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The Role of Social Protection Programmes in Supporting Education in Conflict-Affected Situations

Rebecca Holmes

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The Role of Social Protection Programmes in Supporting Education in Conflict-Affected Situations

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Rebecca Holmes

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Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD
UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0300 Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399
www.odi.org.uk

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Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre le Faim
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EFA	Education For All
FARCD	Congolese Armed Forces
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GAPVU	Cash Payments to War- Displaced Urban Destitute Households Programme (Mozambique)
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JFPR	Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction
LRA	Lords Resistance Army (Uganda)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSP	National Solidarity Programme (Afghanistan)
PAP	Priority Action Programme (Cambodia)
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia)
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

This background paper examines the role of social protection programmes in supporting education in conflict-affected contexts. Drawing on existing literature, the paper looks at the impact, design and implementation issues of social protection programme experience in conflict, protracted crisis and post-conflict contexts, including in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Somalia, Nepal, Northern Uganda and Pakistan.

The paper finds that the costs of education are significant in conflict-affected countries – not only are the direct costs of schooling high, but also parents often have to contribute a significant amount to the school to keep it functioning. In a context of high rates of poverty and disrupted livelihoods and potentially high opportunity costs of sending children to school, the direct and indirect costs of sending children to school are often the most substantial barrier to children's schooling.

Experience suggests that education subsidies and fee waivers offer important potential to offset costs and increase enrolment and attendance, but they have not been widely implemented. Education has remained mainly a secondary objective in social protection programming, for example in cash grant transfers, public works programmes and school feeding programmes. Long-term funding, institutional coordination and support for capacity building are needed to deliver sustainable social protection at scale which supports households to meet both the direct and indirect costs of education in conflict-affected contexts.

1. Introduction

'In fragile and conflict countries, the indirect and direct cost of education to poor families is often the single most important factor excluding them from school' (Fredriksen, 2009).

1.1 Education in conflict-affected states

Countries affected by conflict are unlikely to meet the majority of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, including education-related goals. Reports suggest that only 11% of fragile and conflict-affected countries have achieved universal primary completion or are on track to doing so, and 50% are considered seriously off track (World Bank, 2007b).

The delivery of basic services is severely disrupted in conflict-affected contexts, and key challenges in the education sector include: enabling education and schooling to continue *during conflict*; supporting continued schooling in *protracted crises*; and rebuilding of schools and reintegrating children into the school system in the *post-conflict rehabilitation process*.

However, it is not only the delivery of basic services – the supply side – that suffers in these contexts: importantly, the demand side of education is also a significant impediment to children's schooling. Recent reports on education in fragile and conflict-affected countries find that, for children from poor households, the indirect and direct costs of education to families often represent the single most important factor excluding them from school (Fredriksen, 2009). By extension, where costs of education are reduced or eliminated, enrolment increases significantly (*ibid*). The direct and indirect costs of education are often higher in conflict-affected contexts. At the same time, conflict creates and exacerbates poverty and disrupts livelihoods, and sending children to school incurs a loss of household income/labour. Meanwhile, as a result of poor service delivery, poor households have to disproportionately finance schools out of their own pocket. In Chad, a recent study showed that 68% of teachers, primarily in rural areas, were paid by the community; similarly, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), parents finance 80% to 90% of all public education expenditures (*ibid*). These factors make it even more difficult for households with competing expenditure priorities to fund children's education.

1.2 Social protection conceptual framework

In recent years, there has been growing national and international attention to the role of social protection in low- and middle-income countries to address demand-side deficits in order to support households to meet expenditure needs such as in education and health. Social protection, by definition, encompasses a subset of interventions that seek to address risk, vulnerability and chronic poverty, which can be carried out formally by the state or the private sector or informally through community or household support networks.

Targeted social protection interventions can include instruments such as cash transfers, vouchers, health and education fee waivers, subsidies, insurance and inputs, and should be distinguished from universal basic service delivery (such as free universal education). The objectives of the full range of social protection interventions can be described using Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler's 2004 transformative social protection framework. This entails four key objectives: *protection* – providing relief from deprivation (e.g. disability benefits or non-contributory pensions); *prevention* – averting deprivation (e.g. through savings clubs, insurance or risk diversification); *promotion* – enhancing real incomes and capabilities (e.g. through inputs transfers); and *transformation* – which seeks to address concerns of social equity and exclusion (e.g. through anti-discrimination laws and sensitisation campaigns).

To date, social protection has dealt largely with economic risks – namely, shocks and chronic poverty of an economic nature. Non-income risks, such as insecurity, conflict and social discrimination, have for the most part been absent from the broader social protection debate (Holmes and Jones, 2009). Indeed, the concept of social protection needs some adaptation when being applied to conflict situations, so that it can incorporate an understanding that extends well beyond the economic risks created by conflict and insecurity, including vulnerability to threats of violence and damage to the social fabric of society, which extend into the post-conflict period (Harvey and Holmes, 2007).¹ Furthermore, the challenges of implementing social protection in conflict-affected contexts are likely to be more severe than in stable low-income countries. Table 1 presents a range of social protection interventions and illustrates some of the issues associated with delivering such interventions in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Table 1: Social protection in fragile states

Categories of social protection	Types of projects	Issues in fragile states	Examples in fragile states
Protective	Safety nets and social assistances Disability benefits Single-parent grants Social pensions Fee waivers on health and education Child/orphan grants	Long-term safety nets rarely in place Pre-crisis forms of social assistance may sometimes remain in place (e.g. cash transfers to households in Iraq in 2003)	Food aid usually delivered by humanitarian actors, often for many years, but on the basis of year-by-year appeals and so not amenable to long term planning Cash transfers just beginning to be seen as an alternative to food aid Re-emerging interest in longer-term safety nets (e.g. Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme – PSNP) but limited practical experience to date
Preventative	Social insurance – contributory pensions, health insurance, unemployment benefits	Again, vestiges of old systems may be in place but rarely survive fragility	Interest in insurance both at a micro level as a complement to microfinance and at a national level through weather indexes and catastrophe bonds
Promotive	Livelihood-enhancing programmes – microcredit, public works	Many emergency examples – see next column – but often small scale and of questionable impact and effectiveness	Seeds, tools and other input programmes Cash and food for work Income generation programmes
Transformative	Advocacy, sensitisation, rights campaigns	May be particularly important in fragile states where rights are more likely to be abused	Advocacy around protection Rights-based approaches to programming Human rights advocacy

Source: Harvey et al. (2007).

1.3 Objective and structure of paper

The objective of this background paper is to examine the role of social protection in supporting education in conflict and post-conflict states. The paper discusses both short-term humanitarian assistance (in relation to social protection instruments) and longer-term social protection interventions, and examines the role of these in supporting children's schooling. The paper is guided by the following overarching questions:

¹ For more detailed discussion on definitions, concepts and practices of social protection in fragile states, see Harvey et al. (2007).

- Is there evidence on the impact of different types of social protection programmes on education in conflict-affected countries?
 - Where programmes have been in place in conflict situations, what happens to these as the country emerges from conflict?
- What are the design and implementation challenges of undertaking social protection programmes in conflict and post-conflict settings?
- Do social protection programmes in conflict-affected countries need to be designed and implemented differently to those in stable countries?

The next section of the paper discusses the available evidence on the impacts of direct and indirect social protection programmes on education and schooling, distinguishing, where possible, between the different phases of conflict (during conflict, protracted crisis and post-conflict). Section 3 examines the particular challenges of designing and implementing social protection in conflict-affected contexts, drawing out issues related to design, targeting and delivering social protection interventions in conflict and, where countries are emerging from conflict, to support educational outcomes. Section 4 concludes and provides policy recommendations.

2. Impact of social protection programmes in supporting education in conflict and post-conflict contexts

Long-term government-led safety nets are rarely in place in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Weak institutions, low institutional and absorptive capacity and damaged infrastructure characterise conflict-affected countries, making the financing and delivery of basic services – and social protection – a huge challenge. In contexts where safety nets have historically been in place, for example in Nepal and Tajikistan, the impact of conflict limits or even destroys the delivery of such interventions.²

In recent years, however, national and international interest in social protection mechanisms for reducing poverty and vulnerability, including in conflict-affected states, has increased. Moreover, with the move away from a reliance on food aid in the humanitarian sector, innovative social protection instruments have been developed in a number of conflict-affected countries by international actors over the past few years. In a few countries, such as Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone, attention has turned to the feasibility of institutionalising longer-term safety nets to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction process.

Social protection can support education either directly or indirectly. In conflict-affected countries – as in stable countries – the costs of schooling represent a major barrier to accessing education (Dryden-Peterson, 2010), and social protection interventions can have an important direct or indirect role to play in supporting children's enrolment and attendance at school (see Box 1). A recent review of multilateral and bilateral donors' engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states showed that the primary donor-supported social protection/education activities include school feeding programmes and girls' scholarships (Brannelly et al., 2008).

The role of social protection in supporting education in conflict-affected contexts is likely to vary according to not only the country and local context but also, more broadly, the different phases of conflict. Although there are very few rigorous evaluations of social protection interventions in these contexts, it is possible to draw out some of the small-scale impacts from a range of programmes from the literature below (see also Annex 1).

Box 1: Social protection and its role in supporting education

Fee waivers and school stipends/scholarships support education directly by removing the cost of school fees for households. They are often targeted at poor households and sometimes directly at girls. Fee waivers and stipends are more common at primary school level.

Unconditional cash transfers are an indirect way of supporting children's schooling, as parents and caregivers have a choice over what to spend the income on. Studies in low-income stable countries have clearly demonstrated that school fees and other indirect costs such as books and uniforms are a key expenditure priority when households receive income support. Conditional cash transfers have also improved education outcomes when linked to children's school attendance. Evidence from Latin America also shows that income incentives to send girls to school have increased their enrolment and school attainment.

School feeding programmes are a popular intervention in conflict-affected countries and have two main objectives: to improve child nutrition and to support school attendance. However, the evidence on their impacts is mixed (see text below).

² In Nepal, the Old Age Allowance Programme was started in 1994 by the government and, although implementation continued during the conflict, it faced declines in coverage and particular geographical disruptions related to the conflict. It is expected to take a few years for coverage to increase again to pre-conflict levels. In Tajikistan, the conflict in 1997-2001 fuelled the collapse of the highly developed social protection system. Despite a process of restoration of the system since peace was restored, Tajikistan remains the poorest country among the former Soviet Union states, and growth has not been reflected in public financing for basic social services (ADB, 2008).

Public works programmes also have dual objectives: to build community infrastructure and to provide wages for the unemployed in cash or in kind. Wages paid in cash often pay for school fees and other school-related costs. The creation of infrastructure often includes school buildings, therefore both the demand and the supply challenges in education are addressed. However, a key concern remains about the quality of education as well as adequate staffing and school resources.

During conflict and in bouts of conflict in protracted crises, funding and administrative support to school systems is at risk. There are often dramatic falls in student numbers owing to ongoing fear of attacks, displacement of teachers, student recruitment into armed conflict, destruction and looting of infrastructure and materials and collapse of local and sometimes national educational administration (UNESCO, 2001). High poverty rates, vulnerability and disruption to livelihoods mean that poor households face large and competing expenditure priorities. It is less difficult to maintain educational services during low-intensity but *protracted crises*, and schooling is likely to continue during periodic lulls in countries where fighting is intermittent or seasonal (ibid). However, even where services are maintained, education is of lower quality, funds are limited and the supply of materials is slow or erratic.

Direct and indirect costs of schooling are key barriers to enrolment and attendance. Indeed, where families and communities are chronically displaced as a result of localised, continued armed conflict, even if schools exist children may not be able to enrol, because they lack proper documentation or are unable to pay school fees (UNESCO, 2001). Moreover, regional disparities within a country are often concealed by average education enrolment and attendance rates. For example, in Uganda, despite an overall reduction in poverty over the past 10 years, the conflict-affected Northern region has lagged behind, particularly on education attainment. The cycle of conflict and massive displacement have impeded economic activity and undermined service delivery, and the Karamojong cattle raids, which began in the late 1960s, continue to cause insecurity (Bird and Higgins, 2009). The disruption in livelihoods is a major constraint to sending children to school, especially secondary school (ibid).

Humanitarian responses have rarely prioritised education in conflict contexts, although this has been changing in recent years (Pavanello and Othieno, 2008). School feeding programmes are one of the most common social protection initiatives in such contexts, mainly supported by donors and often implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and reaching a much larger population than other social protection interventions. Although school feeding programmes support education indirectly their main aim is to support food security and nutrition and they are targeted based on food security vulnerability mappings rather than education enrolment and attendance rates.

Despite their relatively larger coverage, school feeding programmes often reach only a small proportion of the total number of school-going children. Meir (2005) found that, within a year of the collapse of the Taliban, the World Food Programme (WFP) was able to feed 350,000 school children in Afghanistan, yet in 2001/02, the total school-aged population was 3.4 million (UNESCO, 2005). Three months after conflict ceased in Liberia, school feeding programmes reached 132,000 children and, towards the end of the 2003/04 school year, the country's Back-to-Peace, Back-to-School operation was feeding 280,000 students. In 1999/00 there was a total of 471,000 primary school-aged children, of whom 30% remained out of school in the same year (ibid) And at the end of 2003, 700,000 Iraqi school children received school meals – the total primary school-aged population in 1999/00 was 3.6 million, of whom 10% were out of school (ibid).

Evidence on the effects of school feeding programmes is mixed. On the one hand, they have proven to be effective at increasing enrolment and attendance of children in conflict-affected

countries (Dryden-Peterson, 2010).³ In Haiti, for example, a multi-donor-funded school feeding programme reached approximately 45,000 children in September 2008 and is reported to have 'increased school attendance and the students' ability to concentrate in class' (World Bank, 2010). Similarly, in five war- and drought-affected zones in Eritrea, school feeding programmes based on the provision of high-energy protein biscuits helped increase enrolment by almost 12% (United States Department of Agriculture, 2003, cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010). Moreover, such programmes can also have a positive impact on girls' schooling. In Pakistan, feeding programmes run by the WFP have seen an increase in girls' enrolment by 43.7% over three years (ibid).

On the other hand, evidence from Southern Sudan suggests that such programmes can overload participating schools and deplete schools that do not receive food, as well as decreasing teacher time, as teachers are taken out of class to prepare and serve meals (Sommer, 2005 cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010). Evidence from internally displaced person (IDP) camps in Northern Uganda does not show any significant effect of school feeding programmes, or take-home rations, on school enrolment. It was found that, among six to nine year olds not enrolled at the baseline, enrolment increased 12.4 percentage points, but with only weak significance (Gilligan, 2009).

Cash transfers in the form of cash grants and/or cash for work are increasingly being used in response to poverty in conflict and protracted crises. Over the past few years, humanitarian aid has seen a shift from a reliance on in-kind relief such as food aid, seeds and shelter to increasingly include cash and voucher transfers. One important cause of this shift has been the decline of food aid tied to domestic surpluses in donor countries (although this is still a factor, particularly with US food aid). There is also emerging evidence that counteracts concerns about the feasibility of cash – that it would be harder to target, more prone to corruption, inflationary in weak markets, disadvantageous to women and impossible to deliver safely in conflict environments (Harvey and Holmes, 2007). In fact, recent experience suggests that cash transfers have the potential to be cost effective, to be no more prone to corruption and to create multiplier effects in local economies (Harvey, 2005). Moreover, recipients have been found to spend income transfers on immediate basic needs as well as on investments in education (paying school fees or indirect costs of education).

Even contexts such as Afghanistan, DRC, Northern Uganda and Somalia demonstrate that delivering cash transfers where markets are functioning adequately can be successful. Cash transfers offer recipients a choice of expenditure and, when given this choice, many households appear to prioritise expenditure on school fees along with basic food and household items. Public works programmes also offer the opportunity to improve access to schools through roads and to (re)build school infrastructure. In Northern Uganda, in 2001, Oxfam implemented a cash-for-work programme in Kitgum for 8,000 households. Cash was found to meet a diverse range of needs, including school fees as well as food, livestock and basic household utensils. It was found to be preferred to food aid, partly because previous food aid distributions had lacked transparency and been subject to substantial leakages (Khogali and Takhar 2001b, in Harvey, 2005). The roads built through the public works component also improved access to schools. However, the programme suffered from a number of weaknesses: providing on average only 11 days of work per household was not sufficient to enable the full recovery of livelihoods in the context of recurring raids and displacement by the Karamojong and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) (McClean et al., 2001).

In 2003-2004 in Somalia, Horn Relief and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) (funded by Oxfam Novib (Netherlands)) implemented a one-off cash grant (\$50) and cash for work for 13,830 drought-affected households in northern and southern areas, using remittance/money transfer companies to minimise security risks during conflict. The programme distributed a total of \$691,500, making it the largest cash response ever mounted in Somalia at that time (Ali et al., 2005). The difficult context in the project implementation area made critics concerned about the feasibility of cash as

³ Evaluations across countries demonstrate that, on average, in WFP-assisted schools, absolute enrolment increases by 28% for girls and by 22% for boys in the first year of assistance (WFP, 2008).

an appropriate response: Sool and Sanaag are at the centre of a territorial dispute between the self-declared states of Puntland and Somaliland, which poses significant challenges for the delivery of international assistance. However, after seven consecutive rain failures, over 12,000 households faced acute food and water insecurity and many faced destitution. A cash response was recommended as the most flexible, immediate and viable programming option, to allow communities to prioritise how they met the vast array of needs identified by the assessment:

‘Cash was deemed appropriate because food was available on local markets (but people did not have the money to buy it); local credit systems were overstretched (which meant that the very destitute had no means to access cash themselves); and well-functioning money-transfer companies were present (making cash a viable option in practical terms). The programme began with a training workshop between 21 and 24 December 2003; households were registered on 28 December, and the majority of the distribution was complete by the end of January 2004: in all, 13,830 households were registered and reached in just four weeks’ (Ali et al. 2005).

Beneficiaries were found to spend the money on basic consumption needs (food and water), on debt repayments and, if transfers were generous enough or timed after harvests, on livestock (Ali et al., 2005).

In Afghanistan, cash for work is more common than cash grants or vouchers, mainly because of the following factors: unemployment is a major problem, particularly after the return of over 3 million refugees after 2001; the widespread use of food-for-work programmes can be combined or replaced by cash for work; and aid agencies have particular expertise in this area. Projects include road reconstruction, rebuilding schools, building irrigation systems and quilt making (Bryer, 2004, cited in Hofmann, 2005).

In 2002, Save the Children implemented a cash-for-work programme rather than a food-for-work programme in Eastern DRC after the volcanic eruption. The results of a Household Economy Analysis showed that livelihood insecurity was a far bigger threat than food insecurity, and Goma was identified as needing an emergency injection of cash into its economy (Guluma, 2004). Moreover, using cash overcame some of the constraints being faced in food-for-work projects implemented by other agencies, for example: lack of demand from the local community to engage in work being paid with food owing to culturally inappropriate imported maize meal; poor quality of beans compared with locally grown produce; and poor timing of food-for-work projects, beginning during the harvest season (a time of abundance), when most poorer households preferred to work for better-off households in their fields, to be paid in cash and (more appropriate and better quality) food (ibid). The programme was small scale and short term but supported education both indirectly and directly: over three months, the rehabilitation/reconstruction of schools covered the needs of 315 households for three months in Bwito, Rutshuru, and 140 households in Masisi Plateaux. Evaluations found that a number of households invested in school fees for their children, as well as purchasing small livestock and paying for health costs (Guluma, 2004).

Recent evidence from the DRC also demonstrates that, similar to cash transfers, voucher fairs have been a successful and innovative way of supporting education (see Box 2).

Box 2: Vouchers support education in DRC

In late 2008, Concern Worldwide implemented an Emergency Assistance programme to newly displaced and host families in Masisi Territory in North Kivu province, DRC, in response to escalated fighting among rebels and the Congolese Armed Forces (FARCD).

The programme ran for nine months and aimed to contribute to the livelihood security of displaced and host families by increasing household access to food, non-food items (NFI) and water. Concern decided to use voucher fairs as opposed to NFI kits as a way to support households meet a broader set of their identified needs. Beneficiaries were given \$35 worth of vouchers (in Francs Congolais) and also received two blankets and soap from Concern; traders were preselected from intervention areas (as opposed to Goma) in order to contribute to the local economy; articles were preselected based on focus group discussions (FGDs) with

women, which also highlighted that IDPs faced difficulties in sending their children to school, which led to the introduction of primary school fees in the voucher options; prices of articles were fixed based on market research and negotiations with traders; and primary school fees could be paid to headmasters. For amounts over \$200, payments to traders were made in Goma to avoid taking large amounts of cash to the project sites.

The innovative inclusion of school fee vouchers was found to be 'an extremely popular and successful aspect of the fairs.' School fees were the most cited reason for preferring the fair format over NFI kits. The fairs resulted in 20% of beneficiaries choosing to pay for school fees: 1,745 households paid for a total of 2,235 students (some households paid for more than one student).

A number of design and implementation features contributed to the success of the vouchers for school fees:

- The fair activities came at an appropriate time for paying school fees, in a season when parents had less income for school fees.
- There was a specific emphasis on protection, and it was determined that fairs would not increase risks of theft or violence (distribution of cash was rejected because of the potential risks to staff and beneficiaries).
- Substantial effort was put into sensitisation to promote understanding of the fair methodology through trained groups of women, who then conducted sensitisation activities prior to the fair, going house to house to explain how the fairs would work.
- Headmasters redeemed the cash value of the coupons for school fees from Concern.

Two main challenges were identified with the programme. The first was that, despite sensitisation activities, many people were still not aware of which items were going to be included in the fairs, which limited their ability to plan in advance what they would purchase. The second was that the total value of the voucher was \$35, which was sufficient to provide households with access to key items (school fees were \$5 per trimester) but was spread thinly across multiple priorities: many recipients also bought seeds and tools.

Overall, paying school fees was very successful and allowed children to continue their studies without interruption, with parents planning on paying the following semester with money made in the harvest season. Although this did not solve the problem of paying school fees in the long term, as displacement and return disrupted livelihoods, the temporary support with regard to school fees was extremely important and timely.

Source: Bailey (2009).

In the *post-conflict context*, the time lag that can occur between the apparent resolution of a crisis situation and the restoration of effective access to education programmes is a key challenge. In some cases, continuing insecurity makes the reconstruction process problematic, and often there is a need to rebuild and re-equip national and local educational administration systems (UNESCO, 2001). A notable dilemma is that, in post-conflict situations, some national governments are unable to fund even the operational costs of schooling, and high rates of poverty mean that meeting educational expenses, both direct and indirect, is a problem for households. In countries emerging from conflict, such as East Timor, Nepal and Sierra Leone, a number of social protection interventions implemented by the government and non-governmental agencies have focused explicitly on education, including small-scale targeted fee waivers, income support for indirect costs of schooling and school feeding programmes (Holmes and Jackson, 2007; Holmes and Upadhyay, 2009; Pavanello and Othieno, 2008).

Post-conflict contexts also demonstrate the increasing use of conditional and unconditional cash transfers. In Cambodia, cash transfers conditional on sending girls to secondary school resulted in increased enrolment and attendance at programme schools by 30 to 43 percentage points. Recipients were also more likely to be enrolled at any school (not just programme schools) by a margin of 22 to 33 percentage points (Pavanello and Othieno, 2008).

In Afghanistan, the public works component of the National Solidarity Programme, supported by donors and implemented by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development through an extensive network of facilitating partner organisations (mostly NGOs), is reported to have

contributed to the building of new schools which supported the education of ‘thousands of children’ (World Bank, 2009).

Interestingly, Nepal is one of the only case studies in which a national-led safety net was implemented and funded (through taxes) by the government during the conflict and continued (and strengthened) in the post-conflict period (see Annex 1). Nepal also implemented, in collaboration with donors, an education stipend to support Education For All (EFA) objectives. The programme has faced a number of implementation and capacity constraints (discussed below), which have diluted the benefits as well as curtailing the coverage of the support, limiting its effectiveness.

In Sierra Leone, the government’s school fee subsidy for support to girls’ education has increased t girls’ enrolment in secondary education (see Box 3 below). And in post-conflict East Timor, donors supported a range of pro-poor policies in the education sector, including the removal of school and examination fees. These policies were complemented by the removal of school uniforms which, together with school and examination fees, had been identified as the main factors in school dropout for the poorest (Vaux and Visman 2003, cited in Pavanello and Othieno, 2008). In addition, the school year was synchronised with the agricultural cycle, so that children could support their parents during critical times of the year without having to miss school (ibid).

3. Issues in design and implementation

3.1 Design

There are a number of important considerations to take into account in the design of social protection programmes in conflict-affected areas. Here we look at four of them: type of social protection intervention; targeting; length and amount of transfer; and complementary activities.

The *type of social protection intervention* depends on the type of vulnerability or risk being tackled. In humanitarian assistance, food aid has dominated the type of response to meeting immediate needs. Over the past few years, however, experience with different kinds of transfers has emerged, with positive results. Cash transfers and vouchers are increasingly being used by international agencies – and to a lesser extent national governments – to support households to choose their own expenditure priorities, whether these be immediate food needs, meeting the costs of health and education services or investing in economic activities to support livelihoods. In addition to an assessment of the needs of the target population, the design of social protection in conflict-affected countries needs to consider what response is most appropriate to meet its objectives in a context of compromised safety and potential conflict, as well as looking at the necessary supply-side functions. For example, in DRC, Bailey (2009) notes:

'While not conducting a specific risk or conflict analysis, a number of issues were taken into account in the programming design [of the voucher fair]. Concern put particular emphasis on protection, determining through focus groups and discussions with leaders that fairs would not increase risks of theft or violence. Traders were paid in Goma in order to avoid having large amounts of cash transported by vehicles or present at the fair sites. Concern opted against distributing cash because of the potential risks to staff and beneficiaries. Eliminating the option of distributing cash transfers appears to have been a wise decision regarding safety and protection: NGO lodgings were subsequently attacked in the operational area and the vast majority of women interviewed for the evaluation felt that cash could have been stolen or simply lost.'

During the conflict in Somalia, however, despite the risks, it was deemed that cash transfers were an appropriate social protection instrument in terms of safety and the functioning of markets.

In many conflict-affected countries, conditional cash transfers are not appropriate because of limited infrastructure, but they have increasingly been used in post-conflict contexts, for example in Cambodia. In Sierra Leone, a limited bank system outside urban areas presented a challenge to the implementation of school fee waivers but, as the banking network increased, waivers were transferred through these channels, which improved distribution and also transparency (Holmes and Jackson, 2007).

Targeting of social protection interventions is the subject of much discussion and debate in relation to low-income countries, where resources for social protection are scarce but the scale of poverty is large. Two key issues are of particular importance. The first is the policy choice with respect to the objectives of the programme and who the eligible beneficiaries should be. The objectives of social protection programmes are often clear (e.g. increasing household consumption, increasing enrolment in school) but both programme design and choice of eligible beneficiaries are influenced by resource availability. In DRC, for example, the voucher value was \$35, which was sufficient to provide households with access to key items, but with many recipients also buying seeds and tools and paying school fees, the vouchers had to be spread across multiple priorities. Other agencies implementing fairs have been using vouchers of higher value; in Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Solidarités fairs the value is often double that in Concern fairs (Bailey, 2009).

Second, even in peaceful countries targeting can create social tensions. Ellis (2008) describes as a major risk attempts to target the very poorest households which result in the exclusion of those who are only marginally less poor. In conflict-affected countries, targeting issues are especially critical – especially where the conflict has its roots in social divisions (Holmes, 2009) and/or there are tensions between the host community and refugees or IDPs or even returnees. The explicit targeting of vulnerable groups can help to overcome exclusion in some cases, but in others it can entrench and further isolate vulnerable groups (Slater and Farrington, 2009). In post-conflict Sierra Leone, targeting public works programmes to specific groups (mainly young men, ex-combatants) has been used as an attempt to diffuse some potential social tensions; in Nepal, the government has focused on extending the cash transfer programme to excluded minority groups (Holmes and Jackson, 2008; Holmes and Upadhyaya, 2009). However, an evaluation of a cash-for-work programme in Northern Uganda (Kitgum) found that targeting created tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries – and as all communities were affected to some degree it was concluded that the tensions created outweighed the benefits of targeting (distinguishing need) between parishes and villages (McClean et al., 2001).

Broader geographical targeting can overcome these challenges where there are strong spatial poverty patterns (Slater and Farrington, 2009). For example, Bird and Higgins (2009) argue that targeting is necessary in Northern Uganda, where universality of service provision – such as free primary education – does not address interregional imbalances, and where tailored social protection programmes like cash transfers and school feeding programmes are needed to help ‘level the playing field’ in education. This can work only if there is adequate funding for such coverage (Slater and Farrington, 2009). Relief programmes often direct attention in times of conflict to the education of refugee children, partly because of ease (groups of children are together in camps) and also a result of their organisational mandates and perspectives: donors are often reluctant to use emergency funds for what ‘they have chosen to interpret as long-term development activities’ (Machel, 1996). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that, in 2005, at least one-third of camp-based refugee children and adolescents, especially girls, were out of school, having never enrolled or having subsequently dropped out (UNHCR, 2007a, cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010). In settings of internal displacement, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2009) reports that the majority of children had no access to school in 2008,⁴ and there is concern that children who are displaced within their own country as a result of localised, continued armed conflict have less access to education. Even if schools exist, children may not be able to enrol, because they lack proper documentation, are not considered residents of the area or are unable to pay school fees (UNESCO, 2001).

Tensions between refugee and host populations are usually a result of political attitudes, competition over scarce resources, cultural conflicts and security concerns (Dryden-Peterson, 2010). In conflict-affected contexts, the implications of such divisions could be detrimental to the peace process, creating tension between the objective of social protection for poverty reduction and the underlying objectives of supporting the peace process (Holmes, 2009). However, it is likely that some form of targeting will be implemented, given fiscal constraints. As Slater and Farrington (2009) argue, governments and programme implementers need to carefully assess the appropriateness (objectives), feasibility (resources and data) and acceptability (public opinion, potential for creating social tension) of targeting.

Length and amount of transfer: A key concern in the humanitarian sphere is that, in long-running crises, what is designed as a short-term instrument to meet acute needs ends up as an inadequate instrument for meeting long-term needs (Harvey et al., 2007). A concern in the design of social protection programmes and in education programmes in conflict-affected countries is that programmes are too short and have not been conceived and designed to support education across the different phases of the conflict.

⁴ Specific examples are Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Yemen and Zimbabwe, most of which are countries affected by conflict.

Transfer values in the form of cash and vouchers tend to vary project by project. A point from the experience of DRC vouchers is that, although vouchers are an important contribution to household income, households face competing priorities when rebuilding their livelihoods and have to juggle short-term and longer-term investments. The voucher value in this project in DRC was \$35 which, as we have seen, had to be spread across multiple priorities (Bailey, 2009).

Additional *incentives and complementary activities* are also important in the design of social protection programmes in conflict-affected contexts. Demand-side interventions work successfully only when the supply side is in place and functioning effectively. In conflict-affected settings, informal education may be considered an alternative where formal schools are not working, and a number of studies demonstrate the importance of focusing on secondary education as well as primary. Girls often face more challenges in attending school than boys, and this can be exacerbated in emergencies, so additional incentives to send girls to school can be an effective mechanism to overcome both economic and socio-cultural barriers to girls' education (e.g. in Pakistan). Moreover, as conflict creates a 'missing generation,' vocational training linked to public works programmes, for example, can support youth to gain an immediate income from employment as well as providing longer-term skills training. Other programmes, in Sierra Leone for instance, have provided food transfers and training.

Social protection interventions, such as cash transfers, can also provide important opportunities to link to other important child protection services and programme (Jones, 2009). In Nepal, for example, a child grant programme is exploring the option of linking households with birth registration facilities (as is the case in Ghana), which would address an important challenge in conflict-affected contexts, where children are not able to register in schools owing to lost/lack of identification or registration details. In Nepal, parents found that the process of applying for such documentation can take days – and the additional costs associated with the process in terms of travel and lost days of work are often not feasible in the face of short-term immediate needs. Other important linkages can also be created through awareness-raising meetings at the community level, for example around children's and women's rights, including on violence, child labour, early marriage and teenage pregnancy (Jones, 2009).

3.2 Implementation: Actors, delivery and financing

A key challenge in implementing programmes in conflict-affected countries is that governments have limited capacity to provide adequate and quality social services at scale, and are unlikely to have the capacity and funds to provide free and accessible education. Moreover, delivering resources or services is also at risk of being diverted by warring parties or caught up in the dynamics of conflict (Collinson, 2003; Duffield et al., 2000, cited in Harvey and Holmes, 2007).

Implementation and funding bottlenecks reduce the potential impacts of social protection programmes. In Nepal, Ayala (2009) found that the education stipend programme disbursed to the School Management Committees commonly faces severe delays and irregular payments, which have led to increased school dropout rates. Indeed, despite sufficient budgetary allocations for girls in theory, actual allocation of instalments to households throughout the school year tends to decrease, and there is substantial dilution of the actual benefit delivered to beneficiaries. A 2006 evaluation of the education scholarship found that many *Dalit* children were receiving a benefit amount smaller than they should (ibid). The same evaluation found that, in certain areas, (the Karnali Zone and the Eastern and Central Terai), girls' enrolment rates were cause for concern, in part because of lower actual than intended scholarship payment levels, which were not sufficient to offset direct and opportunity costs of schooling.

In many countries, the transition from humanitarian relief to 'sustainable development' is difficult. Low levels of government capacity and reach in conflict-affected communities make it difficult to

transfer service delivery responsibility from humanitarian agencies to local government (Bird and Higgins, 2009). At the same time, it is important to try and work with government structures to ensure scalable and sustainable programmes. Identifying where the points of entry are for working with governments on pro-poor service delivery policies and strategies, including in social protection, even in very weak governments, can help set the policy environment and support more effective coordination between other agencies.

Where government capacity is too limited, alternative coordination mechanisms need to be put in place through either the UN or other umbrella coordination organisations (Carlson et al., 2005). Ample examples exist of NGO-led delivery of social protection programmes during the various phases of conflict but, despite a range of innovative social protection programmes to support education, these are usually short in term and small in scale, with limited coverage. Effective delivery of services in difficult environments requires long-term funding commitments. Different financing mechanisms, such as joint programmes and Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), may provide opportunities to operate on a longer-term basis and at a larger scale, through the provision of predictable funding over time, and may incorporate varying degrees of alignment with government systems and donor harmonisation (Harvey and Holmes, 2007).

In Afghanistan, for example, the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was set up in May 2002 to provide support to Afghanistan's in its recurrent costs, including support to service delivery, investment projects and capacity building, as well as public works programmes through the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). The NSP has received funding from multiple donors of \$940 million, and has benefited about 17 million rural people in all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces through public works projects, including roads to increase access to schools and (re)building school infrastructure.

Non-state actors are likely to play a key role in the provision of social protection, at least in the short term. However, as the case of Afghanistan demonstrates, it is important that donors involve national actors, such as the Ministry of Education, in their education service initiatives, rather than bypassing them. A starting point would be for all assistance to work from the principle that local capacity does exist, be it in communities, civil society or local or national government, and that it is possible that infrastructure will improve enough in the coming years to make such transfers viable (Holmes and Jackson, 2007) (see Box 3 on Sierra Leone).

Box 3: Overcoming implementation challenges of primary and secondary education support in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone has made progress in addressing the education challenges it faced after 10 years of civil war. In 1995, at the start of the civil war, gross primary school enrolment was 53.1%; in 2000, it was 69.5%, leaping considerably to 157.7% in 2007⁵ (World Bank, 2007b).

The primary school fee subsidy was introduced by the government in 1999/00 (during the conflict). Initially, the government passed money through local education secretaries. However, there were problems with money not reaching schools, so a private company (KPMG) was brought in to curb leakages of funds. Now, almost every school has opened a bank account. Challenges remain, such as late delivery of fees, but all regional headquarters have banks (some local areas also have banking facilities) and local governments control the funds. This system has significantly improved the accountability of disbursing the subsidies.

The Sierra Leonean government has officially abolished primary school fees, but local levies are still commonly requested to cover school expenses and provide incentives for teachers to attend (Williamson, 2005). Secondary education is even more expensive: with fees and other costs, such as uniforms, exercise books and other supplies, sending a child to school can total up to \$100 per year (ibid).

The Ministry of Education's Support to the Girl Child programme was set up in 2003/04, two years after the end of the civil war, to distribute the equivalent of Le 250,000 (approximately \$77) per girl per year to support

⁵ In 2007, approximately 30% (240,000) of primary school age children were still out of school, but only an average of 64% were completing their primary education in 2004/05.

their access to secondary education. This included school fees and in-kind assistance such as uniforms and school materials. The programme was targeted at the northern and eastern areas of the country, where enrolment – and particularly girls' enrolment – was very low: enrolment ranged from 75% in the western area to 28% in the northern region, and in 2001 girls' enrolment in the north was 33.6% (Hart, 2009). Later expanding to the other regions, in 2006, the programme aimed to reach a total of 24,144 girls in Junior SS1.

In 2005, a total of 4,975 girls had benefited (Alghali et al., 2005). A 2006 study found that 'the enrolment rate of the girl-child in schools is encouraging, but issues like early and forced marriage, poverty and early pregnancy are threats which (if not immediately and effectively addressed) could negate against their chances of acquiring free basic education by 2015' (Lawrence, 2006).

When the programme started, cash was physically taken to the districts. Ministry of Education staff report that this was an effective way of distributing funds at that time, but that they did not feel very secure carrying large amounts of money around. The package has now been revised, because of the increasing number of children to support: the amount of money per child decreases as school levels increase and cash is now delivered to schools directly through bank accounts, in principle, if not yet universally in practice.

Sensitisation campaigns appear to have been successful, as there is increased demand for the programme, but this comes with serious challenges in relation to how existing Ministry of Education capacity can keep up with increasing numbers. The distribution process has been highly political and time consuming: a big ceremony is held as Ministry of Education staff from Freetown distribute the materials and community representatives come from surrounding areas.

Source: Holmes and Jackson (2007).

4. Conclusions

This background paper has sought to examine the role of social protection in supporting education in conflict-affected contexts. In the context of the three main questions asked at the beginning of the paper the paper has drawn out key lessons as follows.

Is there evidence on the impact of different types of social protection programmes on education in conflict-affected countries?

Although impact evaluations of programmes in terms of education outcomes are limited, some relevant lessons can be drawn out from experiences to date. The first is that income transfers, such as cash grants or cash for work in DRC and Northern Uganda, tend to be used for paying school fees, among other basic household necessities and small-scale productive investments. This is of course dependent on the functioning of the supply-side interventions, but it supports evidence from other recent studies (in stable countries) that have demonstrated that, in the short term, school participation levels rely more on reduced cost of access to education than on improved quality of education services (Pavanello and Othieno, 2008).⁶ Unconditional cash transfers and cash for work have only recently started to be used as an alternative or complementary intervention to food aid, which continues to dominate humanitarian response. This reliance on food aid has owed in part to concerns about the feasibility of delivering cash, including in relation to creating inflation in weak markets, difficulties in targeting and the appropriateness of cash as a social protection instrument. Evaluations of cash transfer projects in Afghanistan, DRC, Somalia and Northern Uganda, however, have suggested cash has had several positive effects. Cash can be more cost effective than in-kind assistance, it can create positive multiplier impacts in local economies and it provides people with greater choice, which can create opportunities for productive investment and spending on key social services. Recipients have overwhelmingly been found to spend cash sensibly, first on immediate basic needs and, if more generous amounts are provided, then on critical investments in livelihoods and in accessing health and education services (Harvey et al., 2007).

Second, food aid responses do continue to contribute a significant proportion of assistance in conflict-affected countries, supporting education through for example school feeding interventions. School feeding programmes are often larger in scale than cash grant schemes, for example reaching 350,000 school children in Afghanistan and 700,000 children in Iraq. However, findings are relatively mixed in terms of their impacts on out-of-school children's enrolment in and attendance at school; also, programmes are targeted primarily on the basis of food vulnerability assessments rather than assessments of schooling needs. Given that fees and other indirect costs for education are major items of expenditure for poor households in conflict contexts (in Sierra Leone, costs of secondary education are up to \$100 per year per student; in Chad, parents finance 80% to 90% of all public education expenditures), fee waivers may have more significant potential, although they have seldom been used (Harvey et al., 2007). In this context, other social protection interventions address education only indirectly – school feeding will provide only a small incentive for out-of-school children, and cash grants or cash-for-work programmes often transfer or pay only a relatively small proportion of household expenditure, which will not significantly offset high education costs. As Heltberg (2007) notes, 'vouchers and fee waivers are well suited in countries where the cash cost of health or education is high and it is imperative to exempt disaster-affected households from those fees.'

Third, many social protection interventions implemented by NGOs are small in scale and short in term, reaching only a few thousand households. Apart from school feeding programmes, very few

⁶ See, e.g., Angrist et al. (2002; 2006); Banerjee et al. (2007); Barrera et al. (2007) in Barrera-Orsorio et al. (2008); He et al. (2007); Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2006) – cited in Pavanello and Othieno (2008).

social protection programmes have an explicit focus on education, although supporting education is seen as an important indirect benefit. Moreover, there is little sustainability or continuity across the phases of conflict, which limits their potential to address significant challenges in the education sector – most notably to ensure that children are enrolled in school and do not drop out. This means supporting households to pay school fees and related indirect costs across all school semesters, and supporting transitions from primary school to secondary school. Where primary schooling is free (e.g. in Uganda), supporting households to meet the indirect costs of education will be crucial (e.g. in Northern Uganda), particularly where fees continue to be levied to provide incentives to teachers and keep schools running in conflict-affected contexts, on top of the cost of uniforms, books, etc. Furthermore, supporting households to send children to secondary school through fee subsidies (e.g. as in the case of in Sierra Leone) is also critical.

Fourth, some programmes have addressed the gender gap by providing specific incentives for girls' schooling, for example through education scholarships in post-conflict Sierra Leone, conditional cash transfers in Cambodia and school feeding programmes in Pakistan, which give extra take-home rations to girls for attendance. However, evidence and data on girls' education demonstrate that their attendance continues to lag behind that of boys and that, in addition to financial incentives to send girls to school, programmes supporting girls' education must recognise and address other social risks and vulnerabilities girls face, such as early marriage and pregnancy (see e.g. Sierra Leone).

Finally, the transition between humanitarian relief and development is critical, but also represents a huge challenge. In Nepal, where social protection programmes were in place during conflict, the post-conflict transition has entailed political will to ensure the sustainability of the existing old age allowance, as well as recently committing additional budget allocations to expanding coverage to ethnically marginalised communities. However, in reality, the implementation challenges and funding bottlenecks from central to local government limit the potential effectiveness of such programmes.

What are the design and implementation challenges of undertaking social protection programmes in conflict and post-conflict settings?

The objectives and the typology for social protection in conflict-affected states are essentially similar to those in development contexts, but it will be necessary to adapt instruments and financing and delivery capacity in social protection to support education during the various phases of conflict, which are likely to be different given the different levels of security, governance capacity, poverty and vulnerability.

As in low-income and stable countries, appropriate social protection interventions must be informed by a risk and vulnerability assessment and analysis. The literature on education in conflict emphasises the need to design education programmes not as short-term relief projects but, from the very beginning of a conflict, as a critically important dimension of national reconstruction. The intermittent disruption to livelihoods and education in protracted crisis highlights the need for continued support rather than short-term ad hoc interventions, and calls for a level of transfer and complementary activities sufficient to meet household needs.

The security and risk environment in which social protection interventions operate in conflict-affected contexts needs to be assessed (e.g. DRC vouchers) before deciding on which type of mechanism is most appropriate. Inherent governance deficits and poorly functioning education systems may be significant constraints to the successful implementation of particular social protection interventions, such as conditional cash transfers. However, such programmes may be an appropriate strategy for expanding enrolment and reducing dropout rates in post-conflict environments.

Important implementation challenges of social protection in conflict-affected states include the limited capacity of government to coordinate and deliver social protection programmes. Donors and international agencies have an important role to play here, but unequal allocation of resources to education across different the phases of conflict is a key challenge, as is a country's capacity to absorb aid. The policy and operational challenge is to provide the appropriate help on the scale and for the duration that it is needed.

Experience from a number of countries demonstrates that, even though implementation and resource constraints arise, education subsidies (e.g. in Sierra Leone, Nepal) can be co-funded by donors and governments and implemented through ministries of education. Experience in Afghanistan also demonstrates the potential for strengthening social protection programmes at scale through existing government capacity, rather than setting up parallel systems. In Afghanistan, the MDTF NSP, worth \$940 million, has benefited (directly and indirectly) approximately 17 million rural people in all 34 of Afghanistan's provinces, through public works infrastructure projects supporting access to schools.

Do social protection programmes in conflict-affected countries need to be designed and implemented differently to those in stable countries?

Policy recommendations to help overcome the challenges of delivering effective social protection for education in conflict-affected contexts include the following.

Education can be supported indirectly through various social protection interventions, but to fully support improvements in children's schooling, offsetting both direct and indirect costs of education must be a key objective.

Interventions must be developed based on criteria that address risk and vulnerability in difficult environments. When defining social protection objectives, donors should analyse the specific context and take into account factors such as efficiency in allocation, quality of services and the ability to guarantee that education services can be delivered and sustained. Evidence from Concern Worldwide in DRC demonstrates that including school fees in voucher fairs, based on prior discussions with the community, represented a very successful inclusion. Risk assessments should also be made when considering the form of social protection, such as cash transfers, for implementation.

Targeting is necessary but decisions need to recognise potential social divisions. Where resources are constrained, there are no easy decisions about the trade-offs between targeting, coverage and levels of benefits (see Slater and Farrington, 2009). Where poverty is widespread and social tensions are fragile, geographical targeting can overcome potential social conflicts arising through targeting some households and not others. Other mechanisms include specifically targeting vulnerable groups to include them in development processes (e.g. marginalised ethnic communities in Nepal).

Simultaneous interventions in the supply side are necessary, and linking complementary activities can further address conflict-related vulnerability. Evidence demonstrates that, in order to be effective, interventions aimed at removing the direct cost of education need to be supported by investment in the provision of services. Promoting access to secondary education, developing age-appropriate educational programmes for out-of-school youth and exploring linkages to complementary services such as civil documentation and programmes to address gender inequality, offer potential avenues for effectively supporting education through social protection interventions.

Long-term funding, institutional coordination and capacity building are needed to deliver sustainable social protection at scale. Post-conflict countries need well-planned and predictable assistance to promote sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction; support for institutions

to provide essential services; and policies and programmes that support the peace process and prevent the country slipping back into conflict (Holmes, 2009). Support to the re-establishment and continuity of education must be a priority strategy for donors and NGOs in conflict and post-conflict situations, and education in emergencies should be seen as a funding priority. There should be interagency coordination to ensure continuity from early in the emergency to the reconstruction phase (UNESCO, 2001). Indeed, setting up institutional and financial interagency arrangements is required to ensure continuity in emergency education programmes, from the immediate humanitarian response to the definition of achievable post-conflict reconstruction programmes based on well-defined priorities.

To support the long-term sustainability of service delivery programmes and the need to build accountable public institutions, donors should involve national actors, such as ministries of education, in their education service initiatives, rather than bypassing them. This is a key challenge, but demonstrates the importance of good coordination and the need for capacity building. Non-state providers are likely to continue to provide a key contribution to pro-poor service provision, and can be very effective in scaling up services and ensuring continuity of education, but it is important that these interventions do not bypass the state. Interventions should be planned from the outset in a way that that can be integrated into the public service delivery track (Pavanello and Othieno, 2008).

Furthermore, government and donors need to support capacity building and strengthening of local government. Building the capacity of state and non-state actors should be integrated into all programmes of work in difficult environments. By including capacity building in service delivery strategies, organisations can incorporate the long-term perspective even while providing short-term interventions.

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Annex 1: Examples of social protection interventions in conflict affected countries

Country	Social protection programme and objectives	Transfer amount	No. of beneficiaries	Implementation	Time scale	Education and health outcomes (where available)
Cash grants and cash for work						
Afghanistan	Cash for work			The National Rural Access Programme, a major government programme, provided a widespread cash for work safety net, funded jointly by several donors.	Response to conflict and drought. Money transfer companies have been used as an innovative way of delivering cash to insecure areas, particularly in southern Afghanistan.	Cash has been used mainly for food and debt repayment, helping to revitalise crucial credit markets.
Afghanistan	Cash for work		7,500 communities.	Government and multiple donors.	Post-conflict, the National Solidarity Programme (started in 2003).	Rebuilding schools.
Burundi	Cash grant as part of repatriation package	50,000 Burundian francs (\$41). A family of five received approximately \$205 after bank fees were subtracted.	150,000 returnees.	Funded by UNHCR and implemented by a micro-lending banking cooperative.	Repatriation of returnees from Tanzania.	Evaluation showed that 1% reported using cash for school fees. There are fee waivers in place for primary and for two years after return for secondary schools. Respondents noted that cash was spent on school uniforms and notebooks.
DRC	Cash for work		455 households.	Save the Children	2002	Cash for work to rebuild schools.
Mozambique	Cash Payments to War-Displaced Urban Destitute	\$3-6 a month.	GAPVU provided small cash transfers to more than	In the 1990s, the government of Mozambique	Post-conflict, implemented by government.	Provided important support to households in need

Country	Social protection programme and objectives	Transfer amount	No. of beneficiaries	Implementation	Time scale	Education and health outcomes (where available)
	Households Programme (GAPVU) targeted at those disabled or displaced by the country's civil war, to reduce destitution in urban centres – changed to Food Subsidy Programme,		70,000 households by 1995.	implemented a successful social transfer programme.	GAPVU replaced after closure in 1997.	– but value of the transfer too small to impact significantly on child well-being.
Somalia	Cash grants and cash for work	One-off \$50.	13,830.	Northern and southern areas: implemented by Oxfam and Horn Relief and funded by Action Contre le Faim (ACF), cash was delivered to beneficiaries using remittance or money transfer companies to minimise security risks.	Ongoing conflict but transfer in response to drought – delivered by non-state actors through remittance companies.	Beneficiaries were found to spend the money on basic consumption needs (food and water), on debt repayments and, if cash transfers were generous enough or timed after harvests, on livestock.
Uganda (Kitgum district)	Cash for work programmes	8,000 households.		Oxfam	2001 in response to ethnic violence	Income spent on food, livestock, basic household utensils, school fees.
Conditional cash transfer						
Cambodia	Conditional cash transfer - Targeted Assistance for Education of Poor Girls and Indigenous Children.	Secondary school scholarship for girls and ethnic minorities ranging from \$45-90 per year.	15,000 children including 13,500 girls and 1,500 boys and girls of ethnic minorities receive a scholarship.	Funded by the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR).	Post-conflict, 2002.	Programme impacts are largest among girls who come from poorer households, have parents with less education and live

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						farther away from a secondary school. The programme appears to have dramatically reduced socioeconomic gradients in enrolment and attendance. Programme effects on enrolment and attendance at programme schools of 30 to 43 percentage points. Recipients were also more likely to be enrolled at any school (not just programme schools) by a margin of 22 to 33 percentage points (Pavenello and Othieno, 2008).
Pension						
Nepal	Social security scheme: pension and allowance for widowed, disabled and endangered indigenous peoples to support family-based support systems.	Rs 500 per month (\$6.40); Rs 1000 (\$12.81) for fully disabled; Rs 300 (\$3.84) for partially disabled.	429,000 (in 2001-2002).	National: delivered three times a year. Policy and coordination by Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare and implemented by Ministry of Local Development.	During conflict and post-conflict: pensions started in 1994; widows allowance in 1997; endangered indigenous groups in 2009.	Not available.

Country	Social protection programme and objectives	Transfer amount	No. of beneficiaries	Implementation	Time scale	Education and health outcomes (where available)
In-kind transfer						
DRC (North Kivu province)	Voucher	Voucher worth \$35.		Concern Worldwide	2008 – in response to escalated violence provoking renewed and widespread displacement.	20% of beneficiaries used vouchers to pay for school fees.
School subsidy						
Nepal	Education stipend to improve education among Dalits and disadvantaged girls.	Rs. 500 (\$6.40) a year.		National: the primary scholarship programme is funded by donors but funds are channelled through the government.	Post-conflict: 2004 ongoing.	Implementation challenges hinder outcomes.
Sierra Leone	In-kind and scholarships for education: access to primary school; Ministry of Education aims to increase access to secondary school for girls.	Ministry of Education distributes equivalent of Le 250,000 per girl per year (\$85).	24,144 girls in Junior SS1 initially in Northern and Eastern provinces.	Ministry of Education, NGOs, faith-based organisations.	Post-conflict. Ministry of Education support to girl child set up in 2004.	Not available.
School fee waiver						
Cambodia	Targeted fee waivers for primary school – Priority Action Programme (PAP).	Reduces the cost burden on the poorest families to increase primary school enrolment through removing registration and other school fees, providing remedial classes, and grants to schools.	Nationwide coverage to 24 provinces and 183 districts.	Government of Cambodia with some components integrated with donors.	Post-conflict, 2000.	Played an important role in the improvement of primary net enrolment rates, but the effectiveness of PAP has been impaired by payment delays from the provincial treasury. School operational budgets have been utilised

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						as intended, but schools report a lack of flexibility in using funds to address specific local needs.
East Timor	Fee waivers and indirect cost exemptions.	Removal of school and examination fees complemented by the removal of school uniforms.		Supported by World Bank	Post-conflict	Removing direct and indirect costs reported as 'successful.'

Sources: Barrientos et al. (2008); Devereux et al. (2005); Harvey (2005); Haver et al. (2009); Pavenello and Othieno (2008).