maldives | 12.57 |
| Palestine | 12.14 |
| Mali | 9.89 |
| Bangladesh | 9.58 |
| Laos | 7.90 |
| Sierra Leone | 7.78 |
| Gambia | 7.74 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 7.68 |
| Ethiopia | 6.63 |
| Saint Lucia | 6.32 |
| Lesotho | 5.92 |
| Malawi | 5.89 |
| Tajikistan | 5.82 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 5.60 |
| Bhutan | 5.21 |
| Mozambique | 4.64 |
| Saint Vincent | 4.11 |
| Dominica | 3.65 |
| Cook Islands | 3.48 |
| Djibouti | 3.20 |
| Palau | 2.56 |
| Niger | 2.37 |
| Cape Verde | 2.15 |
| Nauru | 2.12 |
| Somalia | 1.96 |
| Vanuatu | 1.90 |
| Rwanda | 1.68 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1.63 |
| Benin | 1.62 |

| Country | For every million dollars of climate costs, the country should pay (in US dollars) |
|-----------------------|--|
| Timor-Leste | 1.24 |
| Tonga | 1.24 |
| Solomon Islands | 1.07 |
| Samoa | 1.03 |
| Chad | 0.85 |
| Micronesia, Fed. | 0.59 |
| Niue | 0.47 |
| Marshall Islands | 0.29 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0.16 |
| Kiribati | 0.13 |
| Tuvalu | 0.11 |
| Comoros | 0.07 |
| Eritrea | 0.06 |
| Togo | 0.06 |
| Burundi | 0.03 |
| Total | 1,000,000.00 |

Note: This table was obtained from the calculator of the Climate Equity Reference Project assuming a mitigation pathway to keep warming under the 2°C Standard (“Greater than 66% chance of staying within 2°C in 2100.”), which is a moderate assumption, considering that the Paris agreement deems 1.5°C as desirable. It calculates historic responsibilities since 1950 (which is moderate, considering that emissions increased dramatically in industrialized countries from 1850 on) and a development threshold of \$ 7,500 per capita GDP. Further, this table weights equally the factors of responsibility and capacity to act. The index results were then translated to sum one million dollars instead of one to make the very small numbers easier to read.

Source: <https://calculator.climateequityreference.org/>

Table 3.2.8

The Palma Ratio

| Country | Palma ratio | Year | Country | Palma ratio | Year | Country | Palma ratio | Year |
|--------------------|-------------|------|--------------------|-------------|------|--------------------|-------------|------|
| Japan | 0.6 | 2013 | New Zealand | 1.3 | 2013 | United States | 2.0 | 2010 |
| Myanmar | 0.7 | 2010 | United Kingdom | 1.3 | 2011 | Thailand | 2.0 | 2011 |
| Norway | 0.8 | 2011 | Australia | 1.3 | 2003 | Uruguay | 2.2 | 2010 |
| Slovenia | 0.8 | 2011 | Azerbaijan | 1.3 | 2001 | Philippines | 2.2 | 2009 |
| Iceland | 0.8 | 2011 | Spain | 1.3 | 2011 | El Salvador | 2.2 | 2010 |
| Belarus | 0.8 | 2003 | Greece | 1.3 | 2011 | Nigeria | 2.3 | 2003 |
| Sweden | 0.8 | 2011 | Ireland | 1.3 | 2010 | Cameroon | 2.4 | 2001 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.9 | 2011 | Canada | 1.3 | 2007 | Cote D'Ivoire | 2.4 | 2008 |
| Czech Republic | 0.9 | 2011 | Armenia | 1.3 | 2011 | Peru | 2.5 | 2010 |
| Netherlands | 0.9 | 2011 | Portugal | 1.4 | 2011 | Uganda | 2.5 | 2002 |
| Finland | 0.9 | 2011 | Vietnam | 1.4 | 2004 | Bangladesh | 2.5 | 2010 |
| Belgium | 0.9 | 2011 | Kyrgyzstan | 1.4 | 2003 | Dominican Republic | 2.5 | 2010 |
| Austria | 0.9 | 2011 | Laos | 1.4 | 2002 | Jamaica | 2.5 | 2004 |
| Hungary | 0.9 | 2011 | Bulgaria | 1.4 | 2011 | Costa Rica | 2.6 | 2010 |
| Luxembourg | 1.0 | 2011 | Algeria | 1.5 | 1995 | Ecuador | 2.7 | 2010 |
| Mauritius | 1.0 | 2007 | Latvia | 1.5 | 2012 | Mozambique | 2.7 | 2002 |
| Denmark | 1.0 | 2011 | Venezuela | 1.5 | 2010 | Nepal | 2.7 | 2004 |
| Malta | 1.0 | 2011 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | 1.5 | 2007 | Kenya | 2.8 | 2006 |
| Ukraine | 1.0 | 2005 | Maldives | 1.6 | 2010 | Namibia | 3.0 | 2010 |
| Tajikistan | 1.0 | 2004 | Benin | 1.6 | 2003 | Mexico | 3.1 | 2012 |
| China | 1.0 | 2012 | Yemen | 1.7 | 2005 | Nicaragua | 3.2 | 2005 |
| Germany | 1.0 | 2011 | Iran | 1.7 | 2005 | Swaziland | 3.2 | 2001 |
| Cyprus | 1.1 | 2011 | Guinea | 1.7 | 2003 | Paraguay | 3.3 | 2010 |
| Switzerland | 1.1 | 2011 | Jordan | 1.7 | 2003 | Chile | 3.3 | 2009 |
| Croatia | 1.1 | 2011 | Malawi | 1.8 | 2011 | Zambia | 3.4 | 2004 |
| Russian Federation | 1.1 | 2002 | Pakistan | 1.8 | 2005 | Brazil | 3.6 | 2009 |
| Ethiopia | 1.1 | 2000 | Turkey | 1.8 | 2013 | Guatemala | 3.9 | 2006 |
| Poland | 1.2 | 2011 | Madagascar | 1.8 | 2010 | Colombia | 4.1 | 2010 |
| France | 1.2 | 2011 | Indonesia | 1.8 | 2005 | Bolivia | 4.1 | 2008 |
| Estonia | 1.2 | 2011 | Morocco | 1.8 | 1999 | Honduras | 4.7 | 2010 |
| Italy | 1.2 | 2011 | Burkina Faso | 1.9 | 2009 | Haiti | 5.3 | 2001 |
| Panama | 1.2 | 2010 | Sri Lanka | 1.9 | 2002 | South Africa | 11.9 | 2011 |
| Kazakhstan | 1.2 | 2003 | Senegal | 1.9 | 2011 | | | |
| India | 1.2 | 2012 | Singapore | 1.9 | 2012 | | | |
| Lithuania | 1.2 | 2011 | Argentina | 1.9 | 2011 | | | |
| Mongolia | 1.3 | 2002 | Tunisia | 1.9 | 2005 | | | |
| Romania | 1.3 | 2011 | Georgia | 1.9 | 2005 | | | |
| Egypt | 1.3 | 2004 | Israel | 2.0 | 2007 | | | |

Source: Computed by the author with data from the World Income inequality database (UNU-WIDER).

Table 3.2.9

Index on Militarization

| Country | GMI Score | Rank | Country | GMI Score | Rank |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|------|--------------------|-----------|------|
| Afghanistan | 591.75 | 66 | Egypt | 705.21 | 26 |
| Albania | 363.7 | 144 | El Salvador | 571.8 | 78 |
| Algeria | 742.59 | 14 | Equatorial Guinea | 545.66 | 89 |
| Angola | 679.29 | 31 | Estonia | 705.98 | 25 |
| Argentina | 497.63 | 115 | Ethiopia | 504.28 | 114 |
| Armenia | 835.79 | 3 | Fiji | 576.95 | 76 |
| Australia | 591.5 | 67 | Finland | 717.7 | 21 |
| Austria | 578.54 | 72 | France | 606.08 | 59 |
| Azerbaijan | 786.44 | 8 | Gabon | 589.24 | 69 |
| Bahrain | 739.39 | 15 | Gambia | 348.42 | 148 |
| Bangladesh | 473.94 | 122 | Georgia | 614.63 | 57 |
| Belarus | 760.67 | 12 | Germany | 529.35 | 97 |
| Belgium | 535.89 | 93 | Ghana | 409.6 | 136 |
| Belize | 431.08 | 132 | Greece | 771.66 | 10 |
| Benin | 460.4 | 127 | Guatemala | 507.8 | 109 |
| Bolivia | 583.56 | 71 | Guinea | 543.12 | 90 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 520.67 | 102 | Guinea-Bissau | 616.24 | 56 |
| Botswana | 636.92 | 49 | Guyana | 512.01 | 104 |
| Brazil | 577.61 | 75 | Honduras | 565.1 | 81 |
| Brunei | 768.53 | 11 | Hungary | 593.89 | 65 |
| Bulgaria | 690.36 | 28 | Iceland | 179.47 | 151 |
| Burkina Faso | 436.37 | 131 | India | 560.32 | 83 |
| Burundi | 583.85 | 70 | Indonesia | 543.02 | 91 |
| Cambodia | 643.15 | 46 | Iran | 700.21 | 27 |
| Cameroon | 480.83 | 121 | Iraq | 663.77 | 37 |
| Canada | 535.11 | 94 | Ireland | 492.67 | 117 |
| Cape Verde | 350.24 | 147 | Israel | 890.23 | 1 |
| Chad | 647.59 | 42 | Italy | 568.04 | 80 |
| Chile | 665.42 | 35 | Jamaica | 413.07 | 134 |
| China | 550.07 | 87 | Japan | 504.7 | 113 |
| Colombia | 613.34 | 58 | Jordan | 807.98 | 4 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 533.93 | 95 | Kazakhstan | 570.14 | 79 |
| Congo, Republic of | 646.6 | 43 | Kenya | 465.16 | 125 |
| Cote D'Ivoire | 482.75 | 119 | Korea, Republic of | 801.26 | 5 |
| Croatia | 577.62 | 74 | Kuwait | 772.38 | 9 |
| Cyprus | 794.17 | 7 | Kyrgyzstan | 617.69 | 55 |
| Czech Republic | 507.46 | 111 | Laos | 555.95 | 86 |
| Denmark | 642.4 | 47 | Latvia | 563.08 | 82 |
| Dominican Republic | 462.75 | 126 | Lebanon | 727.71 | 19 |
| Ecuador | 633.93 | 50 | Lesotho | 444.53 | 129 |

| Country | GMI Score | Rank |
|------------------|-----------|------|
| Liberia | 321.61 | 149 |
| Libya | 483.63 | 118 |
| Lithuania | 600.01 | 63 |
| Luxembourg | 496 | 116 |
| Macedonia | 638.12 | 48 |
| Madagascar | 406.18 | 137 |
| Malawi | 378.55 | 141 |
| Malaysia | 625.66 | 52 |
| Mali | 440.45 | 130 |
| Malta | 364.9 | 143 |
| Mauritania | 648.46 | 41 |
| Mauritius | 418.45 | 133 |
| Mexico | 482.46 | 120 |
| Moldova | 556.54 | 85 |
| Mongolia | 737.53 | 16 |
| Montenegro | 633.57 | 51 |
| Morocco | 720.35 | 20 |
| Mozambique | 470.89 | 123 |
| Myanmar | 656.09 | 39 |
| Namibia | 645.01 | 44 |
| Nepal | 549.5 | 88 |
| Netherlands | 521.07 | 101 |
| New Zealand | 519.43 | 103 |
| Nicaragua | 510.26 | 107 |
| Niger | 410.11 | 135 |
| Nigeria | 403.18 | 138 |
| Norway | 657.5 | 38 |
| Oman | 750.92 | 13 |
| Pakistan | 619.06 | 54 |
| Papua New Guinea | 282.6 | 150 |
| Paraguay | 604.78 | 60 |
| Peru | 650.61 | 40 |
| Philippines | 509.9 | 108 |
| Poland | 590.62 | 68 |
| Portugal | 681.54 | 30 |
| Romania | 666.54 | 34 |
| Russia | 794.53 | 6 |
| Rwanda | 527.99 | 98 |
| Saudi Arabia | 734.61 | 17 |
| Senegal | 505.26 | 112 |

| Country | GMI Score | Rank |
|--------------------------|-----------|------|
| Serbia | 676.88 | 32 |
| Seychelles | 394.15 | 139 |
| Sierra Leone | 356.96 | 146 |
| Singapore | 868.4 | 2 |
| Slovakia | 530.05 | 96 |
| Slovenia | 604.58 | 61 |
| South Africa | 507.5 | 110 |
| South Sudan | 578.41 | 73 |
| Spain | 539.64 | 92 |
| Sri Lanka | 644.25 | 45 |
| Swaziland | 136.59 | 152 |
| Sweden | 523.47 | 100 |
| Switzerland | 625.23 | 53 |
| Tajikistan | 469.33 | 124 |
| Tanzania | 511.34 | 106 |
| Thailand | 663.97 | 36 |
| Timor-Leste | 365.34 | 142 |
| Togo | 511.52 | 105 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 357.26 | 145 |
| Tunisia | 574.21 | 77 |
| Turkey | 716.31 | 23 |
| Uganda | 391.65 | 140 |
| Ukraine | 716.45 | 22 |
| United Arab Emirates | 712.76 | 24 |
| United Kingdom | 594.2 | 64 |
| United States of America | 683.16 | 29 |
| Uruguay | 601.13 | 62 |
| Venezuela | 557.61 | 84 |
| Vietnam | 727.77 | 18 |
| Yemen | 670.78 | 33 |
| Zambia | 526.38 | 99 |
| Zimbabwe | 444.59 | 128 |

Source: <http://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table>

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

Table 3.2.10

Financial Secrecy Index – 2015 Results

| Rank | Secrecy Jurisdiction | FSI – Value ³ | Secrecy Score ⁴ | Global Scale Weight ⁵ |
|------|---|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1 | Switzerland | 1,466.1 | 73 | 5.625 |
| 2 | Hong Kong | 1,259.4 | 72 | 3.842 |
| 3 | USA | 1,254.7 | 60 | 19.603 |
| 4 | Singapore | 1,147.1 | 69 | 4.280 |
| 5 | Cayman Islands ¹ | 1,013.1 | 65 | 4.857 |
| 6 | Luxembourg | 816.9 | 55 | 11.630 |
| 7 | Lebanon | 760.2 | 79 | 0.377 |
| 8 | Germany | 701.8 | 56 | 6.026 |
| 9 | Bahrain | 471.3 | 74 | 0.164 |
| 10 | United Arab Emirates (Dubai) ² | 440.7 | 77 | 0.085 |
| 11 | Macao | 420.1 | 70 | 0.188 |
| 12 | Japan | 418.3 | 58 | 1.062 |
| 13 | Panama | 415.6 | 72 | 0.132 |
| 14 | Marshall Islands | 405.5 | 79 | 0.053 |
| 15 | United Kingdom ¹ | 380.2 | 41 | 17.394 |
| 16 | Jersey | 354.0 | 65 | 0.216 |
| 17 | Guernsey | 339.3 | 64 | 0.231 |
| 18 | Malaysia (Labuan) ² | 338.7 | 75 | 0.050 |
| 19 | Turkey | 320.9 | 64 | 0.182 |
| 20 | China | 312.1 | 54 | 0.743 |
| 21 | British Virgin Islands ¹ | 307.6 | 60 | 0.281 |
| 22 | Barbados | 298.3 | 78 | 0.024 |
| 23 | Mauritius ¹ | 297.0 | 72 | 0.049 |
| 24 | Austria ² | 295.3 | 54 | 0.692 |
| 25 | Bahamas ¹ | 273.0 | 79 | 0.017 |
| 26 | Brazil | 263.6 | 52 | 0.678 |
| 27 | Malta | 260.9 | 50 | 0.990 |
| 28 | Uruguay | 255.5 | 71 | 0.037 |
| 29 | Canada | 251.7 | 46 | 1.785 |
| 30 | Russia | 243.2 | 54 | 0.397 |
| 31 | France | 241.9 | 43 | 3.104 |
| 32 | Isle of Man ¹ | 228.5 | 64 | 0.068 |
| 33 | Liberia | 218.2 | 83 | 0.006 |
| 34 | Bermuda ¹ | 217.7 | 66 | 0.042 |
| 35 | Cyprus | 213.9 | 50 | 0.518 |
| 36 | Liechtenstein | 202.3 | 76 | 0.010 |
| 37 | Ireland | 187.4 | 40 | 2.313 |
| 38 | Belgium | 181.2 | 41 | 1.863 |

| Rank | Secrecy Jurisdiction | FSI – Value ³ | Secrecy Score ⁴ | Global Scale Weight ⁵ |
|------|--|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 39 | Guatemala | 177.1 | 76 | 0.007 |
| 40 | Israel | 173.7 | 53 | 0.166 |
| 41 | Netherlands | 168.3 | 48 | 0.322 |
| 42 | Chile | 166.6 | 54 | 0.120 |
| 43 | Saudi Arabia | 163.8 | 61 | 0.037 |
| 44 | Australia | 148.0 | 43 | 0.586 |
| 45 | India | 148.0 | 39 | 1.487 |
| 46 | Philippines | 146.0 | 63 | 0.020 |
| 47 | Vanuatu | 142.8 | 87 | 0.001 |
| 48 | Ghana | 139.1 | 67 | 0.010 |
| 49 | Korea | 124.2 | 44 | 0.302 |
| 50 | US Virgin Islands | 118.2 | 69 | 0.004 |
| 51 | Samoa | 117.5 | 86 | 0.001 |
| 52 | Mexico | 117.0 | 45 | 0.211 |
| 53 | Norway | 110.6 | 38 | 0.731 |
| 54 | New Zealand | 109.3 | 46 | 0.129 |
| 55 | Gibraltar ¹ | 109.3 | 67 | 0.005 |
| 56 | Sweden | 100.8 | 36 | 1.006 |
| 57 | Aruba | 99.5 | 68 | 0.003 |
| 58 | Italy | 98.6 | 35 | 1.218 |
| 59 | Latvia | 92.7 | 45 | 0.113 |
| 60 | Belize | 92.4 | 79 | 0.001 |
| 61 | South Africa | 90.8 | 42 | 0.203 |
| 62 | Botswana | 90.5 | 71 | 0.002 |
| 63 | Anguilla ¹ | 89.3 | 69 | 0.002 |
| 64 | St Vincent & the Grenadines ¹ | 79.6 | 78 | 0.000 |
| 65 | Antigua & Barbuda ¹ | 79.5 | 81 | 0.000 |
| 66 | Spain | 77.4 | 33 | 1.090 |
| 67 | Costa Rica | 74.9 | 55 | 0.010 |
| 68 | Turks & Caicos Islands ¹ | 72.4 | 71 | 0.001 |
| 69 | St Kitts & Nevis ¹ | 68.4 | 78 | 0.000 |
| 70 | Curacao | 67.8 | 68 | 0.001 |
| 71 | Iceland | 67.1 | 46 | 0.035 |
| 72 | Seychelles | 60.8 | 71 | 0.000 |
| 73 | Slovakia | 60.1 | 50 | 0.011 |
| 74 | Macedonia | 59.5 | 66 | 0.001 |
| 75 | Poland | 57.2 | 36 | 0.172 |
| 76 | Monaco | 53.6 | 74 | 0.000 |

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

| Rank | Secrecy Jurisdiction | FSI – Value ³ | Secrecy Score ⁴ | Global Scale Weight ⁵ |
|------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 77 | Estonia | 52.9 | 44 | 0.023 |
| 78 | Portugal (Madeira) ² | 52.5 | 39 | 0.063 |
| 79 | St Lucia ¹ | 51.6 | 83 | 0.000 |
| 80 | Brunei Darussalam ¹ | 47.4 | 83 | 0.000 |
| 81 | Czech Republic | 44.2 | 35 | 0.105 |
| 82 | Grenada ¹ | 42.1 | 76 | 0.000 |
| 83 | Denmark | 38.2 | 31 | 0.219 |
| 84 | Hungary | 37.3 | 36 | 0.052 |
| 85 | Greece | 37.2 | 36 | 0.046 |
| 86 | San Marino | 33.2 | 70 | 0.000 |
| 87 | Andorra | 27.3 | 77 | 0.000 |
| 88 | Slovenia | 22.4 | 34 | 0.019 |
| 89 | Dominica ¹ | 21.3 | 76 | 0.000 |
| 90 | Finland | 19.4 | 31 | 0.025 |
| 91 | Cook Islands ¹ | 17.8 | 76 | 0.000 |
| 92 | Montserrat ¹ | 10.8 | 67 | 0.000 |

1. The territories marked in Red are Overseas Territories (OTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs) of the United Kingdom where the Queen is head of state; powers to appoint key government officials rests with the British Crown; laws must be approved in London; and the UK government holds various other powers (see here for more details: www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/UnitedKingdom.pdf). Territories marked in light blue are British Commonwealth territories which are not OTs or CDs but whose final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London (see here for more details: http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Privy_Council_and_Secrecy_Scores.pdf). If the Global Scale Weights of just the OTs and CDs were added together (5.70 per cent of global total and 23.10 per cent with the United Kingdom included), and then combined either with their average secrecy score of 65.90 (63.62 with the UK) or their lowest common denominator score of 71.27 (Turks and Caicos Islands), the United Kingdom with its satellite secrecy jurisdictions would be ranked first in the FSI by a large margin with a FSI score of 1580 or 2221, respectively (compared to 1466 for Switzerland). Even a weighted average, which emphasizes the relative transparency of the UK over its secrecy network, would put the combined group in 9th place on the FSI. Note that this list excludes many British Commonwealth realms where the Queen remains their head of state.
2. For these jurisdictions, the secrecy score was calculated for the sub-national jurisdiction alone, but the Global Scale Weight (GSW) for the entire country. This is not ideal: The authors would prefer to use GSW data for sub-national jurisdictions - but this data is simply not available. As a result, these jurisdictions might be ranked higher in the index than is warranted.
3. The FSI is calculated by multiplying the cube of the Secrecy Score with the cube root of the Global Scale Weight. The final result is divided through by one hundred for presentational clarity.
4. The Secrecy Scores are calculated based on 15 indicators. For full explanation of the methodology and data sources, please read the FSI-methodology document, here: <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/FSI-Methodology.pdf>
5. The Global Scale Weight represent a jurisdiction's share in global financial services exports. For full explanation of the methodology and data sources, please read our FSI-methodology document, here: <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/FSI-Methodology.pdf>

Source: <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2015-results>

Table 3.2.11

The “Social Intensity of Carbon”

| Ranking | Country | Infant mortality (deaths under five years old per thousand born alive – 2013) | CO ₂ emissions per capita (tons of carbon per capita) | Social efficiency of carbon (distance to 0 in the graph) |
|---------|----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| 1 | Sri Lanka | 9.6 | 0.7 | 7 |
| 2 | Tonga | 12.1 | 1.0 | 9 |
| 3 | Costa Rica | 9.6 | 1.7 | 10 |
| 3 | Vanuatu | 16.9 | 0.6 | 10 |
| 4 | El Salvador | 15.7 | 1.1 | 11 |
| 4 | Albania | 14.9 | 1.5 | 11 |
| 4 | Republic of Moldova | 15.4 | 1.4 | 11 |
| 5 | Georgia | 13.1 | 1.8 | 12 |
| 5 | Armenia | 15.6 | 1.7 | 12 |
| 5 | Samoa | 18.1 | 1.3 | 12 |
| 5 | Colombia | 16.9 | 1.5 | 12 |
| 6 | Uruguay | 11.1 | 2.3 | 13 |
| 6 | Belize | 16.7 | 1.7 | 13 |
| 6 | Peru | 16.7 | 1.8 | 13 |
| 6 | State of Palestine | 21.8 | 0.5 | 13 |
| 6 | Brazil | 13.7 | 2.2 | 13 |
| 6 | Grenada | 11.8 | 2.4 | 13 |
| 7 | Paraguay | 21.9 | 0.8 | 14 |
| 7 | Saint Lucia | 14.5 | 2.3 | 14 |
| 7 | Honduras | 22.2 | 1.1 | 14 |
| 8 | Tunisia | 15.2 | 2.4 | 15 |
| 8 | Nicaragua | 23.5 | 0.8 | 15 |
| 8 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 19.0 | 2.2 | 15 |
| 9 | Kyrgyzstan | 24.2 | 1.2 | 16 |
| 9 | Cuba | 6.2 | 3.2 | 16 |
| 9 | Fiji | 23.6 | 1.4 | 16 |
| 9 | Cape Verde | 26.0 | 0.9 | 16 |
| 9 | Panama | 17.9 | 2.6 | 16 |
| 10 | Jamaica | 16.6 | 2.8 | 17 |
| 10 | Maldives | 9.9 | 3.3 | 17 |
| 10 | Viet Nam | 23.8 | 1.9 | 17 |
| 10 | Mauritius | 14.3 | 3.2 | 17 |
| 10 | Ecuador | 22.5 | 2.3 | 17 |
| 11 | Solomon Islands | 30.1 | 0.4 | 18 |
| 11 | Philippines | 29.9 | 0.9 | 18 |
| 12 | Egypt | 21.8 | 2.8 | 19 |

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

| Ranking | Country | Infant mortality (deaths under five years old per thousand born alive – 2013) | CO ₂ emissions per capita (tons of carbon per capita) | Social efficiency of carbon (distance to 0 in the graph) |
|---------|---|---|--|--|
| 12 | Latvia | 8.4 | 3.8 | 19 |
| 12 | Guatemala | 31.0 | 0.8 | 19 |
| 12 | Jordan | 18.7 | 3.3 | 19 |
| 13 | Dominican Republic | 28.1 | 2.2 | 20 |
| 13 | Romania | 12.0 | 3.9 | 20 |
| 13 | Montenegro | 5.3 | 4.1 | 20 |
| 13 | Morocco | 30.4 | 1.8 | 20 |
| 14 | Mexico | 14.5 | 3.9 | 21 |
| 14 | Singapore | 2.8 | 4.3 | 21 |
| 14 | Indonesia | 29.3 | 2.3 | 21 |
| 15 | Algeria | 25.2 | 3.2 | 22 |
| 15 | The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | 6.6 | 4.4 | 22 |
| 15 | Korea, Democratic People's Republic of | 27.4 | 3.0 | 22 |
| 15 | Lithuania | 4.9 | 4.5 | 22 |
| 15 | Suriname | 22.8 | 3.6 | 22 |
| 15 | Bhutan | 36.2 | 0.8 | 22 |
| 15 | Switzerland | 4.2 | 4.6 | 22 |
| 15 | Chile | 8.2 | 4.6 | 22 |
| 15 | Lebanon | 9.1 | 4.6 | 22 |
| 15 | Portugal | 3.8 | 4.7 | 22 |
| 16 | Micronesia, Federated States of | 36.4 | 1.2 | 23 |
| 16 | Cambodia | 37.9 | 0.3 | 23 |
| 16 | Croatia | 4.5 | 4.8 | 23 |
| 16 | Thailand | 13.1 | 4.6 | 23 |
| 16 | Hungary | 6.1 | 4.9 | 23 |
| 17 | Argentina | 13.3 | 4.7 | 24 |
| 17 | Nepal | 39.7 | 0.2 | 24 |
| 17 | Turkey | 19.2 | 4.4 | 24 |
| 17 | Guyana | 36.6 | 2.3 | 24 |
| 18 | Bolivia | 39.1 | 1.6 | 25 |
| 18 | Bangladesh | 41.1 | 0.4 | 25 |
| 18 | Serbia | 6.6 | 5.1 | 25 |
| 19 | France | 4.2 | 5.3 | 26 |
| 19 | Bahamas | 12.9 | 5.2 | 26 |
| 19 | Sweden | 3.0 | 5.5 | 26 |
| 20 | Azerbaijan | 34.2 | 3.6 | 27 |

| Ranking | Country | Infant mortality (deaths under five years old per thousand born alive – 2013) | CO ₂ emissions per capita (tons of carbon per capita) | Social efficiency of carbon (distance to 0 in the graph) |
|---------|-----------------------------|---|--|--|
| 21 | Barbados | 14.4 | 5.6 | 28 |
| 21 | Spain | 4.2 | 5.8 | 28 |
| 21 | Iceland | 2.1 | 5.8 | 28 |
| 21 | Antigua and Barbuda | 9.3 | 5.8 | 28 |
| 21 | Malta | 6.1 | 5.9 | 28 |
| 22 | Iraq | 34.0 | 4.2 | 29 |
| 22 | Tajikistan | 47.7 | 0.4 | 29 |
| 22 | Congo | 49.1 | 0.5 | 29 |
| 23 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 6.6 | 6.2 | 30 |
| 23 | Eritrea | 49.9 | 0.1 | 30 |
| 23 | Botswana | 46.6 | 2.4 | 30 |
| 23 | Myanmar | 50.5 | 0.2 | 30 |
| 23 | Namibia | 49.8 | 1.3 | 30 |
| 23 | Ukraine | 10.0 | 6.2 | 30 |
| 23 | Slovakia | 7.2 | 6.3 | 30 |
| 24 | Sao Tome and Principe | 51.0 | 0.6 | 31 |
| 24 | United Republic of Tanzania | 51.8 | 0.2 | 31 |
| 24 | Yemen | 51.3 | 1.0 | 31 |
| 24 | Rwanda | 52.0 | 0.1 | 31 |
| 24 | Italy | 3.6 | 6.6 | 31 |
| 25 | Libya | 14.5 | 6.4 | 32 |
| 25 | Venezuela | 14.9 | 6.4 | 32 |
| 25 | Uzbekistan | 42.5 | 4.1 | 32 |
| 25 | Belarus | 4.9 | 6.7 | 32 |
| 25 | Seychelles | 14.2 | 6.5 | 32 |
| 25 | Cyprus | 3.6 | 6.7 | 32 |
| 25 | China | 12.7 | 6.6 | 32 |
| 26 | India | 52.7 | 1.7 | 33 |
| 26 | Timor-Leste | 54.6 | 0.2 | 33 |
| 26 | Bulgaria | 11.6 | 6.7 | 33 |
| 26 | Senegal | 55.3 | 0.6 | 33 |
| 26 | Madagascar | 56.0 | 0.1 | 33 |
| 27 | New Zealand | 6.3 | 7.1 | 34 |
| 27 | Gabon | 56.1 | 1.4 | 34 |
| 27 | United Kingdom | 4.6 | 7.2 | 34 |
| 28 | Denmark | 3.5 | 7.2 | 35 |

3.2 Towards a 2030 Agenda Dashboard

| Ranking | Country | Infant mortality (deaths under five years old per thousand born alive – 2013) | CO ₂ emissions per capita (tons of carbon per capita) | Social efficiency of carbon (distance to 0 in the graph) |
|---------|----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| 28 | Kiribati | 58.2 | 0.6 | 35 |
| 29 | Slovenia | 2.9 | 7.5 | 36 |
| 29 | Greece | 4.4 | 7.6 | 36 |
| 30 | Papua New Guinea | 61.4 | 0.7 | 37 |
| 30 | Austria | 3.9 | 7.7 | 37 |
| 31 | Malaysia | 8.5 | 7.8 | 38 |
| 31 | Ireland | 3.8 | 8.0 | 38 |
| 31 | Mongolia | 31.8 | 6.9 | 38 |
| 31 | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 16.8 | 7.8 | 38 |
| 31 | Ethiopia | 64.4 | 0.1 | 38 |
| 32 | Uganda | 66.1 | 0.1 | 39 |
| 33 | Poland | 5.2 | 8.3 | 40 |
| 34 | Malawi | 67.9 | 0.1 | 41 |
| 35 | Djibouti | 69.6 | 0.6 | 42 |
| 35 | Germany | 3.9 | 8.8 | 42 |
| 35 | Kenya | 70.7 | 0.3 | 42 |
| 35 | Belgium | 4.4 | 8.9 | 42 |
| 35 | Liberia | 71.1 | 0.2 | 42 |
| 36 | Lao People's Democratic Republic | 71.4 | 0.2 | 43 |
| 37 | Haiti | 72.8 | 0.2 | 44 |
| 37 | Norway | 2.8 | 9.2 | 44 |
| 37 | Israel | 4.0 | 9.2 | 44 |
| 37 | Gambia | 73.8 | 0.2 | 44 |
| 37 | Japan | 2.9 | 9.3 | 44 |
| 38 | Comoros | 77.9 | 0.2 | 47 |
| 38 | Ghana | 78.4 | 0.4 | 47 |
| 39 | Swaziland | 80.0 | 0.9 | 48 |
| 39 | Netherlands | 4.0 | 10.1 | 48 |
| 39 | Finland | 2.6 | 10.2 | 48 |
| 40 | Czech Republic | 3.6 | 10.3 | 49 |
| 41 | Burundi | 82.9 | 0.0 | 50 |
| 42 | Togo | 84.7 | 0.3 | 51 |
| 42 | Benin | 85.3 | 0.5 | 51 |
| 42 | South Africa | 43.9 | 9.2 | 51 |
| 42 | Pakistan | 85.5 | 0.9 | 51 |
| 43 | Mozambique | 87.2 | 0.1 | 52 |

| Ranking | Country | Infant mortality (deaths under five years old per thousand born alive – 2013) | CO ₂ emissions per capita (tons of carbon per capita) | Social efficiency of carbon (distance to 0 in the graph) |
|---------|--------------------------|---|--|--|
| 43 | Zambia | 87.4 | 0.2 | 52 |
| 44 | Zimbabwe | 88.5 | 0.7 | 53 |
| 45 | Mauritania | 90.1 | 0.6 | 54 |
| 46 | Cameroon | 94.5 | 0.3 | 56 |
| 47 | Korea, Republic of | 3.7 | 12.1 | 58 |
| 47 | Afghanistan | 97.3 | 0.4 | 58 |
| 47 | Burkina Faso | 97.6 | 0.1 | 58 |
| 48 | Lesotho | 98.0 | 1.1 | 59 |
| 49 | Cote d'Ivoire | 100.0 | 0.3 | 60 |
| 49 | Guinea | 100.7 | 0.2 | 60 |
| 49 | Russian Federation | 10.1 | 12.6 | 60 |
| 50 | Niger | 104.2 | 0.1 | 62 |
| 51 | Turkmenistan | 55.2 | 12.2 | 67 |
| 51 | Canada | 5.2 | 14.1 | 67 |
| 52 | Estonia | 3.4 | 14.4 | 69 |
| 53 | Nigeria | 117.4 | 0.5 | 70 |
| 54 | Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 118.5 | 0.1 | 71 |
| 55 | Equatorial Guinea | 95.8 | 9.3 | 73 |
| 55 | Mali | 122.7 | 0.1 | 73 |
| 56 | Guinea-Bissau | 123.9 | 0.2 | 74 |
| 57 | Australia | 4.0 | 16.2 | 77 |
| 58 | Kazakhstan | 16.3 | 16.3 | 78 |
| 59 | United States | 6.9 | 16.8 | 80 |
| 60 | Central African Republic | 139.2 | 0.1 | 83 |
| 61 | Bahrain | 6.1 | 18.1 | 87 |
| 61 | Somalia | 145.6 | 0.1 | 87 |
| 62 | Chad | 147.5 | 0.0 | 88 |
| 63 | Saudi Arabia | 15.5 | 18.7 | 90 |
| 64 | United Arab Emirates | 8.2 | 20.0 | 95 |
| 65 | Sierra Leone | 160.6 | 0.2 | 96 |
| 66 | Luxembourg | 2.0 | 21.0 | 100 |
| 66 | Angola | 167.4 | 1.5 | 100 |

Source: For infant mortality, cf. United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Database at <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>. For CO₂ emissions, cf. World Bank, World Development Indicators at <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>. Social efficiency of carbon: computed by the author from the previous two columns.

Abbreviations

| | | | |
|----------------|---|----------------|--|
| AAAA | Addis Ababa Action Agenda | COP | Conference of the Parties |
| AGOA | African Growth and Opportunity Act | CPD | Cooperation for Peace and Development |
| ALBA | Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América | CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| ANND | Arab NGO Network for Development | CSTD | Commission on Science and Technology for Development |
| AREI | Africa Renewable Energy Initiative | CTCN-AB | Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network |
| ATT | Arms Trade Treaty | DAWN | Development Alternatives with Women for a new Era |
| ATTAC | Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens | DFID | UK Department for International Development |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index | ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council |
| BECCS | Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage | EFA | Education for All |
| BES | Benessere Equo e Sostenibile (Equitable and sustainable wellbeing) | EPI | Environmental Performance Index |
| BIA | Bridge International Academies | EPZs | Export Processing Zones |
| BICC | Bonn International Center for Conversion | EU | European Union |
| BITS | Bilateral Investment Treaties | FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| BMGF | Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation | FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa | FENSA | Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors |
| CARDET | Centre for the Advancement of Research and Development in Educational Technology | FfD | Financing for Development |
| CBD | Convention on Biological Diversity | FOCO | Foro Ciudadano de Participación por la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos |
| CBDR | Common but differentiated responsibilities | FSI | Financial Secrecy Index |
| CBDR-RC | Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities | FTAs | Free trade agreements |
| CDC | Commonwealth Development Corporation | G20 | Group of Twenty |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women | GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| CELAC | Community of Latin American and Caribbean States | GCE | Global Campaign for Education |
| CELS | Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales | GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| CERP | Climate Equity Reference Project | GEI | Gender Equity Index |
| CETA | Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement | GHG | Greenhouse Gas |
| CHP | Combined heat and power | GMI | Global Militarisation Index |
| | | GNI | Gross National Income |

| | | | |
|------------------|--|--------------|--|
| GPI | Global Peace Index | ISDS | Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement |
| GREENT | Global Renewable Energy and Energy Access Transformation | IWRM | Integrated Water Resource Management |
| GVCs | Global Value Chains | KEPA | Service Centre for Development Cooperation |
| GWP | Global Warming Potential | LDCs | Least Developed Countries |
| HDI | Human Development Index | LGBT | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender |
| HLG | High Level Group | MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| HLPF | High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development | MNCs | Multinational Corporations |
| IAASTD | International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development | MOI | Means of Implementation |
| IAEG-SDGs | Interagency and Expert Group on SDGs | MPI | Multidimensional Poverty Index |
| ICC | International Chamber of Commerce | MVA | Manufacturing Value Added |
| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | NFSSD | National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development |
| ICS | Investment Court System | NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| ICSD | Interdepartmental Commission on Sustainable Development | NTBs | Non-Tariff Barriers |
| IFF | Illicit Finance Flow | ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| IFIs | International Financial Institutions | OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organization | OPHI | Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative |
| IMCSD | Inter-Ministerial Conference for Sustainable Development | OSH | Occupational Safety and Health |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund | PBC | Peacebuilding Commission |
| INDCs | Intended nationally determined contributions | PPPs | Public-Private Partnerships |
| IP | Intellectual Property | PV | Photovoltaics |
| IPBES | Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystems Services | RCEP | Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership |
| IPCC | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change | RCI | Responsibility and Capacity Index |
| IPES-Food | International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems | SAB | Scientific Advisory Board |
| IPR | Intellectual Property Rights | SDC | Sustainable Development Committee |
| | | SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| | | SDSN | Sustainable Development Solution Network |
| | | SDT | Special and Differential Treatment |

| | | | |
|----------------|---|------------------|---|
| SEATINI | Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute | UNEP | United Nations Environmental Programme |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency | UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| SIDS | Small Island Developing States | UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| SME | Small and Medium Enterprises | UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| Sodnet | Social Development Network | UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund |
| SPFI | Social Protection Floor Index | UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| STI | Science, Technology and Innovation | UNPoA | United Nations Programme of Action |
| TEEB | The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity | UNSD | United Nations Statistics Division |
| TFM | Technology Facilitation Mechanism | UNU-MERIT | Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology of the United Nations University |
| TISA | Trade in Services Agreement | UNWTO | United Nations World Tourism Organization |
| TJN | Tax Justice Network | UPR | Universal Periodic Review |
| TNC | Transnational Corporation | US | United States |
| TPP | Trans-Pacific Partnership | USA | United States of America |
| TPPA | Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement | USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| TRIM | Trade-Related Investment Measures | USD | United States Dollar |
| TRIPS | Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights | VAT | Value added tax |
| TTIP | Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership | WHA | World Health Assembly |
| UHC | Universal Health Coverage | WHO | World Health Organization |
| UK | United Kingdom | WIPO | World Intellectual Property Organization |
| UN | United Nations | WRG | Water Resources Group |
| UNCED | United Nations Conference on Environment and Development | WTO | World Trade Organization |
| UNCRC | United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child | 10YFP | 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production patterns |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference for Trade and Development | | |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme | | |

Spotlight on Sustainable Development 2016
Report of the Reflection Group on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Published by

Social Watch

Avda. 18 de Julio 2095/301
Montevideo 11200, Uruguay
socwatch@socialwatch.org
www.socialwatch.org

Global Policy Forum

866 UN Plaza | Suite 4050
New York, NY 10017, USA
Königstr. 37a
53115 Bonn, Germany
europe@globalpolicy.org
www.globalpolicy.org

Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era

Level 2 JP Bayly Trust Building
193 Rodwell Road
Suva, Fiji
info@dawnnet.org
www.dawnnet.org

Third World Network

131 Jalan Macalister
10400 Penang, Malaysia
tw@twnetwork.org
www.twn.my

Arab NGO

Network for Development
P.O.Box: 5792/14
Mazraa 1105 – 2070
Beirut, Lebanon
info@annd.org
www.annd.org

**The Reflection Group on the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development is supported by**



Editors: Barbara Adams, Roberto Bissio, Chee Yoke Ling, Karen Judd, Jens Martens, Wolfgang Obenland
Editorial assistance: Karolin Seitz and Hannah Schimpl

Coordination: Global Policy Forum

Design: kipconcept, Bonn

Printing: Medienhaus Plump, Rheinbreitbach. Printed on 100% recycled paper.

The views and opinions expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the publishers, the editors, other authors, or funders.

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

ISBN 978-3-943126-27-3

Beirut / Bonn / Montevideo / New York / Penang / Suva, July 2016

with contributions from

